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Introduction
Willard McCarty
1. The Question in Principle
In his Alfred Korzybski Memorial Lecture, the great neurophysiologist 
Warren McCulloch relates a story from his youth. When in 1917 he entered 
Haverford College, a Quaker institution in the United States, Rufus Jones 
called him in and asked him about his intentions:
‘Warren,’ said he, ‘what is Thee going to be?’ And I said, ‘I don’t know.’ ‘And 
what is Thee going to do?’ And again I said, ‘I have no idea; but there is one 
question I would like to answer. What is a number, that a man may know it, 
and a man, that he may know a number?’ He smiled and said, ‘Friend, Thee 
will be busy as long as Thee lives.’ I have been, and that is what we are about. 
(McCulloch 1988/1960: 2)
Changing what needs to be changed in the above quotation, the central 
complex of questions that work in digital textual studies has been orbit-
ing all these years emerges: his ‘we’ is us, the writers and readers of this 
book, and conjoined to (rather than substituted for) ‘number’, is ‘text’ (and 
so ‘book’). It is this complex of questions that is asked here again by some 
of the leading scholars in the field. What is text that we may read it in all 
its forms and genres, and find meaning in the statistical behaviour of its 
words? What are we that we may find the marks on the pages of books 
intelligible and put them there so that others of our kind may read?
Asking such big questions and claiming, as is so often done, that the 
digital medium has fundamentally altered the conditions for asking them 
are both apt to give pause. Haven’t such questions always been asked or at 
least been implicit in scholarly work? Isn’t the role of the editor much the 
same as it was in ancient Alexandria (and perhaps in even earlier times) 
and then added to in the centuries which followed? Waters muddied by 
decades of hype and kept that way by constant demands for innovation 
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make responding to such reasonable objections quite difficult. Claims of 
revolutionary effects are clearly not good enough; arguments, such as are 
offered here, are badly needed. But neither can the fact of such claiming be 
simply dismissed with some form of the Preacher’s sentence, that ‘there is 
no new thing under the sun’. Change and continuity require each other to 
be meaningful; for both the meaning is in the detail.
Reduction of text to data is a trade-off: manipulability, including quanti-
fication and other transformations, is gained; meaning, and with it ‘context’ 
as a meaningful term, is lost. Effectively all would indeed be lost as far as 
the humanities are concerned if the change were one-way, the machine sub-
stituted for human intelligence. Nothing like that is the case for scholarship. 
Like other tools, computing augments it, gives it greater reach. Further-
more, because the computer is, as we will see, dynamically reconfigurable 
by design, it can in turn be augmented with new intelligence. Computing 
machines and scholarly intelligence change each other, recursively. A per-
fect illustration may be seen in John Burrows’ essay, first in this volume.
What can this recursive machine do with text that is worthy of your 
notice? Let me propose the following features which make a genuine dif-
ference. Chief among these is (1) the automation which brings the time-
scale of forbiddingly laborious tasks within normal human bounds. From 
this fact of temporal advantage the rest can be derived. In particular, (2) the 
capacity to store and retrieve amounts of text large enough to permit access 
to and processing of unread but relevant material gives us the automated 
digital library, which remains an objective of research. On the theoretical 
side is (3) the conceptual language and ultimately software which gives us 
a standard, communicable way of describing processes of interest to us and 
of testing the descriptions, then implementing and distributing them. In 
consequence of the rigours of using this language, which requires complete 
and explicit specification, there arises (4) the struggle to articulate what 
normally goes without saying in our editions and editing practices. The 
mutability if not instability of the digital medium results in (5) the strong 
tendency for scholarship produced with it toward the conversational, 
improvisational and experimental. Hence, (6) the world-wide communica-
tion network implied by the above has developed, and is a necessity for 
exchange of scholarship at a pace commensurate with experimental, often 
collaborative work. 
My principal claim is not about the reality of these features. That, I 
would suppose, is beyond dispute. Rather I claim that they make a genuine 
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difference for two reasons: first, that nothing gets done if it is too laborious 
or time-consuming, and second, that beyond a certain level of complexity 
things begin to happen which could not be predicted logically, though we 
may foresee them. The essays in this volume exemplify and explore these 
differences actually made.
2. The Question Historically Considered
In the early days, when computing was rare within the humanities, it was 
deployed almost exclusively to take the place of long-established manual 
operations. The focus of the majority was on alleviating the burden of 
drudgery, reducing error and increasing the efficiency of scholars’ time. 
A widespread fear of automation in the wider world and the deep worry 
of commentators that new means were obscuring humane ends were 
reflected among textual scholars by the curiously repeated and seemingly 
nervous reassurance that the purpose of the computer was not to replace 
but to support the humanist ‘in the work which only he can accomplish’, as 
Franklin J. Pegues said in a review of the 1964 IBM Conference on Literary 
Data Processing (1965: 107). In a prescient article in the inaugural issue of 
Computers and the Humanities two years later, the literary critic Louis Milic, 
amongst other things, complained that, ‘satisfaction with such limited 
objectives denotes a real shortage of imagination among us. We are still not 
thinking of the computer as anything but a myriad of clerks or assistants in 
one convenient console’ (1966: 4). 
As in artificial intelligence and machine translation, early humanists 
began the 1960s with stirring visions and early successes only to plough 
into a morass of difficulties by mid decade. Then began the characteristic 
cycle of sifting for that which we now call ‘evidence of value’. In 1976 – to 
choose one example out of many – the Aquinas scholar Roberto Busa noted 
the ‘rather poor performance’ of literary computing that had resulted from 
pursuing such limited objectives as Milic identified. To him the failure to 
do better pointed back to a profound ignorance of language, of ‘what is in 
our mouths at every moment’, and so to the need for fundamental research. 
Similarly, in an oft-cited article published two years later, Susan Wittig 
(1978) examined Margaret Masterman’s stirring vision of a ‘telescope of the 
mind’ (Masterman 1962), observing how far short of it scholars had come. 
Like Jerome McGann more recently (2004b), she concluded that the fault 
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lay with an utterly inadequate conception of text and recommended, like 
Busa, fundamental research into the question of what it is.
In the digital humanities ideas and machines interact asynchronously 
to deepen the fundamental problems, rather than solve them. While the 
revolution proclaimed for computing has turned out to be more a going 
around in circles than a liberation from the hard slog of scholarship, what 
matters for research is the nuclear bundle of questions that governs the 
orbital path. To be fair, the revolutionary path isn’t a closed circle either. 
Our accumulating body of work demonstrates that it’s more of a spiral. But 
paying attention to the forward-pointing axis means minding the questions 
at the centre. 
3. The Contents
Seven of the nine essays collected here originated as papers delivered at 
the London Seminar in Digital Text and Scholarship from Autumn 2006 to 
Spring 2008. The remaining two essays were commissioned to complete the 
volume. Altogether the collection is arranged in two parts, the parts united 
by the question of text though divided by the perspectives they take on it.
The first part is analytic and microscopic, with a focus on text as a fun-
damentally probabilistic medium whose hidden devices the patient use of 
statistical tools is allowing us gradually to unravel, and so giving us new 
understanding of our relation to language. The second part is synthetic 
and macroscopic, concerned with how the digital medium affects, reflects 
and bodies forth ideas of textuality, and especially concerned with its trans-
forming potential in both scholarly and popular genres. In both parts, con-
tributors probe how what we thought we safely knew or had in hand, dis-
integrates when seen from the digital perspective, and places us, scholars, 
not merely in the position of witnesses and guessers but in the role of mak-
ers, for whom the emergent potentialities of the medium constitute essen-
tial information. As one of the authors, Alan Galey, points out, ‘The digital 
humanities’ most productive response […] has been to ask ‘why speculate 
when we can prototype?’ – that is, to regard the future of the book as some-
thing we create, not just observe and comment upon.’ (p. 108). Scholars are 
becoming end-makers rather than mere end-users of digital tools.
In the first part of this volume we hear from both sides of the same 
question – from two literary scholars engaged with the empirical aspects 
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of writing (Burrows and Lancashire) and a cognitive neurologist, trained 
in the Classics, who studies literature in English (Garrard). The humanities, 
we know, do not progress by turning the uncertain into the certain, rather 
the opposite. But quantitative, even scientific approaches to the study of 
text, as here, while they provide an ever firmer basis for investigation of 
literature’s relationship to the creatures we are, also pry open cans of won-
derfully wriggly worms.
The essays of the second part place us imaginatively in the messy work-
shops, editorial workspaces and seminar rooms where experiments in the 
design of digital genres are taking place. We are made privy to the argu-
ments, far from settled, indeed digitally unsettled, about what exactly it 
is that we think we are doing with texts. We are disabused of the silly but 
persistent notion that a solid, well-understood but obsolete physical object, 
the codex book, is being replaced ‘real soon now’ by another not so solid, 
not so well-understood but fabulously better object, the e-book, electronic 
newspaper or, in the case of textual scholarship, the digital edition. We 
are brought up against not only undoubted change but also uncertain and 
highly contingent outcomes. We are, by the uncertainty of it all and by its 
dependence on human choice as well as historical accident, invited to par-
ticipate in the shaping of the future. The last 60 years of work with digital 
text inform the arguments of the contributors to this volume and remind us 
how much goes into the cultural assimilation of technical inventions.
3.1. Analysis of Text
In ‘Never Say Always Again’ John Burrows, the pre-eminent scholar of 
computational stylistics in the Anglophone world, reflects on ‘the numbers 
game’ by presenting three case studies to illustrate his most recent meth-
ods for discriminating authorship. His title-word ‘game’ is worth noting 
as a clue to his working method, which is experiment-like and seriously 
playful in its recursive alternation of statistical trials and literary-critical 
judgement. He says, without fanfare, ‘that work by different authors, 
work in different genres, work of different eras, work in different national 
forms of English can all comprise statistically distinguishable groups’ (p. 
28). It is difficult to overestimate the significance of this statement, which 
announces the probabilistic quality of literature. We know from research 
in natural language processing that probabilistic methods have proven 
highly successful in automatic treatment of ordinary human discourse (cf. 
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Manning and Schütze 1999). However, we also know anecdotally and by 
studying linguistic corpora that such discourse is highly repetitive, and so 
we might be inclined to dismiss the success of probabilistic methods as 
trivial. But Burrows shows that the most artfully crafted prose, however 
much the variatio sermonis may have been the author’s intention, yields to 
statistical methods at the deepest levels we know how to reach. Ian Hack-
ing’s The Taming of Chance, which Burrows cites, begins by declaring with 
equally quiet authority that ‘[t]he most decisive event of twentieth century 
physics has been the discovery that the world is not deterministic’, that 
its principles of order are stochastic (1990: 1). In Mind and Nature Gregory 
Bateson argues that culture is transmitted by ‘a sort of hybrid or mix-up’ of 
replication and learning, and that learning ‘gathers its solutions’ out of the 
random play of the world (2002: 45). In other words, in terms of our subject, 
literary texts emerge from this mix-up of mimesis and random opportunity, 
hence are accessible stochastically, and hence are real as the physical world 
itself is. Burrows raises the troubling question of confidence – how much 
can we place in statistical analysis? Here is the beginning of an answer.
In ‘Cybertextuality by the Numbers’ Ian Lancashire constructs a theory 
of authoring from a synthesis of cybernetics, writers’ self-testimony, cogni-
tive psychology and computational text-analysis. The core of his argument, 
and a most valuable contribution to this volume, comes with his conclusion 
that authors, and so our species, have been able to overcome basic limita-
tions of the human mind by means of writing. ‘We have’, he says, ‘unrelent-
ingly developed both cognitive and mechanical technologies consciously 
so as to gain control of our making’ (p. 69). He uses computational models 
and tools to frame the problem of how writing happens and to provide a 
means of detecting evidence for the role it plays in human development. 
The cybernetic idea of the feedback loop, he argues, allows us to explain in 
detail how text is so much more than marks on the page. It is, among other 
things, an Engelbartian technology of augmentation, a creative extension 
beyond nature by means of art, and so creative of a new nature (Engelbart 
1962). Nevertheless the phenomenology of tool-use as a whole for example 
in the writings of Michael Polanyi (1969) and, more recently, Walter Vin-
centi (1990), is highly relevant and helps to connect cybertextuality with a 
broad range of work elsewhere. 
Following the classical approach of physiological research – to investi-
gate a function of the body by studying a relevant pathology – Peter Gar-
rard describes how the loss of structure and organization in consequence of 
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Alzheimer’s, reflected in degeneration of linguistic abilities, may be used to 
infer the nature of healthy cognition. As a case study he describes research 
into the possible effects of Alzheimer’s on the final novel of Iris Murdoch, 
Jackson’s Dilemma, which presents a rare opportunity to study textual 
pathology before the author herself could have been aware of its effects and 
to compare the text against a large corpus of work very close to the author’s 
original manuscripts. This is, Lancashire notes, ‘a uniquely important case 
study’ highlighting the modularity of mental language processing and, in 
this case, the working memory central to his study (p. 44). Garrard consid-
ers the criticisms and arguments surrounding Jackson’s Dilemma carefully, 
but he finds both by a systematic top-down analysis from his hypotheses to 
the data, and by a bottom-up, data-driven approach, striking confirmations. 
In a nutshell, Garrard provides a fine instance, refreshingly clinical, of the 
fact that text embodies embodied thought.
3.2. Synthesis of Textual Genres
The particular focus of this volume’s second half is the macroscopic or tel-
escopic view from textual data to the forms we give them. 
Alan Galey, in ‘The Human Presence in Digital Artefacts’, argues that this 
view begins with the tensions ‘between the surface orderliness of scholarly 
resources and the stubborn irregularity of textual materials’ (p. 93). These 
tensions are the daily concern of textual editors but not usually of their schol-
arly clientele, let alone the reading public. They reveal not only that any inter-
face is cognitively thick and complex in proportion to the text it re-presents, 
but also that textual irregularities can never be completely modelled for or 
by computer processing. Models in the sense intended here, as elsewhere 
in the digital humanities, always simplify by omission of that which others 
may regard as important, and so are never all-encompassing. Galey shows 
that the technical concerns of design are inseparable from the irresolvable 
aesthetic, symbolic and hermeneutical dimensions of editorial work. Thus, 
he argues, there can be no definitive digital resource, no digital monument 
against time, not even in the sense of a single modelling device. Galey’s argu-
ment from these stubborn irregularities, from what text is, concludes in an 
invitation to us to become (as I am fond of saying) end-makers in the design-
ing of digital genres. As the great Australian ethnographic historian Greg 
Dening used to insist (1998), the point is to think present-participally rather 
than nominally – of the future of textual editing as a communal process.
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Edward Vanhoutte’s declared purpose in ‘Defining Electronic Editions: A 
Historical and Functional Perspective’ is to propose a definition of what an 
electronic edition is, and to frame it in terms of work done to date. Against 
the background of the history of electronic textual editing, he discusses 
Peter Robinson’s model of cooperative, distributed editions and Peter Shil-
lingsburg’s knowledge sites (both discussed in following chapters), Espen 
Ore’s self-sufficient archive and both Robinson’s and Jerome McGann’s 
models of the reproductive edition. Vanhoutte’s defining method for the 
electronic edition follows from an application of Espen Aarseth’s taxonomy 
of how texts are traversed. (Again, note the significant emphasis on readerly 
process rather than structural product.) The typologies inherited from edi-
tions in print do not suit the digital environment but offer a way forward. 
He speaks in combinatorial terms, of a set of interoperable tools the end-
user would deploy to construct ‘new genres of editions’. The question of 
what these genres might be reflects back on the question of what text is that 
allows it to be edited. The design of tools raises the question of operational 
primitives – or, less problematically, of commonplace operations discov-
ered in practice, as (one suspects) most tools have been.
Peter Robinson’s practical work over many years itself constitutes the 
raw material for an historical study of how ideas for editing in the dig-
ital medium have developed. His chapter for this volume, ‘A specification 
towards distributed editions’, thus represents as much experience with the 
conceivable alternatives as anyone could muster. Here he specifies what 
might be required to create the ‘fluid, cooperative and distributed’ schol-
arly editions that many scholars, such as Peter Shillingsburg in the fol-
lowing essay, have advocated. He proposes specific mechanisms to label 
components of such an edition, outlines how these components should be 
held on distributed-edition servers and how software tools on the reader’s 
computer and on the server might interact. He sketches out the functional-
ity readers and scholars require. In appendices he gives instances of how 
attributes of distributed editions may be used by various projects, describes 
the relations of components and discusses stand-off encoding, which Paul 
Eggert takes up in a following chapter. The manifest failure of the stan-
dalone ‘e-book’ to replace the printed codex, as Robinson illustrates in an 
opening anecdote, and the manifest success of distributed online resources 
lend strong support to his argument.
In ‘How Literary Works Exist: Implied, Represented and Interpreted’ 
Peter Shillingsburg writes as a digitally informed scholarly bibliographer 
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and book historian with four decades of practical experience and theoreti-
cal reflection. His is a critical activist’s project to tease out the nature of tex-
tual existence and representation in order to address not so much a digital 
future for the book but the future of the book in a digital world. He begins, 
then, where one must – with the codex, recipient of nearly two millennia 
of creative attention. He sees that, on the one hand, speculations about and 
experiments with the tools are weak and rootless without detailed knowl-
edge of the book as it has been; and that, on the other hand, textual edi-
tors face an unavoidable challenge to migrate their skills and concerns to 
the digital medium. He takes the incursion of digital representation into 
textual editing as an urgent opportunity for understanding the book as 
a physical object, medium of communication and locus of understanding. 
The ontological question of what text is, he reminds us, may in its abstract 
formulation turn us away from the prior question of how we in fact actually 
encounter text and what the form of the codex has shown itself capable of 
doing. (Here practice corrects theory and forces us to revise it for another 
go at the stubborn truth of things.) He concludes that we should acknowl-
edge editing as an attempt to deal with complex materials in a wide variety 
of ways; that editing in the digital world should serve as a foundation to be 
maintained and extended; and that a large and future community of schol-
ars can contribute to basic, ongoing editorial work communally. 
In ‘Text as Algorithm and as Process: A Critique’, Paul Eggert orbits the 
basic problem that complete explicitness and absolute consistency pose for 
representation and manipulation of cultural artefacts. The twin computa-
tional demand stirs up fundamental questions for the prospect of a digital 
edition, the central one being, he notes, what are texts and how do they 
function? Since text-encoding is central to edition-making, at least now and 
for the foreseeable future, the imperative to ask this question is undeniable, 
since every tag, however factual, signifies an interpretative intervention. 
‘We have to think about text, its material condition and its reception if we 
are to understand what it is that we are encoding when we say that we 
are encoding texts.’ He takes strong issue with Jerome McGann’s notion of 
the ‘bibliographic code’, arguing that there is no such renderable system of 
signifiers. However useful as a metaphor for thinking about and discuss-
ing textual features, there is nothing computationally tractable beyond it. 
(Here computational experience corrects theory and, as before, forces us 
to revise it for another go.) The full reality of text will always be elusive. 
He asks, how can we stabilise this fluid, ever-changing reality so that we 
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can discuss texts and not just ourselves? Since totalising schemes of encod-
ing can never be implemented, stand-off markup (which Eggert and col-
leagues at the University of New South Wales have pioneered) seems the 
best answer. The strategy he recommends then, is, like Shillingsburg’s and 
Robinson’s, communal, though the means of achieving it may be different 
as there is a need to provide an effective means for coordinating the many 
possible versions of the common source of interest: the work. The resulting 
artefact, one might say, would resemble the ancient variorum commentary, 
with superior organizational capabilities and collaborative distribution of 
work but the same objective of progressive accumulation.
The volume ends with a bridging study which takes us from the strug-
gles of scholarly editing in academia to the struggles of newspaper publish-
ing in daily life. Marilyn Deegan and Kathryn Sutherland, in ‘“I Read the 
News Today, Oh Boy!” Newspaper publishing in the online world’, high-
light the problem common throughout this volume: how the shift in media 
disintegrates everything concerned – understandings, behaviours, objects, 
institutions. Deegan and Sutherland chart ‘a gradual decoupling of news 
from paper and print, with […] hybrid signs of both experiment and formal 
nostalgia’ along the way. Some reformations of old forms make obvious 
sense and find acceptance; others seem emotional curiosities. Deegan and 
Sutherland chart the shift from mass collective identification via a product 
constructed by expert editorial teams to mass individuation of dynamically 
constructed units of what is individually taken to be news. They consider 
what is gained and what is lost, and how reading habits are reforming – 
the habits, one might note, of those who also read literary works and use 
textual editions. ‘What has changed’, they conclude, ‘is the scale and the 
fine-tuning of the newspaper’s functions as its economies and its implied 
reading culture shift from paper to screen and as its conceptual model sets 
a standard for the electronic delivery of other textual forms than those asso-
ciated with the news.’
4. The Future
Scholarly writings in which the computer figures tend to remind us indi-
rectly if not directly that, as mathematicians have also discovered, to com-
pute is to intervene in the world and so to bring ideas and arguments up 
against stubborn actualities. We soon learn that our obviously meaningful 
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texts are to a significant extent beyond the processing abilities of the best 
machines we can devise or seem likely to devise. From the rigorous per-
spective of programming languages all of what one wants to do must be 
completely and consistently spelled out. But when it comes to text, we learn, 
it cannot be and will not be. The puzzle from the readerly perspective of 
the scholar is more that these fundamentally mathematical machines are as 
effective as they are turning out to be: ‘unreasonably effective’, as Eugene 
Wigner (1960), then Richard Hamming (1980) noted about mathematics 
itself in relation to the world we call real. 
In the days when most of the authors and the editor of this volume 
were imprinted by computing (as the OED says of social animals, brought 
to ‘a state of habitual recognition of or trust in another’) user and computer 
were separated in space by a glass wall, input/output desk or other insu-
perable barrier, and in time, by hours or days of waiting for one’s printout 
to be delivered. This is essentially the situation depicted in 1950 by Alan 
Turing for his famous test of machine intelligence (1950: 433-4) and by John 
Searle thirty years later for his equally famous Chinese Room argument 
(1980). Thus when computing, with the practical realities of its use, was 
compared with the codex as a new ‘machine to think with’ (Richards 1924: 
1), it did rather poorly. It proved to be at best something on the side of 
the main action, a useful auxiliary device for certain highly limited kinds 
of investigation (often called drudgery), and simply unable to match the 
referential subtlety of a well-crafted edition in print. This is not, however, 
what computing is now, and not the computing that the authors in this vol-
ume address. Progress, intruding into the humanities, has brought us to a 
new place from which to consider and redefine old problems. 

1. Never Say Always Again: 
Reflections on the 
Numbers Game1
John Burrows
For Harold Love: Vale.
In order to ‘place’ my argument, I declare myself, first and last, a student of 
English literature. I took up computing because it seemed likely to answer 
some of my questions. Perhaps it has, but only by opening up a thousand 
more. My object in this paper is to look back at the quarter-century I have 
spent in computational stylistics and to consider what such work entails. I 
must speak, accordingly, with some generality: yet I am neither a theorist 
nor a philosopher. Our heuristic procedures have much in common with 
those of experimental science: yet I am no scientist and have never claimed 
that work like mine lay in that domain. What I have to say is not offered 
as an apologia: yet I would like, if I can, to allay the doubts that such work 
arouses in many of our colleagues and to face some of the questions that 
they raise. 
1 This paper was originally given at King’s College, London, 25 October 2006, as 
the third biennial Wisbey Lecture and the Inaugural Lecture for the London Semi-
nar in Digital Text and Scholarship, Institute of English Studies, University of Lon-
don. The biennial Wisbey Lecture was initiated by Harold Short to honour the pio-
neering work of Roy Wisbey in the field of humanities computing. It is a pleasure 
to bring their names together and to acknowledge their successive achievements in 
and far beyond King’s College.
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1. Three Case Studies
I shall begin with an account of three cases where my tests seem to indi-
cate that a particular text had two identifiable authors. Here, as also with 
parody and pastiche, the problem of attribution can be more delicate than 
usual. But if problems like these can be successfully resolved, we are better 
placed to handle the suggestion that a text is ‘contaminated’ whether that 
suggestion arises in reality or is introduced as a skeptical gambit.
In the first two cases, my results concur with well-founded documen-
tary evidence. The third case is more contentious because the work in ques-
tion has always been regarded as having a single known author. While 
these cases will occupy us for a little while, they are offered as preamble for 
a broader question. It was put to my friend and colleague, Hugh Craig, in a 
letter from an eminent Shakespeare scholar: How much confidence should 
I place in a result like this? 
The question quite transcends its immediate occasion and goes to the 
heart of our whole endeavour. It should, I suggest, evoke a sense of schol-
arly obligation on both sides. It is always incumbent upon those who 
introduce new methods to proceed cautiously, to work with rigour, and to 
present their findings as plainly as they can. As we advance, it is increas-
ingly incumbent upon other scholars in the humanities to put aside any 
instinctive aversion for unfamiliar forms of inquiry. Both parties can unite 
in an awareness that new methods are not always appropriate and that, 
like old ones, they can be misused. 
The first of my three case-studies concerns St. Ives. When Robert Louis 
Stevenson died in 1894, his unfinished manuscripts included thirty chap-
ters — over a hundred thousand words — of a romance about a French 
prisoner of war in Napoleon’s day. After escaping from Edinburgh Cas-
tle, the eponymous hero goes into England to claim his inheritance from 
a dying uncle, a wealthy grandee of the ancien regime. Our hero then quix-
otically returns to Scotland to clear his name and claim the hand of his 
beloved. Back in Edinburgh after many an astonishing escapade, he is 
stranded by the author’s untimely death. He is rescued by Arthur Quiller 
Couch (1863-1944), who added thirty thousand words and saw the whole 
work published in 1897. While it is a lively specimen of an adventure story, 
both authors give it an extravagantly mock-heroic air. Whenever St Ives 
blunders, his enemies are at the ready. Whenever he is most in need, the 
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very man he needs is waiting round the corner. Not so much a subversion 
of the genre as a mildly ‘camped-up’ version of it.
As a framework of comparison for determining whether it is possi-
ble to show who wrote which part of St. Ives, I began with a 72,000-word 
sample from the novels and stories of each target-author. All of this mate-
rial was downloaded from the Project Gutenberg.2 It was supported by 
12,000-word samples from the work of thirty other authors born within 
forty years before and forty after Stevenson’s own date of birth. In each 
case, the selection drew on at least three pieces by a given author. These 
thirty selections came from our own archive, entered by keyboard over the 
years. Apart from all this were two samples of narrative by Stevenson and 
Quiller Couch selected from works not used above. They, too, came from 
the Gutenberg Project and incorporated about thirty thousand words by 
each author. Like St. Ives, all the samples chosen were of retrospective first-
person narrative. All told then, the main set runs to half a million words 
by thirty-two authors. The two independent samples run to another sixty 
thousand and St. Ives itself to one hundred and thirty-five thousand.
Using standardized word-frequencies in order to allow the other thirty 
authors equal play with the target-authors, I constructed a ranked list of the 
three hundred most frequent words of all. The top two hundred included 
few lexical words and were put to most use in my tests. Neither St. Ives 
itself nor the two independent samples participated in the formation of 
the word-list. Contrary to my former practice, I did not introduce tags to 
distinguish homographic forms from each other.
Using the software package Excel, a work-sheet for the statistical test I 
have called Delta3 was then set up to compare St. Ives with the thirty-two 
members of the main set. It suffices for the moment to recall that, as used 
here, Delta scores register differences between a target-text and the several 
members of a group of genuine or notional candidates for its authorship. 
The lowest score in a set marks the least difference. When (as in the present 
case) the set is large enough, the scores can be converted into z-scores. These 
have a mean of zero and diverge from it in units of standard deviation. It 
follows that the strongest negative z-score in a set marks the least of all the 
differences. Scores ranging out below about –1.5 usually repay attention.
2  http://www.gutenberg.org/wiki/Main_Page [accessed 10/2/10].
3  The calculation and use of Delta scores and Delta z-scores have been shown 
elsewhere and their high but not unfailing reliability has been assessed. See Bur-
rows (2002, 2003) and Hoover (2004). For a part-precursor, see Forsyth, Holmes, 
and Tse (1999, 393).
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The two hundred most frequent words made the final set of variables. 
The target-text, St. Ives, was broken into successive ‘rolling segments’ of 
six thousand words, with increments of a thousand words. This allows us 
to model a reader’s progress through the text while testing authorship at 
each step. It is as if we were to move through the calendar year, registering 
rainfall for successive six-month periods — January through June, Febru-
ary through July, March through August, and so on. In its 135,000 words, St. 
Ives offers 129 segments of this kind.
Figure 1 offers Delta z-scores for the differences, in each of 129 rolling 
segments of St. Ives, between that text and our thirty-two authors. The 
entries for Stevenson and Quiller Couch run across the foot of the chart, 
outside the cloud of other entries. One of the two leads the whole field 
in every one of the 129 results and his rival usually lies second. (Harriet 
Beecher Stowe and an Australian, Louis Becke, trail the field.) The only 
challenger worth naming is Anne Bronte, but even she barely impinges 
on the scores for the main pair. The strength of the result is emphasised by 
the fact that, at each step, the lowest z-score almost always lies below – 2.0. 
Save for a lapse at Segment 34, Stevenson easily leads the whole field for 
the first ninety-eight segments. After that, the lead passes to Quiller Couch, 
who holds it without challenge. This pattern exactly matches what we know 
— that Stevenson wrote the first thirty chapters and Quiller Couch the rest.
Figure 1. St. Ives and thirty-two authors. 
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The scores for Quiller Couch in both phases are worth more thought. 
Since he has no role whatever in the first thirty chapters of St. Ives, the fact 
that he often ranks next after Stevenson shows that his usual fictional style 
is much like that of St. Ives. And yet it is even more like our main sample 
of Stevenson, zigging where that zigs and zagging where it zags. St. Ives 
is least different from both writers in its passages of vigorous action. It 
differs less from others when dialogue supervenes. Segment 34, where it 
differs more from Stevenson than from Quiller Couch, is a long passage 
of reflection and description as the hero is travelling alone down the Great 
North Road. Much the same note is struck, as we shall see, in some of Ste-
venson’s sombre, introspective tales. It is also to be heard now and then in 
his romances, as when Jim Hawkins first goes ashore on Treasure Island 
and when David Balfour thinks himself marooned. But the more charac-
teristic passages in St. Ives, those where the Delta z-scores approximate to 
–3.00, are the prisoners’ duel in Edinburgh Castle and some of the more 
perilous moments of the hero’s travels. All this suggests that Quiller Couch 
was always a most appropriate author to carry on where Stevenson broke 
off. He certainly persisted in a mock-Stevensonian vein in later work like 
Poison Island (1912), where a sybaritic recluse lures treasure-hunters to their 
deaths on his private Caribbean island.
In the second phase of the novel, where Quiller Couch takes over, his 
Delta z-scores approach –3.00, receding slightly at the end. Those for Ste-
venson recede considerably but remain comparatively strong. Quiller 
Couch’s St. Ives, in other words, remains very much his own. Yet it is a 
good enough imitation to stand nearer to Stevenson overall than to any of 
our other thirty writers.
The salient feature of Figure 1 is the sharp transition from Segment 98 
on. 
Our second case-study shows quite another pattern. Its subject is a 
novel called The Boy in the Bush (1924), which has an unusual history. The 
main outcome of D. H. Lawrence’s visit to Australia in the early twenties 
was Kangaroo (1923), a powerful but turgid novel about a right-wing politi-
cal movement of the day. But when he and his wife Frieda arrived, they met 
Mollie Skinner, a nurse in a convalescent home near Perth. A part-time nov-
elist, she asked him to read a manuscript of hers. This was later to appear 
as Black Swans (1925). After reading it , he suggested that she try a new, less 
sentimental direction and agreed to help her bring the resulting work to 
publication. When her typescript reached him in America the next year, he 
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not only began to tinker with the text but continued so vigorously that the 
novel is included in the Cambridge edition of his works as being by ‘D. H. 
Lawrence and M. L. Skinner’. Its editor, Paul Eggert, shows that the deci-
sion is well founded. The question for us is not whether the work is collabo-
rative but whether we can trace a more complex collaborative pattern than 
that presented by St. Ives. Nothing of Mollie Skinner’s typescript is known 
to exist. But Eggert uses the evidence of the letters they exchanged, of Law-
rence’s autograph copy of the whole work, of two revised proof-copies, and 
of Lawrence’s known habits of revision to claim it as ‘a Lawrence novel’ 
(Eggert 1990: liii). Eggert shows that, besides introducing an important 
change of direction towards the end, Lawrence added two closing chapters 
of which Mollie Skinner disapproved. Beyond this, he suggests that Law-
rence made extensive changes throughout. The overall effect is to give a 
sort of colonial Bildungsroman a strong infusion of the idiosyncratic desert 
mysticism preoccupying Lawrence at that time.
Apart from the change of target-text, the only underlying difference 
between Figure 2 and Figure 1 is that long extracts from Lawrence’s Kanga-
roo (61,125 words) and Skinner’s Black Swans (51,014 words) take the place 
of Stevenson and Quiller Couch. The other thirty authors stand unchanged 
and the same word-list is used. Since both Lawrence and Mollie Skinner 
are of an age with the later-born members of the main set, the set fits them 
a little less well than it fitted Stevenson. But the advantage of close replica-
tion prevailed.
Partly, perhaps, for that reason the lowest range of Delta z -scores in 
Figure 2 runs out beyond –3.00. But Lawrence is always more idiosyncratic 
than most. In this work, moreover, there is much of the strong vernacu-
lar that colours Black Swans and Kangaroo and so draws them closer to it. 
This interpretation is supported by the fact that, of the other thirty authors, 
Emily Bronte is nearest to The Boy in the Bush while Edgar Allan Poe’s high 
old-fashioned style stands at the opposite extreme.
Of the thirty-two authors studied, one or other of the two collaborators 
is least far from The Boy in the Bush in all 130 segments. That is as it should 
be. But, in a pattern quite different from Figure 1, the scores for the two 
of them keep criss-crossing and are often sharply opposed. Mollie Skin-
ner has much of the running in the middle of the novel. Lawrence has the 
ascendancy not only in those later passages where he is known to have 
taken the initiative but also in the opening chapters. All this is in line with 
Paul Eggert’s evidence and in close keeping with his conclusions.
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There are nevertheless some segments where the collaborators stand 
close to each other. This is the product, I suggest, of a particular level of 
revision where the changes are such that neither author’s frequency-pat-
tern is able to prevail over the other. At such moments, moreover, as around 
Segments 73, 95, and 119, the difference between our two known authors 
and Emily Brontë is at its least. If one composes artificial models, hybrid 
frequency-profiles, to which each collaborator contributes in designed pro-
portions, the effect is to overlay the distinctive frequency-patterns of both 
authors. As the proportions are gradually altered to favour either author, 
the favoured one eventually prevails. But there can sometimes be transi-
tional stages in which the two authors are not easy to distinguish from each 
other. At just such stages, quite other writers, with no claim at all to the 
authorship of the target-text, sometimes outscore them both. 
The argument so far can be summed up in general terms. In ordinary 
single author works of sufficient length, the frequency patterns fluctuate 
from episode to episode or segment to segment as the text goes forward. 
Such fluctuations are governed by shifts of style as from action to descrip-
tion or from narrative to dialogue. Stevenson’s part of St. Ives, as repre-
sented in Figure 1, is a fair specimen. It converges on and diverges from our 
main set of Stevenson’s fiction but almost always stands nearer to Steven-
son than to any of the other thirty-one authorial sets. 
Figure 2. The Boy in the Bush and thirty-two authors.























Figure 2. The Boy in the Bush and thirty-two authors. 











Plates 1 and 2 (opposite). Henry James, The American (1877).
Specimen of light revision (plate 1) and heavy revisions
 (plate 2) for the New York edition (1907).
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Texts of a second kind, where one author seeks to imitate another can 
also be expected to fluctuate in the same fashion. But whether or not a close 
resemblance to the original is achieved, there is no inherent reason for any 
high level of inconsistency as the text goes forward. The imitator’s render-
ing will reproduce or exaggerate some features of the original, overlook 
some others, and preserve many of his or her own idiosyncrasies. Quiller 
Couch’s section of St. Ives shows a closer affinity for his main text than 
for Stevenson’s. Some other imitator might come closer to the target. But, 
either way, an essentially uniform rendering of the original is likely to per-
vade the whole. 
Texts of a third kind, where an existing work is extensively revised, are 
likely to fluctuate more violently than either of the other kinds. Figure 2 
reflects a typically inconsistent pattern of events in which Lawrence, like 
other revisers, makes few changes here and more there, sometimes leav-
ing a passage almost untouched, sometimes inserting a passage of his own. 
Whereas many revisers weary of the task and emend more lightly as they 
proceed, Lawrence remains assiduous, making some of his greatest and 
best attested changes towards the end. Yet there are segments where he 
seems to have let Mollie Skinner’s version stand with little or no alteration. 
Most authors are obliged to accept the pervasive but comparatively 
slight changes introduced by publishers’ and printers’ house-styles. Few 
are willing to accept wholesale changes by another author. But something 
comparable occurs when Henry James, in his mid-sixties, revises novels 
he had written up to thirty years before. The Scolar Press facsimile of The 
American is a fine specimen, in which both versions can be seen at once. The 
facsimile is of a large workbook, now held in the Houghton Library, into 
which James pasted each page of the 1877 edition of the novel. He had 
returned to it thirty years after it appeared in order to revise it for the great 
New York edition of his fiction. By this time, as is well known, his style 
had altered greatly — so greatly, in fact, that, on tests like mine, his late 
novels could almost be the work of a different author. These are matters on 
which David Hoover is currently working. For our immediate purpose, it is 
enough to offer samples of the different levels of intervention that occurred 
as James worked through his old text in order to make it new. Plates 1 and 
2 show the difference between lighter and heavier revision. In other places, 
pages of the original text are completely replaced by passages of manu-
script or typescript. The varying levels of change observe no logic but that 
of the reviser’s preference.
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Taking the preceding discussion as a framework, we can turn to our 
third case-study. The text in question is The History of Ophelia (1760), a novel 
that has always been attributed to Sarah Fielding, younger sister of Henry 
Fielding. The case for her authorship is not supported by the title-page, 
where ‘by the author of David Simple’, her usual phrase, gives way to ‘pub-
lished by the author of David Simple’. In her Advertisement, moreover, she 
actually disclaims authorship, saying that she found it in ‘an old Buroe’ and 
published it. The phrase used on the title-page has been treated as an incon-
sequential variation upon the expressions of anonymity expected of eight-
eenth-century women authors. The disclaimer in the Advertisement has 
been seen as an early example of a practice that was to become widespread, 
especially in ghost stories and other fictional extravagances. In both sub-
ject and treatment, there is much in the novel that anyone who knows her 
writings would accept as Sarah Fielding’s. And yet, in the course of adding 
parts of this text to our set of Sarah Fielding’s work, we quite unexpectedly 
came upon resemblances to the work of her famous brother. A series of 
different tests, some treating of very frequent words, some of much less 
frequent ones, have all supported the notion that Henry Fielding had a part 
in the composition of this work. If that is so, the only likely rationale is that 
Sarah Fielding drew upon some of his surviving papers but that her own 
contribution is far greater than she claimed.
Figure 3 employs the same procedures as those used above. The main 
set of texts has been replaced. The substitute, comprising almost 540,000 
words, is made up of samples of first-person narrative by twenty novel-
ists of the early and middle eighteenth century. The samples of the Field-
ings’ work comprise eight such narratives apiece, amounting to over 75,000 
words each. All told, The History of Ophelia itself runs to almost 102,000 
words.
The strongest z-scores in Figure 3 are in the positive register, where the 
bluff vernacular of Defoe and the breathless muddle of Mary (‘Perdita’) 
Robinson carry them far from all the rest. The effect of such strong ‘outliers’ 
is to drive other entries together. (The real differences in distance among a 
range of London suburbs are similarly made to seem smaller if Canterbury 
and Cambridge are shown on the same map.) It is evident, even so, that 
a majority of the strongest negative z-scores are Sarah Fielding’s and that 
her brother is her principal rival. His ascendancy is strongest at the begin-
ning but he also leads the field around Segments 40 and 70. Nowhere else 
in Sarah Fielding’s writings, save for an acknowledged contribution to her 
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Familiar Letters, does Henry Fielding score so strongly on tests like these. A 
range of other statistical tests, some treating of these frequent words, and 
some of the more unusual words, yield similar, often stronger, results. The 
most likely explanation is that, long after her brother’s death, Sarah Field-
ing took up some of his manuscript fragments and wove them into a novel 
whose authorship she never claimed. The chapters dealing with the hero-
ine’s early life, her imprisonment in a country house, and her later visits to 
Bedlam and Tunbridge Wells are those where his hand is clearest. 
Whenever the z-scores for the Fieldings diverge sharply from each other, 
the stronger of them leads the field of twenty authors. Whenever they con-
verge, three other authors take a turn or two. In prose style (to speak simply 
as a reader) , both Eliza Haywood and Charlotte Smith often show some 
resemblance to Sarah Fielding while Charlotte Lennox’s more pointed style 
is not unlike that of Henry Fielding. Nowhere but in The History of Ophelia, 
however, has it proved difficult to distinguish any of them from either of 
the Fieldings. It appears likely that, as in The Boy in the Bush, some levels 
of revision blur the frequency-profiles and admit interlopers. On external 
evidence, none of those mentioned is a genuine candidate for the author-
ship of The History of Ophelia. 
There is no need, however, to resort to external evidence. If each of these 
unlikely candidates is tested, in turn, against each of the Fieldings, one or 
Figure 3. The History of Ophelia and twenty authors.
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other Fielding is the victor. The simpler discrimination of a head to head 
contest allows a much sharper focus.
One further possibility should be entertained. Sarah Fielding is known 
to have collaborated with a friend, Jane Collier, on The Cry (1757). Since 
Jane Collier’s only independent work, An Essay on the Art of Ingeniously 
Tormenting (1753), is quite different in kind, it is misleading to include her 
in a direct comparison (where she scores badly). But a helpful inference is 
possible. Tests on The Cry show that it differs more from Henry Fielding 
than does Sarah Fielding’s other work. A putative contribution by Jane Col-
lier, therefore, is unlikely to account for those parts of The History of Ophelia 
where Henry prevails.
Together with Anthony Hassall, a Fielding scholar, I have written a 
more detailed study of this matter in which he takes up the historical and 
literary questions that arise (Burrows and Hassall 2006). After encounter-
ing some resistance from students of Sarah Fielding, this piece found an 
editor willing to publish a mildly controversial finding so that scholars can 
form their own opinions. It should be acknowledged that Peter Sabor, the 
most recent editor of The History of Ophelia, rejects our case and proposes 
that the stylistic anomalies of the novel may stem from its being written 
by Sarah Fielding intermittently over a period of years (Sabor 2004: 14-15). 
That, however, is not a difficult question to test. Sarah Fielding’s style does 
indeed change over time. Nowhere else does it show so close a resemblance 
to her brother’s work as in parts of this novel.
But my interest is not in arguing for victory. When the evidence is put 
before the scholarly community, our case will stand or fall on its merits. I 
raise it here because it is a suitable point of departure for a more general 
argument. Like any of us, literary scholars find it easy to preserve their 
equanimity in the face of evidence that favours their opinions. It is usually 
when the evidence runs the other way that we meet the pointed question: 
How much confidence should I place in a result like this? It is, as people say, 
a good question — a very good question indeed. The literary scholars who 
maintained their doubts in the matter of the Elegy by W. S. were ultimately 
vindicated. Such doubts as theirs are often held but they are not always 
justified by the evidence.
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2. Questions of Confidence
2.1 Has Statistical Analysis a Place in Literary Studies?
On the face of it, literary texts offer an ideal arena for statistical analysis. 
They make up a vast range of specimens whose provenance and charac-
teristics are well known and a further range where challenging questions 
arise on every side. By way of measurable variables, they incorporate large 
populations of phenomena, some frequent in occurrence, others extremely 
rare. Some behave according to straightforward rules, others are less pre-
dictable. Computers now make it possible to count, sort, and classify such 
phenomena with unprecedented speed and accuracy. As Paul Fortier, still 
much missed by many of us, would put it, the very nature of evidence in 
literary scholarship has changed. Whereas we would gather examples to 
illustrate a proposition and test it on our fellows, we can now gather all the 
relevant examples and put the case more firmly.
Among the many sorts of phenomena available, let us address ourselves 
to the study of words. Problems of definition declare themselves at once. 
Should I’ll be taken as it stands or resolved into its constituents? In the 
latter case, should it be I shall or I will? Should word-types like so and that, 
which embrace several homographic forms, be left alone or given gram-
matical tags? Tagging brings an advantage in accuracy but, besides being 
laborious, it makes it too hard for others to replicate one’s work. Much to 
Paul Fortier’s satisfaction, I have come to believe that the text is usually best 
left as it stands.
Far subtler difficulties arise with truly polysemous words like blue where 
numerous literal meanings shade off into all sorts of metaphorical senses. 
Is it feasible to treat such diverse tokens as instances of a single word-type? 
In general, I believe, a given word-form can be seen as having one or more 
cores of meaning, populated by many almost synonymous instances and 
surrounded by a penumbra of increasingly unlike specimens. Especially 
in their outer, more sparsely populated reaches, different penumbra will 
sometimes overlap. At the very core, Shakespeare’s let can mean either 
hinder or permit. But there will be few occasions on which blue means red or 
chalk means cheese or romantic, classical. There are several reasons for turn-
ing I into we, as in Margaret Thatcher’s ‘We are a grandmother’. But is it 
only in Australia that redheads used often to be addressed as ‘Blue’? The 
virtue of a statistical approach is that a few exceptions are readily absorbed 
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in any large population. This line of reasoning transcends the visible cases 
of difficulty and answers also to the more pervasive objection that every 
word-token is unique — that, as Robert Louis Stevenson put it, there are 
no true synonyms in English. But, I repeat, if each word-type is a cluster 
of near synonyms, it is usually a distinguishable cluster. At this point, the 
argument that words lose meaning when they are taken from their contexts 
can be seen as a version of a general objection to counting and classification. 
The idea that such procedures distort the very selfhood of unique living 
creatures (especially moi) can be either a rational complaint about unsuit-
able measures or a superstitious fancy. In either case, the questions arising 
are not peculiar to literary studies but bear on the ubiquitous presence of 
statistics in our lives.
In The World We Have Lost, Peter Laslett cites a survey of 1688 in which 
the population was divided almost equally into those ‘Increasing the 
Wealth of the Kingdom’ and those ‘Decreasing the Wealth of the Kingdom’ 
(Laslett 1971: 36). Economic rationalists may still be content to leave it at 
that. But Ian Hacking (1990) shows how such simple demographic records 
have broadened their range and increased their sophistication over the last 
two hundred years. His title, The Taming of Chance, is apt. Three main forms 
of statistics, I suggest, now pervade our lives. There are confidential sur-
veys conducted, chiefly for exploitative purposes, by people like politicians 
and commercial entrepreneurs. Then there are scientific studies conducted, 
chiefly for the public good, by epidemiologists and others. And there is the 
unconscious or almost unconscious kind of statistical work that enables us 
all to live our daily lives. The first of these is of great influence but very lit-
tle intellectual interest. Its principal effect is upon what we are allowed to 
buy, in the shops or at the ballot-box, and how it is packaged. The second 
can be a powerful force for the public good as, for example, when epide-
miology led to a proper understanding of the malign effects of tobacco. It 
can also go a little awry when the statistics are incomplete or the results are 
misunderstood. Many people of my age benefited from being persuaded 
to turn from cigarettes to pipes. We now know that lung cancer was only 
part of the story and that pipe-smoking also did great harm. In another 
affair, one of the most effective drugs for osteoarthritis was withdrawn 
because it had some dangerous side-effects. It has emerged that the side-
effects came from overdosage and that the media had misinterpreted and 
exaggerated the statistical evidence. But the drug remains unavailable. The 
third great branch of current statistics comprises those that we all use more 
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or less unconsciously all the time. It embraces everything from planning 
the future or investing money to crossing busy roads, navigating rounda-
bouts, and carrying raincoats — everything in which we assess risks and 
rely, often quite intuitively, on judgments of probability. In all three of these 
large areas, some measures best fit the case. Even the poignant cry, ‘That 
traffic-light is always against me’ can be stilled, if one cares to, by keeping 
an honest tally. The impetuous young motorist and the timid elderly one 
make different risk-assessments. Though both cause accidents, they are 
outmatched by the novice. No statistician he, he errs at random.
Like it or not, we cannot escape the use of numbers and the calculations 
of probability that beset us. We need to know all we can of the statistics 
imposed upon us. For those we ourselves employ, our best course is to 
seek appropriate measures, whether formal or merely rule of thumb, and 
to apply them with such rigour as seems due. All this considered, it is hard 
to see how literary studies could be exempt. On the positive side, let one 
immediate instance stand for many. The study of D. H. Lawrence must be 
advanced by fresh evidence bearing on the belief that he contributed exten-
sively to The Boy in the Bush and identifying further passages as likely (or 
unlikely) to be his.
2.2 What Sorts of Measures Best Suit Literary Studies?4
When engineers use principal component analysis, I am told, they usually 
choose factors (such as velocity and mass) on which any group of speci-
mens will record different scores. The chosen factors allow the scores to 
be arranged in ranked sequences (or vectors) showing how performance 
varies in the group. In literary applications of the method, we allow cho-
sen specimens to distribute themselves according to their own dictates and 
then try to infer meanings for the main vectors that emerge. The top-down 
approach might bear, for example, on defining suitable limits of tolerance 
as specimens diverge from declared norms. Our bottom-up approach, 
however, has chiefly to do with classification — with the possibility that 
specimens of known proclivities may form interesting classes, with the 
relative importance of such classes, and with the affiliations displayed by 
specimens of doubtful or unknown provenance.
This simple difference is a watershed. On the one side lie categorical 
methods, like discriminant analysis and artificial neural networks, whose 
4  For more information about the sorts of statistical method referred to in this 
section but not actually employed here, see Holmes (1994).
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outcome is either Yes or No, either Accept or Reject. In cases of doubtful 
authorship, for example, these methods come into their own when only 
two candidates have any claim. On the other side lie more empirical meth-
ods, like cluster analysis and the ‘bottom up’ version of principal compo-
nent analysis, whose outcome is more complex. The Delta procedure is of 
this more open kind. These are all better fitted for exploratory work in areas 
where that is requisite.
Authors themselves and the works they produce can be classified in 
many ways. Computational stylistics uses patterns of phenomena like 
word-frequency as part of that endeavour. We have mounting evidence 
that work by different authors, work in different genres, work of different 
eras, work in different national forms of English can all comprise statis-
tically distinguishable groups. A further contrast, distinguishing between 
male and female authors, is coloured by differences of education in former 
times. But even the basic validity of such evidence is still contested. Partly 
because we are dealing with complex entities and partly because computa-
tional work in the humanities is still in its infancy, we do well to cultivate 
exploratory methods of analysis. For we have yet to find our Linnaeus: we 
have no agreed hierarchy of classes and no settled opinion as to whether 
our classes have strict boundaries or, as I suppose, more shadowy border-
lands where monsters sometimes dwell. 
Cluster analysis and principal component analysis both highlight what-
ever patterns of resemblance and difference emerge when a number of 
specimens are assessed in terms of their scores on a set of variables. When 
these methods are used in an exploratory way, any meaning attaching to a 
given pattern is a matter of inference. But, while they provide the genesis 
of many fruitful discoveries, such inferences must be tested sternly and 
persistently.
The last decade has seen an increasing attention to the need for more 
tests than one. More attention has been given to the use of replication and 
of suitable ‘controls’. But we have been slower than we might to appreciate 
the need to make our tests as independent of each other as possible. The 
behavior of the language at different levels of word-frequency is so subtly 
interlocked that even the move from frequent words to rare ones does not 
yield complete independence.
In order to try a different tack, let us take a case where our results 
accord with the known truth. In the 129 rolling segments of St. Ives, all 
except one of the results are correct. By setting aside our outside knowl-
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edge, we may suppose that the test results need verification. The Delta test 
suggests, as we have seen, that Stevenson wrote most of St. Ives and that 
Quiller Couch contributed the closing chapters. But, taken alone, Figure 1 
does not quite justify that conclusion because Delta is not an absolute test 
of authorship. It treats, in the present case, relative differences between 
successive segments of St. Ives, and thirty-two authorial samples of prose 
fiction. Since those by Stevenson and Quiller Couch are least unlike St. 
Ives, authorial inferences are obviously admissible. And yet, improbable 
as it may be, another author altogether might prove even less unlike St. 
Ives than any of these thirty-two. And, again, it is conceivable — though 
barely so — that our large samples of Stevenson and Quiller Couch stand 
apart for some non-authorial reason.
Student’s t-test and the Mann-Whitney non-parametric test are used 
to determine which of many variables serve to differentiate two sets of 
specimens. To provide an adequate number of specimens, our main sam-
ples of Stevenson and Quiller Couch were each broken into thirty-six seg-
ments of two thousand words. The three hundred most frequent words of 
our thirty-two author corpus were taken as variables. Eighty-three of the 
three hundred words satisfied both tests at the 5% level of statistical sig-
nificance or better. (The degrees of freedom usually exceeded sixty, and 
allowance was made for the ‘two-tailed’ character of the data.) A yield 
of eighty-three significant results out of three hundred, at a level where 
chance would admit a mere fifteen, shows that the two main sets of data 
come from genuinely distinct populations.
When these new data are employed on the original range of speci-
mens, the outcome, not surprisingly, is even more clear-cut. At this point, 
however, the secondary sets of thirty thousand words apiece by Steven-
son and Quiller Couch come into their own. These selections from their 
tales and stories are entirely independent of the previous sets. They were 
each broken into five successive segments — not rolling segments — of 
six thousand words. Stevenson’s part of St. Ives was broken into seven-
teen segments of that size, of which five were chosen at random. Quiller 
Couch’s part of St. Ives yielded five more. Word-counts for the eighty-
three ‘significant’ variables were derived from each of these twenty seg-
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ments. None of the twenty segments had any part in establishing the 
main list of three hundred words or in selecting eighty-three of them as 
differentiae.
Figure 4 is the outcome of a cluster analysis of these twenty specimens.5 
The division into two authorial families verifies our previous finding, jus-
5  Cluster analysis compares the members of a set of specimens, each with every 
other, on the basis of their relative scores on a given set of variables. (In the present 
case, the specimens are texts, the variables are a range of words, and the scores are 
standardized word-counts) For each specimen in turn, its differences from every 
other are calculated and then squared to eliminate the negatives. The sum of these 
squared differences is extracted. The two specimens showing the smallest such dif-
ference are then united. The next smallest such difference either unites two other 
specimens or adds a third member to the first pair. The next smallest difference is 
introduced in the same way and the process continues until all specimens have 
been embraced. The outcome is then plotted in a dendrogram, an inverted tree-
structure. As seen from the foot of the page, the y-axis shows a progressive depar-
ture from 100% similarity. The specimens are arrayed on the x-axis. The twigs of the 
inverted tree show which specimens united first, as being least different from each 
other. These pairs and trios unite in branchlets, lesser branches, greater branches, 
and so on until all are united in one trunk (usually at a low or even negative level 
of resemblance). Where specimens neighbouring each other on the x-axis do not 
unite, their proximity to each other is usually a reflection of the configuration of 
other unions.
The version of cluster analysis used here is part of the MINITAB package. The 
main options chosen embrace ‘standardized variables,’ ‘Ward’s linkages,’ and 
‘squared Euclidean distances.’ For an explanation of these terms, the MINITAB 
Help file refers the reader to Lance and Williams (1967).
Figure 4. Cluster analysis of twenty 6000-word segments.
Analysis based on eighty-three Stevenson-Quiller Couch Differentiae.
1-5 RLS Tales; 11-15 RLS St Ives
6-10 AQC Stories; 16-20 AQC St Ives











tifies the belief that it was indeed authorial and helps to close the door 
on any putative interloper. The detail of Figure 4 also repays attention. 
On Stevenson’s side, only one entry from the Tales intrudes into the sub-
group of entries for St. Ives. Like most long single works, St. Ives develops 
a ‘note’ of its own, as Henry James would say, and stands a little apart from 
a mixed sample of its author’s writings. On Quiller Couch’s side, the first 
three entries for St. Ives stand together. The last two lie in the sub-group of 
Quiller Couch’s stories. Like most imitators, it may be, he gradually loses 
sight of his object and drifts towards his own style. 
A sterner form of replication yields a supportive, though less powerful, 
result. If the two new samples by Stevenson and Quiller Couch are put in 
place of the original pair and no other change of any kind is made, a new 
version of Figure 1 can be established. When that is done, Quiller Couch 
still easily resists any challenge to his part of St. Ives. In his part, Steven-
son still prevails on average but no longer at almost every point. The next 
step is to identify sets of ‘discriminating words’ in the same manner as the 
eighty-three described above. When that is done, the various challengers 
all fail in head to head contests with Stevenson. But because this further 
task must be undertaken iteratively, with each challenger in turn, the spec-
tre of the unknown interloper can never quite be put to rest. A return to 
the texts explains why the new result is less clear-cut than the original. The 
original sample of Stevenson comprised selections from his romances. The 
new one draws on sombre, introspective tales like ‘The Body Snatchers’. 
Both sets fall well within his stylistic repertoire but the former is more in 
keeping with St. Ives.
2.3 But is All this Really Scientific?
While this question deserves attention, I begin with reservations. I do not 
accept that scientists have a monopoly on serious heuristic methods. To 
call computational stylistics a science does not hallow it and may even mis-
represent it. Nor, I believe, are scholars in our field much given to calling 
it a science. The suggestion is usually made by others, not always with a 
favourable intent. These reservations of mine are the product of long expe-
rience: but I know, only too well, that I am now moving on to ground where 
I am less at home.
Encouraged by Willard McCarty, I have done a little fresh reading about 
‘scientific method’. Putting it beside my shabby, old furniture is like putting 
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a new bathroom into an old French hotel – one admires the facilities but 
wonders about the plumbing. At any rate, I take two examples. Sir Peter 
Medawar (1982) focuses on the central phase of experimental procedure. 
Claude Bernard (1865), whom Medawar quotes approvingly, sets such pro-
cedures in a much broader heuristic framework. 
Despite some differences of terminology, they are at one in an emphasis 
on the central experimental role of hypotheses as propositions susceptible 
of testing against fresh facts. Both of them regard unfalsifiable proposi-
tions as alien to the spirit of inquiry. They draw attention, albeit in different 
ways, to the asymmetry of proof: falsification is more conclusive than cor-
roboration. In that light, they stress the need to persist unflaggingly in the 
task of disproof and they maintain that verification can never be more than 
dubitative or probationary. I can see nothing here that scholars in any field 
of rational inquiry would dispute.
Medawar’s account of the genesis of hypotheses is narrower and, for 
me, less congenial than Bernard’s. Perhaps because he is convinced that 
there is no such thing as an ‘innocent eye’, Medawar regards anything that 
precedes the formulation of a hypothesis as of little interest. It is inexplica-
ble, an expression of mere ‘idle wonder’. One may grant that the inquiring 
mind is no tabula rasa, but still share Bernard’s belief that we often perceive 
important anomalies when our minds are not on duty. The response ‘That’s 
odd’ rests upon an experience of what is normal but remains close to inno-
cence. It is only when ‘I wonder why’ gives way to the truly pre-hypothet-
ical ‘I wonder if’ that an experiment is in the making. But the ability to say 
‘That’s odd’ is fundamental. If the discovery of penicillin is the classic case, 
the example can readily be multiplied.
The ability to say ‘That’s odd’ may be of particular value in fields like 
ours where theory does not — or does not yet — prevail. The many mean-
ings attached to the word ‘theory’ cloud the question of whether empirical 
work like that of computational stylistics lacks a theoretic basis. (McCa-
rty and Love write strongly on this topic from opposed standpoints. See 
McCarty, 2005, 139-55 and Love, 2002, ch. viii). From mere hobby-horses, 
through hypotheses (usually of some breadth), the word reaches out to 
include such general laws as Newton’s and Einstein’s. Let us cherish our 
hobby-horses but keep them in their stables. Let us welcome hypotheses 
and put them to the test. And let us stand firm against the suggestion that 
we can do nothing until we are ready, like Newton, Einstein, or Chomsky 
himself, to embrace the universe.
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It is possible, nevertheless, to aspire to a modest generality. If lan-
guage can be seen as a manifestation of cognitive behavior, it is only to be 
expected that the performance of any individual in this field, as in many 
others, should not only resemble but also diverge from the performances of 
other people. Ferdinand de Saussure brings this to a point in his distinction 
between langue and parole, between the set of linguistic resources available 
to us and the subset of choices we each make. Through a simple corollary, 
one may suppose that parole has a frequentative as well as a selective aspect. 
What else could give it an enduring shape of its own? One may also hope 
that a better understanding of computational classification will help to fill 
the ground between de Saussure and the various experiments we under-
take. As matters stand at present, I have yet to see or hear of a text of any 
length whose patterns of word-frequency could not be distinguished from 
others of its kind or which failed to show meaningful affinities with others 
written by its author. To the extent that this tests his theory, de Saussure still 
holds his ground and serves us well.
In discussing what comes after the experimental phase of a scientific 
inquiry, Medawar and Bernard concur. Where an hypothesis is upheld, it 
still remains open to further inquiry. Failed hypotheses are to be rejected. 
(Medawar adds ‘or modified’ but says no more). Neither of them, unfortu-
nately, sheds much light on the meaning of failure or on its sequel. 
What are we to suppose? The strict position these eminent scientists 
take is a necessary response to human ingenuity. Most sets of data are sus-
ceptible of several hypothetical explanations. Any anomalies can usually 
be rationalized away. Why pretend to test hypotheses at all if one is deter-
mined to ‘save’ them when they falter? It is in this spirit, I suppose, that I 
have been reproached for explaining such anomalous specimens as Seg-
ment 34 of Figure 1. The question here is whether it is legitimate to try to 
diagnose the behavior of a single anomalous specimen in a field of 129. I do 
not believe that the objection to ‘saving the hypothesis’ should be carried 
so far. For if a single aberrant specimen spells failure, there is no place in 
science for the study of human behavior and no role for statistical analysis. 
Since that is patently absurd, we must think again. 
An error in observation or calculation has no bearing on a hypothesis. 
When one is found, it should be rectified without ado. Such trivialities apart, 
it seems that scientists must distinguish between crucial, casual, and fruit-
ful anomalies and between acceptable and unacceptable levels of tolerance. 
These will differ greatly in different fields of inquiry. But, in any field where 
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‘zero tolerance’ is not required, the value of statistical measures of significance 
and error is immense. It seems clear that we, too, must work along such lines 
and that we must persuade our traditionalist colleagues that it is right to do so.
And after a hypothesis is seen to fail? Dead end or new point of departure? 
That will depend upon the residual merits, if any, of the original hypothesis. 
Willard McCarty (2005: 286, s. v. ‘failure’) writes compellingly on the fruitful-
ness of failure. After a failure, to put it in my terms, there is likely to be a period 
of disappointment. But then ‘I wonder why’ comes back into its own, ‘I won-
der if’ soon follows, and the game begins again. A new hypothesis emerges to 
transcend the old and is tested in its turn. If that is unscientific behavior, we 
must gladly draw our skirts aside and leave the scientists to their own ways.
3. How Much Confidence Should I Place in a Result 
Like This?
The question underlying this whole discussion sometimes reflects a desire for 
certainty. But successful scientific hypotheses remain dubitative. Statistical anal-
ysis deals only in levels of probability. Scholarship in the humanities is seldom 
regarded as definitive. Life itself is, in many ways, a game of chance. Should lit-
erary scholars ask us, as some do, for certainty? In its usual form, the suggestion 
is that, unless computational methods can offer certainty, they are more trou-
ble than they are worth. A subtler version is latent in Joseph Rudman’s demand 
(1998, 2000) for ‘verifiably unique’ authorial signatures. Many of his structures 
have been of great value. But here, as with his notion that it is time to settle upon 
a single agreed method of analysis, he, too verges on naivety.
We cannot offer certainty. But where there is an adequate body of material, 
computational stylistics usually offers strong evidence and is getting better at 
it. (For a somewhat more conservative assessment than mine, see Craig, 2004.) 
In my view, head to head contests are rarely difficult to resolve. In more open 
cases, the likely candidates can be identified. We cannot proceed with equal con-
fidence in cases where an unknown interloper may be in the game. Even there, 
however, a weak set of results for known candidates may indicate that it is desir-
able to look elsewhere. 
Our findings usually concur with the scholarly consensus because both 
parties are usually right. When there is no such consensus, our findings can be 
especially serviceable. And when our findings are seriously at odds with the 
consensus, both parties need to think again. The statistical evidence may not be 
valid and, when it is, it can still give rise to mistaken inferences. And even when, 
on the other side, a scholarly opinion is widely held and of long standing, it is 
open to correction. 
2. Cybertextuality by the 
Numbers
Ian Lancashire
When we think in words, the thoughts come in grammatical form with 
subject, verb, object and modifying clauses falling into place without our 
having the slightest perception of how the sentence structure is produced 
(Lashley 1958).
I suppose that all of us have a primitive prompter or commentator 
within, who from our earliest years has been advising us, telling us what 
the real world is. There is such a commentator in me. I have to prepare the 
ground for him. From this source come words, phrases, syllables; some-
times only sounds, which I try to interpret, sometimes whole paragraphs, 
fully punctuated. When E. M. Forster said, ‘How do I know what I think 
until I see what I say?’ he was perhaps referring to his own prompter (Bel-
low 2006: 95).
1. Introduction
Readers who want to find the author in the text should not be too dis-
heartened when they see only themselves. The New Criticism and Reader 
Response theory gave up trying, not unreasonably, because authoring 
takes place largely in the author’s unconscious and resists being observed.1 
Cybertextuality,2 the subject of this essay, theorizes the authorial process by 
1  The works of Sigmund Freud make the acceptance of this simple truth much 
easier. As Karl Lashley says, we can recall the process of writing only in the act of 
writing (that is, language-making is a procedural memory; see Squire 1987: 152); we 
have no memory storage system that can save, for later retrieval, knowledge of the 
steps in which we create an utterance.
2  See Lancashire 2004b. Cybertextuality extends Espen Aarseth’s term ‘cybertext‘ 
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bringing together observations from four areas: Norbert Wiener’s cybernet-
ics, self-testimony by creative writers, cognitive psychology, and compu-
ter-assisted text-analysis. I first apply Wiener’s communications theory to 
describe how authors craft sentences by subjecting their own chunk-sized 
phrases to mental cycles of uttering (messaging) and error-monitoring (self-
feedback). Cybertextuality pays close attention to evidence for two hypo-
thetical cognitive quantities, the cognitive chunk or phrasal word-packet, 
and the cognitive capacity or load. I then review what cognitive psychol-
ogy knows of these numbers, and of our mental self-monitor. 
I refer to chunk size as the alpha value. What constrains it is the capac-
ity of the phonological loop of Alan Baddeley’s model of working mem-
ory (Baddley 2000). This constraint comes with being human, although 
an author can appear to get around it by shuttling chunks rapidly in and 
out of working memory from the clusters or schemas that form, distinc-
tively, in long-term memory networks and serve domains of knowledge 
in which the author has expertise. Computer text-analysis (stylistic counts 
and the repeating patterns in textual concordances) detects what even 
the author cannot perceive about himself: it reveals these chunks in the 
phrasal vocabularies of authors (Lancashire 2004a). Chunk size also limits 
the error-finding capacity of our mental self-monitor: mistakes that cross 
chunk boundaries normally escape notice. Authorial self-repairs in a holo-
graph manuscript, such as Shakespeare’s hand in The Book of Sir Thomas 
More, (1910) show this mental feedback at work. The second constraint 
is the omega value, the cognitive capacity or load for a thought. Virginia 
Woolf’s holograph manuscript versions for The Waves (1976) reveal this 
size-constraint for her mind. 
The alpha and omega values, these cybertextual numbers3, inform the 
authoring process and help shape an author’s idiolect. They do not change 
markedly from person to person. These two verbal capacities — of chunks, 
and of maximum text-size that chunks may combine to express a unified 
thought — also drive authors, both to invent language technologies that 
supplement their memory capacities and to empower conscious self-edit-
ing. These technologies act through the laws of copyright to replace the 
(1997), which is first used in 1991 by the ‘speculative fiction’ poet Bruce Boston. 
3  I call them alpha and omega because, in operating within their constraints, our 
minds approach as close to the Old Testament creative God as creatures of a post-
Darwinian world can get. `I was in the spirit on the Lord’s day, and heard behind 
me a great voice, as of a trumpet, Saying, I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the 
last: and, What thou seest, write in a book[...]’ (Revelation 1:10-11).
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concept of a creative author by that of an owner-author. The post-literate 
cyborgic author is a self-employed expert at expressing (not thinking) ver-
bally (not conceptually) original texts that are always fixed in some medium. 
Fixation, when utterance takes an external form, is the critical step. It marks 
where the author-creator gives way to the author-owner, who may even be 
defined as someone who has never even read the authored text he owns. 
2. Cybertextuality
Cybertextuality theorizes our authoring of speech and written text, in the 
context of what we know about language cognition and about the technolo-
gies by which we supplement that. Every language tool that we have made, 
from oral-formulaic metre to the digital workstation, speaks to our species’ 
frustrations with native cognition in language production, that is, unas-
sisted speaking, writing, and reading. Dissatisfied with how genes have 
designed us, we have built communications technologies that give us a 
flawlessly searchable and readable external long-term memory and an aid 
to working memory by which we can author error-free, carefully sculpted 
utterances, both brief and epic. The author uses a literary machine (this is 
Ted Nelson’s term (1987), modified in Katherine Hayles’ Writing Machines 
(2002)) as a cybernetic extension of her mind. 
The cognitive mechanics of authoring need cybernetic concepts: both 
Espen Aarseth’s book Cybertext (1997), which describes texts (such as inter-
active fictions) that ask readers to do physical work, and posthumanist 
Katherine Hayles (1999), stimulated theory to re-think Norbert Wiener’s 
communications theory. The human-computer interface supplements and 
imitates cognitive language production by the inner Muse and her receiver, 
the inner Editor. We have even developed text-analysis software that facili-
tates the reading of texts. Such tools extend the human mind in uttering. 
By availing ourselves of them, we become cyborgic and partake of the 
character of a cybernetic organism. Authoring of texts is a recursive proc-
ess in which hand-shakes cycle between a sender who utters something 
and a receiver who perceives the sent message and feeds back information 
about it to the sender. Unlike Wiener’s cybernetics, cybertextuality asserts 
that the sender and the receiver are initially the same: we read ourselves 
before anyone else does. This is an old idea found in the speech-pathology 
research of Edward D. Mysak (1966). He argued that the ‘speech system 
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may be viewed as a closed, multiple-loop system containing feedforward 
and feedback internal and external loops’ (1966: 17), that is, loops that take 
place wholly within the mind, as distinguished from Wienerian loops that 
involve the reactions of other listeners.4 Cognitively, everyone utters speech, 
syllable by syllable, only after extensive self-monitoring for errors, and 
then self-adjusting for corrections.
Wiener coined the word cybernetics in the 1950s to name a theory of 
communication that has since morphed into information science and has 
influenced how everyone thinks (Wiener 1950/1967). The word comes from 
the Greek word for steersman, kubernetes. Cybernetics asserts the com-
monalties between how people communicate with people, how machines 
such as anti-aircraft guns and radar technology signal one another, and of 
course how people negotiate with machines like text-analysis tools. Wie-
ner had the brilliant idea that communication is a hand-shaking exercise, a 
series of message-response transactions between sender and receiver. Each 
sent message prompts a response that enables the sender to correct the 
first message or to move on to something new. Wiener’s five cybernetic 
modules are sender (author), receiver (reader), message (text), channel 
(medium), degrading noise (language and culture change, and more), and 
feedback (criticism). His ‘theory of messages,’ as he referred to it (Wiener 
1950: 106; Masani 1990: 251-52), is that the sender steers or controls compo-
sition according to a receiver’s incremental feedback because only after that 
response can the sender be certain that noise has not rendered the message 
unreadable. A message is thus an incomplete act of communication with-
out its partnering feedback. 
Biology has for a long time been influenced by cybernetics, and cog-
nitive scientists frequently describe mental and neural processes as mes-
sage-feedback in nature. Wiener’s universal phenomenon, in cybertextual-
ity theory, also embraces many aspects of literary research. For example, 
rhetoric and genre can be conceived as strategies of redundancy employed 
by authors who want to reduce reader misunderstanding that arises from 
4  Mysak specifi ed ten loops, two of them feedforward (ff ) and fi ve of them feed-
back (fb): thought propagation, word formation (ff), thought pattern-word pattern 
comparison (fb), word production (ff), actual word product-desired word product 
comparison (fb), word product-thought pattern comparison (fb), internal multi-
ple-loop speech recycling, word product-listener comparison (fb), actual listener 
reaction-desired listener reaction comparison (fb), and internal and external multi-
ple-loop speech recycling (19). Levelt’s recent theory of lexical access in speech pro-
duction (1999) uses the same terminology of feedforward and feedback in mapping 
cognitive processing. 
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cultural, gender, and social differences as well as from transmission errors 
often identified in textual criticism and scholarly editing. (Redundancy 
sacrifices cognitive message size to make messages immune to disruption 
by noise.) Reader-response theory internalizes the message-feedback part-
nership in the reader rather than the author. The scepticism that moves 
postmodern theorists to speak of the death of the author arises from their 
legitimate perception of how unconscious the author is of cognitive cre-
ative process, of how mysterious it is. We retreat into Michel Foucault’s 
author-function (Foucault 1989/1969), that is, the owner-author in which 
law and capitalism trade. 
From a cybertextual perspective, however, the author is partly alive in 
the work. Messaging and feedback cycles leave idiolectal and idiosyncratic 
traces that survive the author’s replacement by the editor, the owner-author, 
the employer who asserts property rights on an authoring employee, the 
buyer, death itself, the deceased’s estate manager, and especially the reader. 
Texts incorporate fossils of their own biological realization. Cybertextuality 
asks us to read texts in a new way, to discover within them the stigmata of 
authoring − the marks that distinguish its subjection to cognitive limita-
tions. These are partly observed in uttering-feedback cycles as they create 
evanescent or frozen texts. 
Of course, Norbert Wiener’s five cybernetic modules do not map onto 
authoring as neatly as one might like.5 The author is apparently unknow-
able, for the time being at least a see-through cellophane entity that we can-
not perceive directly because we have no memory system to store (and thus 
consciously verbalize) what it is. The reader is the only part of the author 
whom we can see at work, subvocally as error-catching and inner speech, 
externally as what our writing and speaking tools utter back. Unlike 
5  A researcher reading a blurred photocopy of an article, or someone listening to 
a friend’s goodbyes on a cellphone losing power: cybernetics interprets these cases 
well. The article and the friend’s goodbyes, however badly distorted by noise, are 
fixed and analyzable. The reader’s and listener’s puzzled reactions - what’s this? 
what did you say? − are themselves also unambiguous. Everything here can be quan-
tified. We can measure the percentage of loss in visual and acoustic signals and as-
sign a value to them. That value would take into account the redundancy we build 
into language, unconsciously, to ensure that, despite plenty of interference, we can 
still understand what is being said. Given that fifty percent of alphabetic English is 
technically redundant, as Claude Shannon calculated (1948: 14-15; Pierce 1980: 75; 
cf. Reed and Durlach 1998), a great deal can be obscured without badly damaging 
the information in an utterance. For example, if a filter removes all sounds above or 
below 1500 Hz from speech, as A. B. Wood (1955) showed, there is only a 35 percent 
decrease in intelligibility.
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Wiener’s messages, both uttering and feedback are sent as phrasal frag-
ments. Sometimes the sender fashions an utterance for two or more receiv-
ers and crafts the message so that they find different things in it. Messages 
are readable first, not externally, but in the sender’s own working memory, 
a little living auditory and visual book that dynamically overwrites itself in 
seconds. Then they appear in iconic or echoic sensory memory for a brief 
time, unless machine-assisted. The channel for these cybertextual trans-
actions is the mind’s neural infrastructure, the brain, but the brain is not 
the simple left-to-right pipe by which Wiener’s cybernetics represents the 
arena across which a message travels from sender to receiver. For one thing, 
as lesions prove, the channel can break down and generate the cybernetic 
noise that damages transmission. Uttering uses not a single channel but 
a crosshatch of dynamic and parallel processes operating and interacting 
simultaneously. Only when an utterance reaches our sincerest flattery of 
the brain, the computer, does it take a simpler path. The sources of noise 
that afflict cognitive messages in transmission – dementia among them − 
also resist easy explanation, although imaging devices, and biopsies and 
autopsies, have for a century gradually unveiled the havoc that cerebral 
lesions can wreak on cognitive functions. 
Cybertextuality asks cognition patently awkward or impossible ques-
tions about an imprecise phenomenon, literary making. Scientific consen-
sus abhors the quick answers we would like, and even science changes its 
mind sometimes.  Cognitive-psychology experiments focus tightly on test-
ing hypotheses advanced by previous experiments. Research runs counter 
to the grain of basic science when it treats governing theories, like Alan 
Baddeley’s working memory, Willem Levelt’s lexical access in speech pro-
duction, and Walter Kintsch’s construction-integration theory of text com-
prehension, as other than explanations that are consistent with cognitive 
affects and other experimental results. Not infrequently, an explanation for 
a well-attested empirical effect, accepted for some time, suddenly is con-
troverted by a related experiment. Yet even cybertextuality theory, while 
speculative, anchors itself in an experimental science, text analysis. Here, 
the subjects of text-analysis experiments are Shakespeare’s hand in the 
manuscript play of Sir Thomas More, and Virginia Woolf’s method in cre-
ating The Waves.
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3. Cognitive Authoring and the Chunk
Most of the human brain, topographically, is active at some point during 
an utterance.6 The purpose, the plan, and the gist of a message originate in 
the pre-frontal cortex, like every other thing we intend to do. If we decide 
to read a sentence aloud, for example, processing begins once the visual 
cortex at the very back of the brain receives data from the eyes. The frontal 
cortex then sets in train an acoustic re-encoding of this visual data so that 
they assume the form they would have had if heard and passed on by the 
temporal auditory cortex. Next the brain must perceive semantically what 
is said. Wernicke’s area in the left hemisphere in the brain of a right-handed 
person is associated with semantic comprehension. This assigns words 
(lemmas) to each sound from long-term memory. If Wernicke’s area is dam-
aged, the brain can produce word-salad sentences: they have a proper syn-
tactic form but do not make sense. Whatever emotional (rather than logical 
and linguistic) content a sentence has is recognized by the right hemi-
sphere of this right-handed person. Then the brain encodes the recognized 
word-train syntactically and phonologically: Broca’s area, just forward of 
Wernicke’s area, does this. A brain in which Broca’s area is damaged utters 
semantically understandable sentence fragments lacking grammatical 
form. Activities at both sites tend to involve areas immediately under the 
cortex. Finally, the fully-encoded sentence moves to the motor cortex for 
pronouncing. Once the brain gives phonological form to an utterance, it 
can enter the catchment area of working memory as inner speech. After 
semantic and affective processing, we hear the sentence unfold subvocally 
and overtly aloud. It never occurs to many people that language produc-
tion is unconscious because we experience its assured power immediately 
in uttering speech.
Functionally, this process takes one step after another, but it very prob-
ably happens all at the same time, each sub-process affecting every other. 
Different aspects of uttering take different paths through the brain. If we 
type an invented sentence, for example, the brain must re-encode the audi-
tory data native to its language function into visual form and must issue 
instructions to the motor cortex on how to operate a keyboard. Localization 
of brain functions thus reveals the modularity of mental language process-
ing. Certain activities take place in specific places in the brain, even though 
6  See Geschwind (1979), a classical account of how the brain handles language; 
and Damasio (1994) and Lieberman (2000), for valuable correctives.
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many activities are active simultaneously. Localization has proved espe-
cially meaningful in analyzing the writing of individuals who have been 
subject to medical testing. 
Peter Garrard’s research on novels by Iris Murdoch as she succumbed 
to Alzheimer’s disease — an essay found elsewhere in this volume — is a 
uniquely important case study in that respect. A ‘profound bilateral hip-
pocampal shrinkage’ that turned up at an autopsy after her death in 1999 
affected the linking of her working memory to her long-term memory. 
Jackson’s Dilemma, her final novel, exhibits lexical and semantic impover-
ishment, with a drop of twenty percent in vocabulary. This result was not 
unexpected: Alzheimer’s Disease sufferers have a ‘relative impairment 
in semantic processing’ (Poore and others 2006). The medical tests and 
autopsy had turned up a medical condition – in effect, a growing deterio-
ration in one location of the brain, something like a lesion – that coincided 
with a reduction in Murdoch’s lexical store and in the information den-
sity of her prose. The link between Murdoch’s body and mind in Garrard’s 
case study was her working memory. The hippocampus, its gateway, must 
also be involved with the most important part of our mental life, where we 
directly and self-consciously hear and manipulate our language subvocally. 
When we hear ourselves think in the mind, we use working memory to do 
so. Sufferers of dementia gradually feel that space shrink. If there is any 
part of the complex cybertextual channel that we can access directly, that 
part is our working memory.
Alan Baddeley’s sturdy model of working memory (formerly called 
short-term memory) has lasted nearly thirty years (Baddeley 1986). It has 
four functions: the phonological loop (where we hear subvocal mental lan-
guage), the short-term visual sketchpad (where we summon up or store 
images, including written text), the episodic buffer (where we retrieve mul-
timodal episodic memories), and an executive that manages these three 
slave systems. We use the executive to refresh what appears in either store, 
or to overwrite what is there with something else. Because our brain can 
only manage mental language if it is auditorily encoded, the visual sketch-
pad can keep a printed or a written sentence or page before our conscious-
ness as an image, but before we can manipulate text cognitively as language 
we have to re-encode it phonetically (read it); thus we transfer it into the 
phonological loop. That loop, a kind of cognitive mobius strip, imposes big 
constraints on our linguistic self-awareness. The most important limit is 
on how much spoken language we can place in and retrieve from working 
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memory. What can we say about its size in a healthy person? I refer to this 
size the alpha value because it characterizes where every utterance starts.
One of the best known quantities of working memory is George Miller’s 
‘magical number’ (1956): this is the maximum number of elements we can 
hold in active memory — seven, plus or minus two elements. Telephone 
numbers were allotted seven numbers for this reason half a century ago. 
Now that we have an area code as well, another three digits, we can only 
consciously keep a phone number in memory until we dial it by making 
several chunks represent two or more numbers. In 2000, Miller’s ‘magical 
number’ was revised (on the basis of decades of experiments) by Nelson 
Cowan downwards to four chunks, plus or minus two chunks. Cowan esti-
mates that the still uncertain size of each chunk is perhaps three or four 
items. Another variable is the Brown (1958) / Peterson (1959) duration rate 
for short-term memory items, which decreases markedly until it almost 
reaches nil at twenty seconds. An equation for a person’s working-mem-
ory retrievability capacity, therefore, would have at least three variables: 
chunks, items (or subchunks), and their current duration, measured in sec-
onds, within working memory. These quantities have been proposed by 
cognitive scientists after dozens of experiments with human subjects over 
half a century. Arranged in my simple model formula, they model one’s 
retrievability capacity, the number of potentially retrievable items from 
Alan Baddeley’s phonological loop, at any given point in time, as the alpha 
value.
The formula is α = (β * γ) * δ, where beta (β) is Cowan’s chunk capac-
ity, a number from two to six; gamma (γ) is Cowan’s items per chunk, a 
number from three to four; and delta (δ) is the percentage of items still 
retrievable, measured by the seconds so far held in working memory since 
the last refresh or rehearsal, according to Brown and Peterson.7 They esti-
mate that memory loss increases, the longer the duration: nothing lost after 
no seconds, fifty percent remains after three seconds, forty percent after six 
seconds, twenty percent after nine seconds, twelve percent after twelve sec-
onds, and so on. The range of alpha values goes from 0.6 items, for someone 
with the lowest chunk and item capacity near the end of maximum dura-
tion in working memory, to 2.8 items, for someone with a median chunk 
and item capacity in mid-duration, and to 24.0 items, for someone with 
the highest chunk and item capacity at the very point when everything is 
7  I hope that someone else, more qualified than myself, has devised or will devise 
a better formula.
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planted or refreshed in working memory. Fernard Gobet and Gary Clark-
son (2004) demonstrate that, for experts (those with the highest capacity), 
the number of chunks is fewer than three, but they are templates from long-
term memory and the items they hold are go up to fifteen. The Gobet and 
Clarkson alpha value, then, for an expert with fresh working-memory con-
tent would be (2 * 15) * 1 = 30 items. The inner voice would have, if Cowan’s 
experiments are definitive, half a word at the least, three words on average, 
and (at the most) two alexandrines or 12-syllable lines (or three pentameter 
lines, following Gobet and Clarkson). 
The alpha value does not give information calculated in bits. That amount 
is less than the items represented by the alpha value because all human 
languages are redundant. Further, the alpha value is not an intelligence 
quotient, or a measure of long-term memory size, or a limit on what we can 
communicate to others. Almost all speech and thought-making take place 
in the unconscious mind and feed off a long-term memory store that we can 
probe but never read. Damage to phonological working-memory capacity 
does not impede sentence comprehension (Martin 1987). Alan Baddeley 
explains that, on the basis of experimental work with children and second-
language learners, the phonological loop is the system that evolution has 
developed for the crucial task of language acquisition. Adults who have a 
disruption to this system do not have too many problems, provided they 
are not required to learn new languages (2004: 54).
We are aware of an intelligence working in the cognitive background as 
a gist of something we want to say. Although we can consciously schema-
tize the process of thinking, we cannot recall how this gist emerges, that is, 
how we make a thought. Working memory thus limits the mastery of lan-
guage, not thought. It is the mental function (other than immediate audi-
tory or echoic memory) where we are conscious of what our mind gener-
ates or receives before vocalization and where we can do something about 
that awareness, such as commit it to long-term memory or to paper. Our 
unconscious continues to feed language effortlessly, spontaneously, into 
subvocal working memory in chunks that fit within the phonological loop. 
The retrievability limit represented by the alpha value is unaltered by 
what enters our sensory stores, whether echoic or iconic. Both these imme-
diate forms of sensory memory, echoic or auditory, iconic or visual, decay 
rapidly after 250 milliseconds or a quarter of a second and are gone utterly 
after half a second (Robinson-Riegler 2004: 104-5). The longer we continue 
to look at something, oddly, the more the iconic image decays (Robinson-
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Riegler 2004: 106-07). We can deliberately store what we see in sensory 
experience in the visual sketchpad, but only after conversion to phonetic 
encoding can we manage it as language. As a result, we again appear to 
bump into the constraints of the phonological loop. What we hear from 
others as vocal speech overwrites some or all its contents. That is why it 
can be hard to finish a thought in words when someone suddenly breaks 
one’s attention by talking to one. Our phonetic working memory has no 
shut-off valve, no filter, to save us from an incoming utterance in a natural 
language we know. 
4. Cognitive Reading
It’s unclear whether we actually edit what we say before we say it, but the 
fact that we edit what we have already said is not in doubt (Robinson-
Reigler 2004: 421).
From time to time we catch ourselves in making a speech error. We stop 
what we are saying in mid-flow with an editing comment such as ‘uh, that is’ 
or ‘um, I mean,’ and we substitute a corrected word or phrase. These sponta-
neous self-repairs illustrate cybertextual cycling. (Comparable are the kinds 
of word-processing corrections that we make as we type a sentence.) Hesi-
tations, pauses, or rests are another sign of message-feedback cycling. We 
may not know why we are hesitating after one phrase, and before the next, 
except that we are not ready to move on. In oral delivery, we nervously use 
fillers or paralanguage to keep the listeners’ attention and signal that some-
thing else is on its way. If we time a lecturer’s use of these fillers, one every 
few seconds, we can see chunking and cybertextual cycling at work.
Self-monitoring also occurs at the pre-vocal cognitive level when a mis-
take is interrupted in the middle of uttering it. Willem Levelt (1989: 467-8) 
proposes that, at different levels of utterance-processing (lexical, phono-
logical, etc.), ‘a watchful little homunculus’ monitors, editor-like, ‘the con-
struction of the preverbal message, the appropriateness of lexical access, 
the well-formedness of syntax, or the flawlessness of phonological-form 
access.’ His self-monitor intercepts or receives both inner (subvocal) and 
covert speech, checks it for errors, and reports back to what he calls the 
‘conceptualiser’ so that it can reformulate the utterance (cf. Hartsuiker and 
others 2005: 4). As an example of an error caught subvocally, before articu-
lation, Levelt gives the example, ‘we can go straight to the ye-[...] to the 
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orange dot,’ and explains that ‘To interrupt right after the first syllable [ye-], 
the error must already have been detected a bit earlier, probably before 
the onset of articulation’ (1999: 33; and for additional evidence, see Hart-
suiker and Kolk 2001). Another recent experimental finding, from magne-
toencephalography, is that self-uttered speech takes about 100 milliseconds 
to activate the speaker’s own auditory cortex (Curio and others 2000: 190). 
This suggests to me that self-monitoring of such errors occurs in prevocalic 
inner speech,8 somewhat in advance of actual vocalization. Levelt believes 
that self-monitoring can only be effected by a cognitive process parallel to 
the one that authors an utterance. This process would read incremental 
stages of composed utterance and return feedback to the authoring proc-
ess. Both processes would be simultaneously active and, at each exchange, 
would effect a cybertextual cycle.
There is already reason to believe that we cognitively model or construct 
what we hear and see, accepting our own model over the initial sensory data. 
Philip Lieberman (2000: 57, citing McGurk and MacDonald 1976), explains 
the well-known McGurk effect. When a person sees a video of the face of 
someone saying ga at the same time as the video sound system outputs ba, 
that person hears the intermediate sound da. If the person covers his eyes, 
however, he hears ba. Test subjects, faced with an inconsistency in the data 
(what might be termed noise), unselfconsciously hear only what they ana-
lyze as being said. The McGurk effect reveals that we use visual evidence 
to determine what a sound is, but it also demonstrates that we integrate, in 
a mandatory and spontaneous way, audiovisual speech syllables that disa-
gree with one another and create a sound never made. Posner and Raichle 
report another instance of how a deep cognitive process emends sensory 
input: ‘if one removes a phoneme from an auditory word and replaces it 
with white noise, what is often heard is the correct word with a burst of 
noise superimposed’ (1994: 112). Semir Zeki agrees that ‘One of the func-
tions of the brain ... is to instill meaning into this world, into the signals that 
it receives,’ but he cautions that often the mind must ‘allow of several inter-
pretations, all of equal validity.’ (2006: 262). We experience these alternate 
meanings sequentially and do not feel obliged to select among them.
The brain betrays its cybertextual cycles in error recognition and recov-
ery. Self-monitoring may extend to any cognitive language representation, 
whether in uttering or reading a word or syllable, where error or ambiguity 
8  Baddeley suggests that the auditory imagery system, not working memory, 
may be responsible for inner speech that accompanies reading (2004: 49). If so, the 
distinction may be marginal because their capacities appear to be identical.
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is perceived. For example, the remarkable N400 brain waves discovered in 
electroencephalographs (EEGs) of individuals reading semantically prob-
lematic or unexpected words show that the long-term memory store reads 
the message as it unfolds and comments on it using data that appear to 
be non-linguistic in nature. An N400, negative-voltage wave in the brain 
peaks 400 milliseconds after it encounters a semantically incongruous 
word (Robinson-Reigler 2004: 391; Federmeier and Kutas 1999). The N400 
wave registers a channel-wide response to an unexpected mental utterance 
such as ‘Experience is the mother of despair.’ After formulating a message 
partially, the brain responds to it, occasionally with a N400 wave, other 
times with vocal self-repair. Because we cannot script our words haltingly 
in working memory before we say them, because we seldom know exactly 
what we are going to say until we actually say it subvocally or aloud (as E. 
M. Forster says), and because we hear ourselves speak and see ourselves 
write at almost the same time as a listener or a viewer does, we need an 
unselfconscious error-checking facility in place to catch mistakes.
Most speech errors caught by our cognitive self-monitoring involve a 
switching of word-onset consonants in small phrases (e.g. phrall smases). 
These are well within the alpha value for management in working memory. 
Larger errors in syntactical structure, such as subject-verb agreement in 
number, elude detection until we engage in close editing and proofreading 
or run an analysis by automatic style-checking software. The perceptual 
span in reading a text has a comparable capacity to the phonological loop. 
Our eyes traverse in successive fixations, saccades (left-to-right jumps), 
and regressions (reverse saccades). A saccade takes twenty milliseconds 
and traverses six to eight letters, and a fixation lasts 200-300 milliseconds,9 
unless it settles into a gaze, and encompasses about three characters to the 
right and fifteen to the left (or four to five words in length). College-level 
students move and fix their eyes 90 times for every 100 words, 25 percent 
of which saccades are regressive (Crowder 1992: table 2.1). The phrase, 
‘watchful little homunculus,’ describes both the cognitive self-monitor and 
the reading eye. Both perceive mental speech segmented in comparable 
spans whose capacity may approximate also the alpha value.
Language self-consciousness appears to be a stream but, when exam-
ined closely, consists of staccato-like pulses in which a succession of chunks, 
proposed by a cognitive conceptualizer (which we experience as the gist of 
9  We fixate more briefly on function words than on content words (Gleason and 
Ratner 1998: fig. 5.4). 
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what we intend to say), are monitored for correctness by a parallel process 
before being articulated. The Muse who brings texts piecemeal into being 
from darkness, and the Editor who announces corrections to those texts 
and knits them together from much the same obscurity, feedforward and 
feedback our utterances in cybertextual cycles. Messages are normally frag-
ments. The phrasal size of caught speech errors, and the perceptual span in 
reading, both fall near the alpha value. Is this value, then, a broader cogni-
tive storage limit? Although the brain has ‘1011 neurons connected by 1015 
synapses’ (Chklovskii and others 2004: 782), and the consensus is that our 
long-term memory capacity is limitless, working-memory capacity is con-
ceded to filter and constrain information, especially language data, enter-
ing the long-term store. Is it possible, then, that there may be a maximum 
conceptual span, an upper limit on the extent of a cognitively manageable 
associative memory cluster?10 Would it be so odd if all memory systems 
worked by the same numbers?
Gilgamesh, the Bible, War and Peace, and La Divina Commedia are not just 
phrasal sequences: these epic achievements have, camel-like, come through 
the eye of such  needles as the alpha and omega values. It is unclear whether 
a faulty phonological loop would have prevented Dante, Tolstoy, and 
Shakespeare from writing. However, because language is always chang-
ing, language learning never stops. If evolution designed the phonological 
loop for language learning, then it is also, to a degree, the Procrustean bed 
of language. Has anyone in recent memory created a substantial utterance, 
novel-sized, simply with the unaided human memory system? Most of us 
cannot manage a list of groceries, even though we may well be able to use 
language well enough not to starve.
How have we overcome the limits of these values? We have externalized 
the Muse and the Editor. Writing, printing, and digital tools have exported 
much of our Muse, that is, our long-term memory and lexical production 
system (as Levelt calls it), into dictionaries, encyclopedias, and the world’s 
vast libraries. Word processors operating on computer workstations with 
visual displays have imported some of the knowledge by which Willem 
Levelt’s ‘watchful little homunculus’ corrects speech errors. Our worksta-
tion adds two additional dynamic systems to those which that our cogni-
tion calls its own. While the eyes are fixed on the page and on the screen, 
iconic memory maintains a much fuller copy of what we have uttered than 
working memory could ever have stored. 
10  I discuss the omega value for this below.
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5. Cognitive Capacity
What impact does a thought-capacity limit — the omega value — have 
on our uttered texts? Except for conversation, where the amount of text 
between turns is quite small, we do much better than generate phrases and 
paragraphs. The process by which we cobble our chunks into speeches, 
essays, and books uses two technologies, the more recent being external 
memory and processing systems from writing (which first unfettered 
length restrictions on sentences and paragraphs) to word processing, and a 
second, more ancient one in the loci et imagines method of artificial memory 
described in Frances Yates’ The Art of Memory (1966). It asks the extempo-
raneous speaker to prepare by mapping the order of his sentences as stops 
on a walk through a public place like a forum or a mall, and the content of 
each of those sentences in an object placed, mentally, in each stop. As the 
author speaks, he guides himself by mentally taking his own guided tour 
through the place, pausing at each stop to pick up its object. (For example, 
if I memorized the structure of this essay by mapping it to my local retail 
park, I might think of artificial memory as the local Indigo bookstore and 
place a toy locomotive, symbolizing the loci et imagines method, at its front 
door.)
This method can be observed today in the behaviour of experts and 
mnemonists. Chess masters can rapidly move schemas (the templates 
in Gobet and Clarkson 2004), which are specially encoded and stored in 
long-term memory, in and out of working memory. They can expand the 
sub-parts of these schemas without losing track of where they are. This 
mental technique shuttles between the two memory systems, leading to 
a ‘10-fold increase in performance on tests of STM [Short Term Memory],’ 
but only in their specific areas of expertise (Ericsson and Kintsch 1995: 
211-12). Normally it takes between five and ten seconds to store a memory 
long-term and a second to retrieve it, but experts manage to make retrieval 
from long-term memory only 300 milliseconds longer than from working 
memory (1995: 215). This technique draws not on deductive logic but on 
stored memories of sequences of moves and positions on a chessboard. 
Experienced writers and readers have similar stocks of sentence and para-
graph structures in long-term memory that can be applied at need. Writers 
like John Milton, Henry James, James Joyce, and Cormac McCarthy can 
produce very long sentences, extending well beyond page boundaries. 
Periodic styles like Milton’s in Paradise Lost, composed mentally in daily 
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segments while he was blind, and dictated to his daughters in the morning, 
must have grown from decades of expertise as a master of Latin, Greek, 
and Hebrew, and as Oliver Cromwell’s Latin secretary. Milton and these 
other writers are as great experts in English composition as chess grand 
masters are in positional play. The making and exploitation of these sche-
mas constitute individual traits, but they do not enlarge personal cognitive 
capacity. The expert learns to associate a more-or-less abstract analytic map 
in long-term memory with many small but fully-realized codes for that 
map in working memory.
That we cannot use an expert’s mental technique generally suggests that 
some general cognitive capacity limit exists on our ability to comprehend 
thoughts as well as utterances. Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf 
believe that we can only think in natural language − to them, there is no 
distinction between thought and language − while others believe that we 
think in non-linguistic concepts, often called mentalese, and then translate 
its output into language (Pinker 1994: 67-82). Language being a late evolu-
tionary development, should we deny thought to so many other language-
less species (including our own, not so long ago)? Insofar as language 
represents only a part of the content of our long-term memory, also, does 
it make sense that we do not think with the images, events, and sounds 
stored in it when so many testify otherwise? A non-linguistic mentalese 
offers a plausible foundation for the making of all languages from Swahili 
to symbolic logic and music, much as XML,11 for example, enables us to 
devise a multitude of encoding languages. The inchoate gist we feel before 
saying something has not been shown to be natural language.
If languageless thought observes a cognitive capacity limit, does it 
exceed the alpha limit on speech in working memory? Well, of course who 
cannot comprehend instantly a sentence that takes longer than two sec-
onds to utter? That granted, a limit manifests itself in many ways. When we 
artificially interfere with someone’s working memory, as by giving a writer 
a second, simultaneous task, we know that his sentence length falls. We 
know that college students who had to hold in memory six digits concur-
rently even as they devised two-noun sentences wrote significantly shorter 
sentences (Kellogg 2004). The practice of professional writers is also telling. 
Average sentence length in 58 articles in The Independent newspaper is only 
24.58 words (Hearle 2007), that is, about two alexandrines in length. Oxford 
11  �ML (Extensible Markup Language) is a set of rules for encoding documents X
electronically.
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University Press recommends that sentences average 15-20 words. The 
most frequent length for sentences in the million-word Brown Corpus12 is 
twelve words (Sigurd, and others 2004). Sentence length also turns out to 
be a factor in syntactic difficulty, as vocabulary length (in word-syllables, 
for example) is in semantic difficulty: together those lengths define read-
ability measures like the Flesch-Kincaid (Kincaid and others 1975). If our 
minds did not have a cognitive capacity limit during reading, we would 
not have to develop readability measures that often exceed the phonologi-
cal loop. These measures imply that a capacity limit exist for understanding 
outside working memory as well as for phonemes inside it. How big is this 
limit, and how do we even find the words and the measures to tell?
The omega value here names how large a language-mediated thought 
we can mentally grasp. This conceptual span is related to the gist with 
which authors begin in formulating an utterance. If we reverse the cognitive 
sentence-production process, translating sentences back into concepts, as 
readers do in text comprehension, we reduce an utterance with many parts 
(syntactic structures that build on phrases and words, supplemented by 
information on how to pronounce) to an originating, graspable thought. So 
far, we have not been able to measure how large this conceptually graspa-
ble entity may be, but several approaches look promising. Two appear in 
cognitive psychology: our ability to measure the psychological status of 
propositions; and the discovery that students who can solve a problem by 
using a worked-example fail — by exceeding their cognitive load — when 
asked to employ an ends-means technique. Others belong to the humani-
ties. For example, self-imposed text-length restrictions plausibly register 
sensitivity to a general human cognitive capacity, so do the size limits of 
poetic forms. So far, little attention has been paid to text genres as evidence 
of cognitive capacity.
Propositions in cognitive psychology are subject-predicate units, con-
centrated to their ideational minimum, and their modifying elements. They 
differ from the three linked, unmodified propositions in a typical Aristote-
lian syllogism: the premises and the conclusion. The terms in logical propo-
sitions repeat in a set order, expressible symbolically as A → B, C → A, and 
C → B. 
12  The Brown Corpus is a carefully compiled selection of current American Eng-
lish, totalling about a million words drawn from a wide variety of sources. It was 
first compiled by Henry Kucera and W. Nelson Francis at Brown University, Provi-
dence, RI in 1963-64.
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Here is an example:
Given that 1. Humans are mortal. A → B
and given that 2. Socrates is human C → A
it follows that  3. Socrates is mortal. C → B
The first two propositions share a common term as a premise (human), 
and the last proposition joins the two unrelated terms in the preceding two 
premises (mortal, and Socrates). Propositional analysis in cognitive psy-
chology, in contrast, concerns the mental status of any subject-predicate 
unit, simple or modified.
Walter Kintsch (1998: 69-73) describes half a dozen experiments about 
how test subjects mentally process propositions. One shows that we retrieve 
a proposition and its modifier differently. For example, if at some point test 
subjects are primed with a sample sentence, ‘Socrates posed moral ques-
tions that never failed to annoy his wealthy students,’ and later cued with 
the word ‘questions,’ these subjects would recall words from the core prop-
osition (e.g., ‘Socrates’) better than ones from the modifier (e.g., ‘students’). 
In another experiment, when subjects had to remember instructions, ‘Dou-
bling the number of propositions from two to four caused an increase in 
errors from 3% to 52%’ (1998: 70), but doubling the number of words made 
no difference. Kintsch himself co-authored an experiment that showed that, 
for every proposition added to a text, reading time increased by 1.5 sec-
onds. These results point to a capacity limit in maintaining in memory any 
proposition, that is, an utterance converted from natural language to its 
underlying conceptual meaning. Four terms in two propositions, read in 
three seconds, cause no trouble, but eight terms in four propositions, read 
in six seconds, cause cognitive breakdown. These numbers recall Cowan’s 
two-second phonological memory capacity, 4 ± 2, yet they represent not 
sounded words but thought. Word-counts are not the right measure for 
cognitive capacity because readers often model (understand) text in terms 
of the propositions to which it can be reduced, and the word-count of an 
easily grasped proposition can well exceed the capacity of working mem-
ory. However, if we substitute propositional terms for words in Cowan’s 
‘magic number,’ the same formula seems to apply to cognitive capacity. 
Could it be 4 ± 2 propositional terms, if we keep in mind that, for an expert, 
a term may well point to a substantial schema in long-term memory?13 
13  Cognitive load theory (Sweller 1988, 2006) shows that students oft en fail to 
solve a problem in mathematics or physics because they use means-ends analysis, 
which exhausts their cognitive capacity. However, students who use worked ex-
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Do poetic forms offer corroborating evidence? Early verse forms such 
as the four-beat, two-part oral-formulaic Anglo-Saxon line link two short 
phrases by means of alliteration. In 1979 John B. Lord observed that Mill-
er’s ‘magical number’ constrains line-length in Anglo-Saxon verse, but the 
maximum number of lines that form a unified thought in Old English is 
hard to determine because no stanzaic forms existed then. However, we 
can measure the number of syllables in verse segments by poets such as 
Chaucer, after writing became common in England (a form of artificial 
memory). He used, not alliterating initial word-syllables, but nine- or ten-
syllable lines bounded by terminal rhymes. If verse forms might be said to 
define a passage length, Chaucer’s maximum-length verse unit was not the 
rhyming couplet in the Canterbury Tales but the rhyme-royal stanza found 
in Troilus and Criseyde: seven pentameter lines, mainly end-stopped, that 
rhyme ababbcc and have about seventy syllables or 56 words. A contempo-
rary manuscript image shows Chaucer reading Troilus to a court audience, 
people with some education. He must have assumed that courtiers — who 
were not scholars — could hold and comprehend, as coherent thoughts, 
passages much longer than the capacity of working memory. Does Chau-
cer’s rhyme royal conceivably mark an omega value, the cognitive capacity 
of a thought? 
Let me convert the words in a popular hymn stanza to propositional 
form, Isaac Watts’ ‘Man Frail and God Eternal’ (beginning ‘Our God, our 
help in ages past’), written in common measure. Its eighth stanza has six 
different terms (time, stream, bear everything away, sons, dream, and die at 
dawn) in seven linked propositions.
Time, like an ever-rolling stream,
Bears all his sons away;
They fly, forgotten, as a dream
Dies at the op’ning day.
1. Time is like a stream.
2. A stream bears everything away.
3. Time bears everything away. 
4. Time bears away his sons.
5. Time’s sons are like a dream.
6. A dream dies at dawn.
7. Time’s sons die at dawn.
amples (which help create schemas in long-term memory) can operate within their 
capacity and learn effectively. This expert technique does not increase the number 
of chunks but enlarges the scope of the terms in each chunk.
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The fact that the word-count, 21, overflows average working-memory 
capacity seems to have had no effect on the ease with which ordinary peo-
ple comprehend this stanza, but this sequence of seven propositional terms 
exceeds the 4 ± 2 capacity that the experiments of Kintsch and others sug-
gest for cognitive capacity. Is the omega value larger?
I am guessing not. Most readers will not transform poetic text into logi-
cal form in order to comprehend it. They will likely process language as 
words, images, and episodes in a narrative: that is, they will simultaneously 
use two or more of the phonological loop, the visuospatial sketchpad, and 
the episodic buffer in working memory. Remembered images have the 
same 4±2 constraint (foci) as the phonological loop has for auditory speech 
(terms); possibly the episodic buffer may have some such limit as well. If 
so, and if we use the full resources of our working memory to be conscious 
of a verbalized thought, might it not expand to 12±6 elements in all? Watts’ 
stanza has eight propositional terms (the subjects and objects time, stream, 
sons, dream, and dawn, and the verbs be, bear away, and die) and three images 
(time the river bearing sons away, sons flying forgotten, and a dream lost 
at dawn). 
Our cognitive capacity could thus be a multiplier of the alpha value. 
If thought exists partly independently of the language in which it is 
expressed – and the behaviour of primates indicates that it does − we could 
understand the meaning of a sentence that is too large to fit, as auditory 
language, in working memory by activating the non-verbal slave systems 
of working memory. Cognitive capacity, the phonological loop, the visu-
ospatial sketchpad, the episodic buffer, and the visual reading span might 
all be defined in terms of a single comparable constraint. 
6. Reading Authorial Process
How can we determine an author’s cognitive capacity? A reading method 
— not for meaning but for process — cannot be expected to mature quickly 
because it waits on scientific research of brain function. Yet, I have stum-
bled over some heuristic techniques. The extent of text that an author can 
write before repeating himself might well signal his omega value. Shake-
speare’s appears to have been about as long as a 14-line sonnet (Lancashire 
1999). The output of a blind author, someone who could not store his utter-
ances in writing or by dictating to a machine, might establish a limit: in 
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creating Paradise Lost when blind, Milton reputedly could create and hold 
20-30 decasyllabic lines a night before uttering them to an amanuensis. Or, 
when an author edits a written version of a text, the average size of his 
interpolations — newly-minted and inserted passages — might represent 
a cognitive limit. 
Alpha and omega values may not themselves be stylistic markers but 
they point to what we should be looking for. Although chunk size is uni-
versal, the lexical combinations that comprise an author’s chunks will be 
idiolectally distinctive. Cognitive capacity does not vary from one person 
to another, but the schemata that authors, as experts, expand to use that 
capacity and can rapidly shuttle in and out of working memory reflect indi-
vidual expertise. (A critic must work hard not to impose his own schemas 
in interpreting an author’s schemas.) Authorship attribution might also 
conceivably develop measures for how authors express propositional con-
tent. We might use the ratio of a proposition’s length in terms and modifiers, 
to the word-count of the corresponding text into which that proposition 
is translated, as a stylistic marker. Francis Bacon’s Essays are as renowned 
for their Tacitean concision as Sir Philip Sidney’s prose is for its Ciceronian 
amplitude. On average, it seems likely that Sidney will take more words, 
Bacon fewer, to declare the same proposition or thought. 
If authors sometimes leave traces behind in rare written drafts and 
audio recordings, once we learn to read a text for authorial processing, we 
can detect these traces. Examples are everywhere, but I will discuss only 
two, the spontaneous flow of Shakespeare’s Addition II in The Book of Sir 
Thomas More (1910), and Virginia Woolf’s calculated recraftings of passages 
in The Waves (1976, 2006).  
The Book of Sir Thomas More
Hand D in this unpublished play, found over one hundred years ago in 
British Library MS Harley 7368, is now accepted by most scholars as Shake-
speare’s, from about 1594-95. This offers an opportunity to test cybertextu-
ality. G. Blakemore Evans (1974) describes the 147 lines of Addition II by 
Hand D as ‘an authorial first draft, with vague and carelessly used speech-
prefixes and with deletions and insertions made in the process of com-
position’ (1974: 1684). Figure 1, below, a facsimile of folio 9r (part of this 
Addition), shows 52 lines of text, with 446 word-tokens, of which 243 are 
word-types, for a type-token frequency of 0.41, a fairly high rate of repeti-
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Figure 1: fol. 9r, British Library Harley MS 7368 (Croft 1973: I, 23).
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tion. The secretary hand has some odd features, like the so-called spurred 
a (hath in line 7). 
Table 1, below, is a transcription of this page. Two numbers precede each 
chunk, its line number, and then the number of its syllables. It segments 
Shakespeare’s chunks according to three boundaries, the verse-line end, 
mid-line punctuation, and the points of error-repair. Shakespeare’s compo-
sition took place in chunks that correspond in phrasal length to the alpha 
value, self-repaired speech errors, and reading span. Pairs of passages, the 
first pair in italic, the second in boldface, and so forth, show Shakespeare 
repeating himself: evidence for chunk-segmentation, as well as of feedback 
from reading what he had just penned. Marked, in small capitals, are sev-
eral passages where Shakespeare’s composition slowed down considerably, 
to judge from letter spacing, word-size, and writing out of a word normally 
abbreviated. These hesitations conceivably mark moments where his cog-
nitive Editor was at work.
Blank-verse lines, written so as to be 10-11 syllables in length, are con-
ceptual units for playwrights of this period. Shakespeare shaped his words 
so as to fit them in these 10-11 syllable sequences, but he often broke lines 
at mid-point: here, in 24 of the 52 lines. These caesural pauses are marked 
plainly by a comma or a period, and occasionally by a long space, encoded 
here as <>. Shakespeare does not routinely use full-stops in his writing. For 
example, lines 18-19, ‘why euen yor hurly / cannot proceed but by obedienc 
what rebell captaine / as mutynes ar incident, by his name / can still the 
rout,’ have no sentence-ending period or comma after ‘obedienc’? Or lines 
24-25 go unpunctuated despite their stream of verbs: ‘youle put downe 
straingers / kill them cutt their throts possesse their howses.’ Rather, Shake-
speare appears to use a full-stop as a pause while he waited for the next 
phrasal unit to emerge. The two dozen set-off 5/6-syllable half-lines show 
a regular constraint at work, suggesting that Shakespeare composed in 
phrasal chunks.
The ten errors that Shakespeare makes reveal his mind in the act of 
emending them as he wrote. Six of these self-repairs exhibit cybertextual 
feedback and unveil aspects of his language cognition. 
1. In line 7, after writing god hath not le (7), and regretting the repetition 
of both god and lent from line 3, Shakespeare crosses out god and adds he 
just to the left of it and decides to qualify the verb by only (and so he excises 
the first syllable of lent). 
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Line Syllables              Text
1 6 ALL MARRY GOD FORBID THAT 
2 6 MOO  NAY CERTAINLY YOU AR 
3 10 FOR TO THE KING GOD HATH HIS OFFYCE LENT 
4 5 of dread of Iustyce,
4 5 power and Comaund 
5 4 hath bid him rule, 
5 6 and willd you to obay 
6 10 and to add ampler matie . to this 
7 3 he god hath not le 
7 8 only lent the king his figure 
8 4 his throne his & sword, 
8 7 but gyven him his owne name 
9 6 calls him <> a god on earth, 
9 4 what do you then 
10 10 rysing gainst him <> that god himsealf enstalls 
11 4 but <> ryse gainst god, 
11 6 what <> do you to yor sowles 
12 7 in doing this <> o desperat ar 
12 3 as you are . 
13 10 WASH YOUR FOULE MYNDS WT TEARES <> AND THOSE SAME HANDS 
14 10 that you lyke rebells lyft against the peace 
15 4 LIFT <> VP FOR PEACE, 
15 6 AND YOUR VNREUERENT KNEES 
16 10 THAT MAKE THEM YOUR FEET <> to kneele to be <> forgyven 
17 4 is safer warrs, 
17 6 then euer you can make 
18 7 whose discipline is ryot, 
18 4 why euen yor warrs hurly 
19 14 cannot proceed but by obedienc what rebell captaine 
20 7 as mutynes ar incident, 
20 3 by his name 
21 11 can still the rout who will obay th a traytor 
22 10 or howe can well that proclamation sounde 
23 11 when ther is no adicion but a rebell 
24 7 to quallyfy a rebell, 
24 5 youle put downe straingers 
25 10 kill them cutt their throts possesse their howses 
26 10 and leade the matie of lawe in liom 
27 6 to slipp him lyke a hound, 
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Line Syllables              Text
27 8 sayeng alas alas say nowe the king 
28 5 as he is clement, 
28 5 yf thoffendor moorne 
29 11 shoold so much com to short of your great trespas 
30 6 as but to banysh you, 
30 5 whether woold you go. 
31 11 what Country by the nature of yor error 
32 12 shoold gyve you harber go you to ffraunc or flanders 
33 6 to any Iarman province, 
33 5 to spane or portigall 
34 4 nay any where why you 
34 7 that not adheres to Ingland 
35 7 why you must <> needs be straingers . 
35 4 woold you be pleasd 
36 11 to find a nation of such barbarbous temper 
37 11 that breaking <> out in hiddious violence 
38 5 woold not afoord you, 
38 5 an abode on earth 
39 10 whett their detested knyves against yor throtes 
40 4 spurne you lyke doggs, 
40 6 and lyke as yf that god 
41 6 owed not nor made not you, 
41 6 nor that the elaments 
42 11 wer not all appropriat to ther yor Comforts . 
43 6 but Charterd vnto them, 
43 4 what woold you thinck 
44 4 to be thus vsd, 
44 6 this is the straingers case 
45 11  all AND THIS YOUR <> MOMTANISH <> IN HUMANYTY 
46 13 fayth a saies trewe letts vs do as we may be doon by 
47 12 all Linco weele be ruld by you master moor <> yf youle stand our 
48 7 freind to procure our pardon 
49 10 moor Submyt you to theise noble gentlemen 
50 10 entreate their <> mediation to the kinge 
51 12 gyve vp yor sealf to forme obay the maiestrate 
52 4 and thers no doubt, 
52 6 but mercy may be found. <> 
52 5 yf you so seek it 
Table 1. Transcript of fol. 9r, British Library Harley MS 7368
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The two self-repairs occur within a four-word span. The first error 
interruption occurs in mid-syllable at le. This indicates the short strokes 
in which the cognitive engine pumps out utterances, as well as shows that 
the inner Editor is pre-conscious, seeing a problem at a point preceding 
vocalization. 
One more error occurs because Shakespeare recognizes that he is repeat-
ing himself. 
2. Another hand, belonging to a professional scribe (and thus irrele-
vant for our purposes), crosses out everything in lines 17-19 and adds two 
replacement clauses, ‘in in to yor obedienc’ and ‘tell me but this’ above the 
lines.14 Shakespeare’s only deletion here is to cross out warrs (line 18) and 
write hurly afterwards. He appears to have recognized an unwise repetition 
of the word from the previous line. When he corrected this is unclear.
The first occurrence of warrs takes place 12 words before the error halts 
Shakespeare. This result could have been prompted either by a regressive 
saccade or by a conceptual trace or by active iconic memory as he was look-
ing at the page on which he was writing.
Four self-repairs arise from a last-moment change in immediate syntax 
that does not affect the preceding text. 
3. In line 12, Shakespeare deletes the eighth syllable, ar, just after he had 
written it, evidently because he realized that it would be hard to fill out the 
line to 10-11 syllables: he then adds the needed three syllables, as you are. 
The motive for this self-repair is a problem in metrical line length.
4. At the start of line 16, a change in syntax dictates the deletion of that: 
Shakespeare remakes a subordinate clause modifying feet into an impera-
tive clause. The deletion must have been made immediately.
5. In line 27, Shakespeare deletes sayeng and replaces it by say to intro-
duce an imperative clause. (The addition of alas alas above, an extrametrical 
four syllables, is harder to understand: the scribe later deleted these words.)
6. At line 34, Shakespeare deletes why you to introduce a seven-syllable 
subordinate clause rather than immediately give the seven-syllable excla-
mation, ‘why you must needs be straingers,’ that he instead postpones to 
the next line. 
All these self-repairs15 signal cognitive feedback to the author’s own 
14  Scribal changes are not included in the transcription.
15  There are four other self-corrections. (1) A worry about repeating his three 
times leads him to cross out the second his in line 8 and overwrite it with an amper-
sand. Because it does not follow the offending his, Shakespeare could have corrected 
it in re-reading the finished speech. (2). In line 21, he deletes th and follows imme-
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emerging speech. Note how Shakespeare often makes syntactical changes 
at phrasal boundaries: only then can his Editor perceive how his uncon-
scious mind is tying a phrase to its successor. Another way of putting this is: 
Shakespeare fought his own unconscious maker at its weakest, which was 
in forging long units (sentences) from sequences of short ones (phrases). 
In this page, Shakespeare was affected by what he had just uttered on 
six occasions when he repeats, with variation, word-clusters or seman-
tic groupings that occurred earlier. One (we have already seen) elicited a 
conscious error check: the repetition of god, lent, and king (3, 7). Caroline 
Spurgeon found this semantic combination also in Richard II (1930: 265-
66). Three other clusters have repetitions following one another closely: the 
cluster rise, gainst, and god (at lines 10 and 11), the cluster lift and peace (at 
lines 14 and 15), and the cluster wars, discipline / obedienc, and riot / rout 
(at lines 17-18 and 18-21). These occur inside spans that fit into working 
memory. Two others, however, activate only after a long interval, eleven 
and eight lines later. The first is the cluster obay / obedience, king / rebell, and 
name (at lines 5-8 and 19-21). The second is the cluster straingers, cutt / kny-
ves, throts / throtes, howses / abode, and hound / doggs (at lines 24-27 and 35-40). 
Spurgeon finds these clusters in half a dozen plays as ‘peculiarly character-
istic of Shakespeare’ (1930: 269). Here they look like feedback from persist-
ence of vision, the effect of iconic sensory memory as Shakespeare kept his 
eyes on the page; or, from time to time, when at a pause, he let them shift 
upwards in a recursive saccade. All illustrate cybertextual cycles at work.
The last evidence of self-monitoring occurs when Shakespeare’s hand 
slows down, the writing equivalent to hesitation in speech. A combination 
of traits in letter spacing, word-size, and expansion of a normally abbrevi-
ated word identify three passages as written more slowly than the rest. They 
are (a) lines 1-3, (b) lines 13, 15, and the first half of 16, and (c) line 45. The 
two telltale orthographic signals of delay in lines 1-3 are the separation of 
initial fo from the rest of the word in fo rbid (1) and fo r (3), and the whole or 
partial isolation of initial or medial t from the rest of the word in cer t ainly 
(2) and t o (3).16 Note also the separation of g from the rest of the word g od 
diately with a traytour: the indefinite article does not suggest a specific individual. 
(This also characterizes Shakespeare’s usage later at lines 23-24 where he writes a 
rebell.) He catches this error right away. (3) At line 33, Shakespeare deletes the to in 
to spane or portigall, presumably for metrical reasons. (4) At some point, Shakespeare 
corrects a spelling mistake, the second r to b in the word barbarous in line 36.
16  Later, at lines 16 (forgyven), 38 (afoord), and 51-52 (forme and found), this separa-
tion disappears. Normally, initial t in to is unseparated (see lines 5-6, 11, the second 
half of 16, 24, 27, etc.).
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(1), and the isolation of r in ce r t ainly (2). Line 13 has both separated initial 
fo (in fo ule) and the first occurrence, on this page, of expanded your. Shake-
speare normally uses abbreviated yor, the sign of a rapid hand at work, as 
in lines 11, 18, 31, 39, 42, and 51. Lines 13, 15, and 16 (each slowly penned), 
however, each has expanded your. The third passage, line 45, exhibits three 
features of slow penmanship: unabbreviated your, the isolation of t in the 
odd word momtanish, and the separation of the prefix in (in humanyty).17 
Each delay in writing coincides with a cognitive problem. Lines 1-3 
reveal Shakespeare pausing to work out what More’s speech to the mob will 
be. Delays at lines 13 and 15-16 appear related to Shakespeare’s repair of 
errors at the end of line 12, and the beginning of line 16. Line 45 is especially 
interesting. Shakespeare originally intended this line to be the crowd’s (as 
the speech prefix all shows), but after he penned the prefix he decided that 
it would be More’s crowning indictment of the mob. The first content word 
in this insult, ‘momtanish,’ is unrecorded elsewhere in English: whatever it 
means, Shakespeare invented it, and to this day it must elicit an N400 wave 
on reading.18
Virginia Woolf’s The Waves (1931)
Woolf’s most experimental novel is streams of consciousness by half 
a dozen characters, but it was her own unconscious that initiated those 
streams. Separated by interludes that describe the sea, her chapters reveal 
stages in a lifetime. The Waves once existed in two holograph manuscript 
drafts, three typescripts, and a final printed text dating from September 
1929 to mid-1931. None of the typescripts has survived, but the first and 
second holographs have (Woolf 1976: 30). She typed in the afternoon what 
she wrote in longhand each morning, but usually without changing any-
thing. Leonard Woolf observed that during typing her ‘conscious critical 
intellect was in control and the tension was less’ (1976: 38). One manuscript-
typescript pair thus represents each of a version A (1929-30) and B (1930-31), 
and she used the former as a basis for the latter. Because versions A and B 
have deletions and marginal additions, the two holographs actually reveal 
17  The presence of several large spaces separating words, occurring at lines 11, 16, 
and 45, may be a fourth trait of hesitation.
18  It may be a portmanteau word, �mome�tan�ish‘, i.e. tanned or sunburned like 
a common mome or fool. See OED �tan‘ v., and �mome‘ n. 2. Wentersdorf (2006) sug-
gests that �momtanish‘ is �a contraction of mahometanish’ but if so the word is still 
a poser because the OED recognizes only the different word-form, �Mahometish.’
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four versions, initial and revised A, and initial and revised B. In each ver-
sion, Woolf also sometimes rewrote the same passage several times (1976: 
40). She stored her composed utterances as text in order to work on them 
and trusted her editor more than her muse.
One passage in the published novel (2006: 72) concerns a late-night 
experience by Jinny, one of her six main characters. It appears once in both 
versions A and B (1976: 190, 505). Version A, in 69 words, describes Jinny 
walking down a dark street under windows behind which people had 
undressed and gone to sleep. Then a taxi turns a corner and casts a white 
light on her. Version B, in 122 words, is written in the first person, from Jin-
ny’s point-of-view, rather than in the third person. Interpolated in materials 
from version A is Jinny’s meditation of body-parts she feels — her knee, feet, 
neck, and head — in 45 additional words. Woolf transforms a narration of 
successive events in version A into a singular, present experience in version 
B. The final printed version, in 169 words, adds a further passage, found in 
the middle of the thoughts and experiences of the first two versions, that 
describes the street in terms of the burning of street lamps, the rush of 
pedestrians, and some standing policemen. This has about 48 words. Table 
2 holds an encoded transcription of A, B, and the final printed text.
Chunk size (measured by punctuation) increases over the three versions 
from 1-3 to 1-7 words, and average sentence-length from 4.9 to 6.3 words. 
The longer in time that the text survives in external memory, on paper, the 
longer its length grows. Gradually Woolf’s use of external-memory tools 
relax the constraints of the alpha value in working memory. Each version 
also becomes progressively longer by the addition of one more thought or 
experience. A single thought (in 69 words) becomes two (in 139 words) and 
then three (in 169 words). Woolf rearranges the material of the previous 
version, deleting some words, expanding others, but she also injects a new 
passage into the centre of the old.
The text grows incrementally. Words deleted in the holographs decrease 
from 14.8 percent to 12.2 percent, and words passed on from A to B, and 
from A and B to the final print copy, increase from 34.8 percent to 68.9 
percent. Storing the text where it is visually accessible normally stabilizes 
an author’s text, but Woolf’s working habits show that, although she likely 
reread Version A in starting Version B, she carried forward only chunk-size 
phrases from it and she recast the sentences entirely. For example, version 
A uses the past tense and the third-person, but version B the present tense 
and the first-person. A says ‘everybody must have … gone to bed … which 
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Version A: MS Draft
[underlining: words carried forward to Version B; //: left margin addition]
It was all dark. Indeed, just before the cab turned the corner, one might
have been in the street was so dark that everybody must have been asleep, &
undressed gone to bed, asleep already; undressed, undressed – which was
incredible to Jinny: For she was passing beneath their windows // in silver,
in white; pointed, her body // so different; in a state, that this momentary
darkness affected her solemnly; like the darkness before light; like the hush
¬music begins the violins.
Version B: MS Draft
[underlining: words carried forward from Version A; bold: words carried 
forward to Version C;//: left margin addition]
// & the dark chimney pots & the blue [width?] as I pass shuttered shops;
as I pass the bed rooms // ‘How strange that they should have gone to
bed’ said Jinny. There are no lights in any of these houses. The street is
almost dark. They must be undressing; they must be going to sleep; while
I sit why the night is just beginning. I feel white; I feel shining. Silk is on
my knee. My feet feel the pinch of shoes. the stones my hands a necklace
lie cold on my throat; my head is smooth; I can sit bolt upright, arrayed
prepared; I wait for the so as not to touch my head. // I am arrayed,
prepared // This is the momentary pause; the prelude; the dark moment
before the light pours flares; over me. the music begins.
Version C: Printed
[underscored: words carried forward from Version A; bold: words carried 
forward from Version B]
‘How strange,’ said Jinny, ‘that people should sleep, that people should
put out the lights and go upstairs. They have taken off their dresses, they
have put on white night-gowns. There are no lights in any of these houses.
There is a line of chimney pots against the sky; and a street lamp or two
burning, as lamps burn when nobody needs them. The only people in the
streets are poor people hurrying. There is no one coming or going in this
street; the day is over. A few policemen stand at the corners. Yet night is
beginning. I feel myself shining in the dark. Silk is on my knee. My silk
legs rub smoothly together. The stones of a necklace lie cold on my throat.
My feet feel the pinch of shoes. I sit bolt upright so that my hair may not
touch the back of the seat. I am arrayed, I am prepared. This is the
momentary pause; the dark moment. The fiddlers have lifted their bows.
Table 2: Three versions of a passage from The Waves
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was incredible to Jinny,’ whereas B inverts that structure, ‘How strange 
that they should have gone to bed.’ She thus appears to have started over 
completely, returning to her muse and its long-term-memory stemmata to 
regenerate the utterance. The image or word-cluster in long-term memory, 
strengthened by the afternoon typing, would have held dark, moment, street, 
and light, Jinny and white, and undressed and sleep, eight items occurring 14 
times. Woolf’s authorial process from version B to the final copy was dif-
ferent. Some ten sentences from version B recur in the final copy almost 
verbatim. Much more editing from the page was going on than re-uttering.
The three versions show how chunks structure successive revisionings 
of a passage in The Waves, but they also define Woolf’s omega value. She 
does not allow repetition to mark her omega limit, but the two interpola-
tions in the last two versions have a like size. They extend to 45 and 48 
words in length and amplify two images or ideas in the original, Jinny’s 
whiteness and the street. In version A, verbal repetitions of dark, darkness, 
and undressed, three consecutive events (the undressed going to bed, fol-
lowed by Jinny’s walking, ending with the cab’s turning the corner), and 
two images (dark and light − the undressed sleeping and the street in 
dark, Jinny in sudden light) seem manageable in the three slave systems of 
working memory. The single added thought includes four images in visu-
ospatial working memory (Jinny’s knee, feet, throat, and head), and the 
repeated words feel or touch, and silk, look to be manageable. Because eve-
rything happens in the present, the episodic working memory slave system 
appears inactive. Last, the 45-word addition in the printed copy presents 
three visual foci: street lamps burning, rushing pedestrians, and standing 
policemen.
In these examples, we observe two authorial processes, Shakespearean 
flow and Woolfian inflation. Shakespeare creates spontaneously and cor-
rects only in mid-flow. Once he reaches his cognitive capacity, he some-
times repeats, with variations, what he has just uttered. Woolf sponta-
neously utters a passage in writing and reads it back into her long-term 
memory by typing it out. She then either regenerates the same thought in a 
new flow or she edits the typed copy down on paper. In both instances, she 
typically interpolates a new, spontaneously uttered thought. She inflates 
her text from within. From my inadequate samples, Shakespeare’s cogni-
tive load appears to be larger, about 70-75 words to Woolf’s 45-50 words. 
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7. Conclusion
Cybertextuality draws on cybernetics, computer text analysis, and cogni-
tive psychology to illuminate authors in the texts that survive them. Read-
ers do not constrain an author’s works; the author’s cognitivity does. With-
out an author’s desire to say something, without personal emotional drives 
associated by Antonio Damasio with the pre-frontal cortex (1994), there 
would be no work. The author fashions its propositions, images, and epi-
sodes from his unique associational long-term memory and private, pre-
linguistic thought. When he unselfconsciously formulates the language for 
these declarations, he faces mental constraints that have only become obvi-
ous in the past century. He cannot directly observe the cognitive process of 
uttering until the very end. The capacity of his working memory limits, to 
under two seconds, the amount of language he can consciously work with, 
and then it has to take phonological form as inner speech. If what an author 
wants to say lies outside his long-honed expertise, it cannot be shuttled in 
and out of working memory rapidly and will overflow cognitive capacity. 
What fits within it emerges, pulse-like, pre-phonologically as unspeakable 
chunks or phrases, sometimes with errors. To exert some control over this 
opaque, maddening-at-worst, inspiring-at-best creative process, the author 
relies on cybernetic feedback from his mind’s equally hidden cognitive 
monitor. It tracks phrases and halts him in mid-stride when it finds an error. 
His uttering happens, interrupted regularly by hesitations, paralanguage, 
and self-corrections. Often it is only the feedback of questions by those who 
are listening that enable the author to define what he intends to say, and to 
say it.
Texts (manuscripts, printed books, digitalia) mark significant victo-
ries by both their authors and our species over these limitations. We have 
unrelentingly developed both cognitive and mechanical technologies con-
sciously so as to gain control of our making. Both these mental and exter-
nal technologies create feedback mechanisms and give rise to cybertextual 
cycles. An expert writer pre-builds propositions in long-term memory as 
maps or schemas, and assembles an utterance by linking two of his mem-
ory systems in a collaboration that is cybernetic. Writing, the first external 
technology, made explicit the contents of a collective long-term memory 
and offered a visible space that supplements working memory. Then came 
the computer. Its outliners19 map symbolic concepts to the ampler language 
19  An outliner is a particular type of digital text editor that allows the grouping 
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in which texts must be expressed. Digital technology, however, goes well 
beyond storage to create agents that can interrupt, interrogate, and gloss a 
writer’s work currente calamo. Text-analysis tools, readability software, and 
spell-and-grammar checkers offer feedback on features of writing.
If authorial process can be read, if we can detect how the author oper-
ates within alpha and omega cognitive limits, the maker is not entirely 
inaccessible in the text. We need not capitulate to capitalism, which turns a 
literary creator into an owner, the bearer of copyright. How we are to read 
authorial process is of course much disputed ground. I can suggest heuris-
tics only at this time. Repeated phrases (isolated and clustered), shifts in 
the cursiveness of handwriting, in-process authorial corrections, the extent 
of editorial interpolations, and other stylistic measures (e.g. changes in 
vocabulary richness) signal mental habits that comprise the cognitive base 
of a literary work. When Christians search for the Logos in the texts of the 
Bible, and today when we use, in a revealing metonymy, an author’s name 
for his collected works, we anthropomorphize an alien neurological entity 
that we also have within us but of which we are all, nonetheless, largely 
unconscious. Cybertextuality does not deny the loss of the creator with 
a photographed face and a pronounceable name but finds in all texts an 
anonymous entity. We need authorship attribution methods that can ana-
lyse more works than are orphaned in copyright limbo. 





In very broad terms, the theme of this chapter is disruption of brain func-
tion and its effects on higher order linguistic structure. More specifically, I 
will outline the changes caused by a particular species of neurodegenera-
tive pathology — Alzheimer’s disease — on the physical apparatus of the 
brain, the impact of these changes on the brain’s ability to execute the cogni-
tive tasks involved in the production and comprehension of language, and 
the extent to which this functional disturbance is evident in the products of 
a particular form of linguistic output, namely the production of a literary 
text. If literary aesthetics is the study of sensory, emotional and intellectual 
beauty in literature, and neuroscience the study of how the brain does what 
it does, then here I open a backdoor on the question with which this vol-
ume is occupied by considering physical causes for defects of such beauty 
where we would most expect to find it.
I shall begin by providing a few brief, orienting explanations of brain 
structure in health and disease before moving on to the infinitely more 
complex and controversial subject of how this inchoate mass of axons, den-
drites, synapses and neurotransmitters instantiates a level of organisation 
that we perceive and experience as cognitive activity. 
Although a treatise on battlefield surgery, including detailed macro-
scopic descriptions of the cranial cavity and cerebral cortex, survives in 
a 17th century BC papyrus, and although Claudius Galenus of Pergamum 
(129-200 AD), experimented on the nervous systems of a number of differ-
ent mammals, it is nonetheless neat, comforting, and if nothing else memo-
rable, to consider the origins of modern neurology as synonymous with two 
Englishmen: Head and Brain. Sir Henry Head’s (1861-1940) experiments 
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on cutaneous sensation were largely conducted on himself and a cadre 
of dedicated colleagues (patients’ subjective reports were considered too 
unreliable as a basis for scientific theorising). His legacy was taken up by 
Sir Walter Russell (later Lord) Brain (1895-1966), who wrote a textbook of 
neurology (Brain’s Diseases of the Nervous System) that is now in its eleventh 
edition (Donaghy 2001) and for many years edited the journal that might 
as well have been named after him. Sadly, this line of descent did not con-
tinue in the manner of little Lord Tangent (the only son of Lord and Lady 
Circumference in Evelyn Waugh’s Decline and Fall) with Viscount Lobe, and 
the Hon. Mrs. Sarah Bellum. Happily though, it also escaped that fictional 
family’s painful and ignominious extinction. 
2. The Brain
When removed from its protective bony casing, the brain of an adult human 
appears as a multi-lobed organ with a furrowed surface and has a volume 
of about 1.4 litres. It weighs around a kilogram and a half, which is on aver-
age approximately two percent of total body weight. The brain is a paired 
organ, consisting of two mirror-identical hemispheres. Slice through one 
of these hemispheres, and it becomes apparent that it consists of a sur-
face layer (or cortex), overlying a deeper material (known as white mat-
ter), and that the ridges and furrows on the surface are a result of a large 
outer surface folding in order to fit within the rigid confines of the contain-
ing skull. In general, as you move away from the cortex into the deeper 
structures of the brain – midbrain, cerebellum, brainstem – you encoun-
ter structures critical to reflexive rather than ratiocinative activity: the cer-
ebellum for maintaining balance and coordination; the upper brainstem 
for ensuring that eye movements are yoked together; the lower mediating 
involuntary protective or vegetative phenomena such as blinking, cough-
ing and breathing. It is when these structures are disconnected from higher 
centres, that one encounters the clinically ambiguous and philosophically 
difficult states such as brainstem death (in which all cognitive, reflexive 
and vegetative activity has ceased while the body lives on), the ‘vegetative 
state’ (where there are brainstem reflexes without apparent cortical activ-
ity), or the ‘locked in state’, in which cognitive activity is present but invis-
ible because of complete muscular paralysis.
3. Textual Pathology 73
Magnify up and you find that both white matter and cortex are com-
posed predominantly of nerve cells (neurons), with a characteristic if vari-
able morphology consisting of a cell body, from where the cell’s growth, 
metabolism and behaviour is controlled, a narrow process or axon, which 
makes contact with other neurons, and a complex of extensions known tau-
tologously as the dendritic tree, with which the axons of other neurons 
make contact. 
In contrast to this structural complexity a single neuron is, in functional 
terms, a rather boring entity, being limited to only two states (active or inac-
tive), two effects (excitation or inhibition), and one property (which I will 
call unit memory). When it is inactive, the inside and outside of a neuron 
are maintained in a state of electrical equilibrium, with the interior slightly 
negatively charged relative to the exterior. When activated, the direction 
of polarity rapidly changes; this change is propagated along the length of 
the cell until it reaches the axon terminus, which makes contact (synapses) 
with a dendrite of a neighbouring cell. At this point, the cell’s depolarised 
state causes the release of a protein (neurotransmitter), which acts at the 
membrane of the neighbouring neuron. This chemical signal may be either 
excitatory (encouraging the neighbour into an activated state), or inhibitory 
(making the neighbour more resistant to activation). Any individual neu-
ron will be subject to inputs from many thousands of axon termini, some of 
them sending excitatory signals, others inhibitory; and whether or not the 
second neuron becomes active or not therefore depends on the numerical 
sum of large numbers of positive excitatory or negative inhibitory signals 
received. 
The unit memory of an individual neuron, which enables it to alter in 
response to previous activity – such that it becomes permanently more or 
less likely to respond to similar stimuli in the future – is a property with a 
biological basis that can be demonstrated in laboratory preparations, and 
is known as ‘long term potentiation’, or LTP (Bliss and Lomo 1973). LTP is 
also assumed to be the biological basis for the learning that we experience 
at the psychological level, which is held to depend on this sort of plasticity 
taking place in large-scale neural assemblies. Donald Hebb predicted all 
this in 1949, long before its biological basis was worked out: 
When an axon of cell A is near enough to excite cell B and repeatedly or 
persistently takes part in firing it, some growth process or metabolic change 
takes place in one or both cells such that A’s efficiency, as one of the cells fir-
ing B, is increased. (Hebb, 2002/1949)
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These days, Hebb’s insight is usually summarised by the more memora-
ble phrase ‘cells that wire together fire together’.
Interspersed with neurons are a large number of other cells, collectively 
referred to as glia. Glia outnumber neurons by a factor of ten to one, and 
subserve a diverse range of functions: some simply act as structural sup-
port for neurons, some regulate the chemical balance of the internal envi-
ronment, and others form components of the brain’s immune system. A 
particularly important species of glial cell ensheathes the axons of neurons 
in the deep white matter of the brain, forming a membrane that enhances 
transmission of electrochemical activity, as well as insulating it from inter-
fering activity in its neighbours. Thus, the cells of the white matter are able 
to carry out their primary function: forming channels of communication 
between geographically distant brain regions. Cortical neurons are devoid 
of this insulating sheath, hence the colour difference on the cut slice; in the 
cortex, therefore, informational units combine, at both short and long range, 
to produce a complex system with an effectively limitless number of states. 
3. Cognition and the Brain
Unless we commit ourselves to the implausible doctrines of dualism (Pop-
per and Eccles 1977), and claim that mental activity is different in kind from 
the physical changes that are occurring, from millisecond to millisecond, 
inside the brain, we are left with the question of how all this neurochemical 
activity gives rise to what we experience and see as cognitive activity and 
its products. There has been no serious scientific attempt to support the 
dualist position for over two decades, and it now seems clear that dualism 
is not so much a solution, as a reversal and a postponement of the problem: 
for if neural activity is not the basis of mental activity, then what is it for? 
To cool the blood, as Aristotle speculated? And if mental activity has a dif-
ferent basis, then why does it seem so difficult even to begin scientifically 
to characterise it?
David Marr, the visual neurophysiologist, was the first to articulate the 
idea that the brain, or for that matter any informational system, is suscep-
tible to description at different levels (Marr 1982). He identified these as, at 
the highest level, the goals of the system, followed by the methods used 
to achieve the goal, and the material means by which such a method is 
implemented. We might think of a digital clock, a clockwork timer and an 
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hourglass as sharing a common goal (the division of time into equal por-
tions), while exploiting the physical properties of a range of materials in 
order to achieve it. When applied to the brain, the top level clearly maps 
on to psychological constructs (memory, decision making, communication), 
while neural structures represent the means. To articulate description of 
the brain’s method — its algorithms — is a challenge that is synonymous 
with the modern discipline of cognitive neuroscience. 
To claim that the brain is a computer still prompts a sharp intake of 
breath from those with an aversion to over-simplistic analogies. Clearly the 
danger of any analogy is to take it too far and too literally, leaving room for 
the inevitable reductio ad absurdum (‘if the brain is a computer, then where 
is the keyboard?’). Of course, for those who appreciate the power of anal-
ogy, even this imaginary piece of chicanery invites a very simple answer: a 
keyboard is a device for inputting information to a desktop computer, and 
therefore maps neatly on to the brain’s sense organs. That such an expla-
nation is unlikely to be considered a satisfactory response by the analogy-
phobic is hard to comprehend: I have never heard anybody object to the 
assertion that the heart is ‘a pump’ or the kidney ‘a filter’. The unexception-
able claim of cognitive neuroscience, however, is not so much that the brain 
is ‘a computer’, or even ‘like a computer’ but that a computer and a brain 
(and their physical components) are examples of the same general kind of 
thing; both are devices for representing, storing and manipulating infor-
mation. The analogy-averse are perhaps responding, over-sensitively, to 
the equally self-evident fact that one is infinitely more advanced, complex, 
powerful and versatile at accomplishing these goals than the other.
So if we accept that the brain is implementing its goals in the matrix 
of billions of boring, interconnected single units that I began by describ-
ing, then the next questions to arise are, first, what sort of work does it 
do, and secondly, how does that work result in the goals being accom-
plished? A series of constraints, moral and technical, mean that we can 
only investigate these fundamental questions scientifically in an indirect 
manner, though there are experimental approaches, some of which exploit 
techniques for in vivo visualisation of brain activity while it works towards 
different cognitive goals. The best known of these techniques is functional 
magnetic resonance imaging, or fMRI, which produces maps of regional 
changes in blood flow (a surrogate marker of local neural activity) during 
performance of a well-defined cognitive task. Another approach is to rely 
on the occurrence, through accident or disease, of distortions in cognitive 
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activity following damage or disruption to brain function, and then to try 
to correlate the physical properties of the damaged region with the details 
of the functional deficit (cognitive neuropsychology). 
A third approach is to try to simulate the achievement of a goal using 
computational units with similar properties to those employed by the 
brain. This endeavour is referred to by a variety of different names, includ-
ing ‘connectionist modelling’, ‘parallel distributed processing’ and ‘neu-
ral network theory’: all excellently descriptive names for the same simple 
idea. Take an informational unit which, like a neuron, can be either active 
or inactive, and allow it to influence, in a positive or negative way, any 
number of similar units on to which its activity extends. Set the resulting 
network in motion, and watch activation propagate through it. Make the 
connections between units modifiable, such that those that are subjected to 
large amounts of activation become more sensitive to similar activation in 
the future, and vice versa. Leave such a network alone, and it will eventu-
ally settle into an unchanging steady state. However, it can also be pro-
vided with a target state to achieve, and provided with regular feedback 
on whether it is getting closer to or further from this target. If this feedback 
process is accompanied by small incremental changes in the responsivity of 
its units, then the target state will eventually be reached. 
To appreciate that a similar incremental process may underpin some 
forms of biological learning, think of the process of learning to throw a 
basketball through a hoop: if the ball falls short, or overshoots, we adjust 
our technique accordingly, and after many such sessions we find our initial 
throws more accurate than they were when we started out. Thus, learning 
(a task or skill) is at least one goal that can be instantiated in a network of 
simple units with modifiable connections. 
What about more complex and abstract cognitive activity, such as the 
ability to generalise or draw inferences? We can think of this in terms of 
the essential cognitive goal of forming generic concepts from experience of 
only specific instances. For instance, seeing Rex, Rover, and Snowy in the 
park, hearing them referred to as ‘dogs’, and then correctly deciding that 
Lassie (whom we have never seen before) is a member of the same category. 
There are various ways of accomplishing such a goal: one would be to learn, 
in addition to the defining characteristics of Rex, Rover and Snowy, the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for membership of the class of things to 
which they belong. Another is to store descriptive representations of each 
example, and to look for similarities between the stored representations 
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and anything novel. It should be self-evident that the first of these two 
strategies is not employed in this instance (though it is in others, such as 
the ability to distinguish between a square and a rectangle): for any set of 
necessary and sufficient characteristics of a dog that you might give me (fur, 
legs, ears, a bark, etc.) I could provide an example of a dog that was missing 
at least one of them, but which you would be forced to concede was still a 
dog. The second strategy is undoubtedly more flexible, though also risks 
giving rise to widely differing definitions. 
The problem can be modelled in a network of simple units, in which 
the task to be learned is the assignment of a series of inputs to one of two 
categories (see Figure 1). It turns out that what the network comes to rep-
resent is an average, or prototype, of these various patterns; patterns close 
to the prototype (whether or not the network has been trained on them) are 
assigned; those that do not reach this threshold are rejected. So the network 
not only learns, it generalises to new materials. Better still, if a similar task is 
given to human subjects, most will claim to recognise a prototype as famil-
iar even if they had never previously been exposed to it (Whittlesea 2002). 
Figure 1:  Simplified connectionist network consisting of three layers of active 
(filled) or inactive (unfilled) units, and weighted connections. By modifying its 
weights in response to error, the network can ‘learn’ to associate each of the input 










The point of the above was to provide a sense of how cognitive activity 
might be thought of as being instantiated in the intact cerebral cortex. It is 
not difficult to imagine that, when the structure of the cortex becomes dis-
rupted – when all the long and short range connections that have built up 
to underpin learning, memory, language and reason, start to break down 
– the brain becomes less proficient at carrying out these tasks. This loss of 
structure and organisation can have a number of causes, but by far the 
commonest is the onset and progression of Alzheimer’s disease.
For reasons that are poorly understood, Alzheimer’s disease begins 
when one of the proteins made by the brain (a protein whose function 
is still incompletely understood) undergoes a conformational change, 
becomes insoluble, aggregates, and accumulates inside and between corti-
cal neurons, disrupting function both in the neuron itself and at the syn-
apse. In common with many complex systems, a degree of redundancy is 
Figure 2:  Hypothetical relationship between neuronal loss (x-axis) and cognitive 
function (y-axis), in a neurodegenerative disorder such as AD.  Cognitive function 
remains intact in the face of early degeneration (preclinical phase), and undetect-
ably deficient thereafter (prediagnostic phase) until sufficiently obvious to allow a 
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built into the high-level organisation of the brain, enabling it to function as 
normal even when a proportion of its structural components have become 
damaged or lost. There follows a further phase, during which functional 
disruption takes place but is so mild that the patient and his/her associates 
are unaware of its true nature. These phases are illustrated in Figure 2 and 
can usefully be referred to as the preclinical and prediagnostic. The length 
of the prediagnostic phase depends on a number of variables, including 
the sufferer’s willingness to seek help, and the diagnostic capabilities of the 
doctor, but typically lasts between six and twelve months. The length of the 
preclinical phase is more difficult to determine, though it has been argued 
to extend for many years or even decades (Ohm et al. 1995). I will return to 
this graph and this point towards the end of the chapter.
5. Effects of Neurodegenerative Pathology on 
Language
Once a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease has been established there is (at 
present) no way back, and accumulating damage brings about increasing 
disruption to various cognitive abilities. In Alzheimer’s disease the first 
ability to suffer is usually the acquisition and retention of new information 
(usually referred to as ‘episodic memory’). As more and more of the brain 
succumbs, however, the neural circuits required for maintenance of atten-
tion, visual discrimination, and language also begin to undergo degenera-
tion, resulting in progressive functional decline in all these abilities. Since 
language is the theme of this chapter, let us look briefly at how these dif-
ficulties manifest themselves.
One of the earliest difficulties encountered by patients with Alzheimer’s 
disease is one of word-finding (an inability to call to mind the correct word 
to describe a concept one wishes to convey). This is a familiar — it might 
even be claimed universal — experience, and it almost certainly becomes 
commoner with increasing age. There is not, as far as I am aware, empiri-
cal data to support the latter assertion, and even if there were, it would 
not necessarily imply that incipient degenerative change was responsible, 
since there are both demand and supply side changes to cognitive activ-
ity at different stages of life. By way of a personal anecdote, I was recently 
asked to give my opinion on a patient in front of an audience of clinical 
colleagues, and was forced to stop in mid-sentence by a sudden inability to 
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produce the word ‘confabulate,’ despite having used it in an aside to a col-
league five minutes earlier. I am sure that this experience has been shared 
by many, if not all, readers. 
Everyone is familiar with the so-called ‘tip-of-the-tongue’ phenomenon. 
In fact it is so widespread that scientists, including a group at University 
College London, have used ‘tip-of-the-tongue induction’ as a technique for 
examining the brain’s word production system (Vigliocco et al. 1997). The 
subject is provided with definitions of low-frequency words, and asked to 
produce the term thus defined. For example: [what is the word for] ‘a bit-
tersweet longing for things, persons, or situations of the past’; and ‘a navi-
gational instrument for measuring the angular elevation of the sun or a star 
above the horizon’. This seemingly easy task becomes far from straightfor-
ward when the subject is put under time pressure, leading to the frequent 
‘tip-of-the-tongue’ states for words such as nostalgia and sextant.
I mention this here principally to sharpen the contrast between normal, 
everyday word production difficulties and the profound, clearly pathologi-
cal problems that are seen in patients with Alzheimer’s disease and other 
forms of dementia. For such patients retrieval of even simple vocabulary 
items becomes a daily and progressive problem. Even in the early stages, 
patients will exhibit marked difficulty producing common, concrete nomi-
nal terms in response to pictures such as those in Figure 3. Later, they may 
Figure 3:  Sample stimuli  used in a naming test. 
This straightforward technique may detect difficulties with word 
retrieval and verbal output difficulties early in the course of dementia.
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even fail in the considerably simpler task of selecting the correct referent 
from an array when the item is spoken by the experimenter.
Moreover, there is typically a complete overlap between items that can-
not be visually matched in this way and those that cannot be named. There 
is also a clear and graded relationship between the quality of the naming 
response (i.e. how close the subject came to producing the correct word), 
and the same subject’s ability to produce a list of the item’s features (Gar-
rard et al. 2005). Also, if we arrange the test items in terms of how frequent 
or familiar they are likely to have been in the lives of an average 60 or 70 
year old, it is those at the more unfamiliar end of the spectrum that present 
the greatest difficulty. See Figure 4.
A somewhat more naturalistic technique for studying the phenomenon of 
language breakdown systematically is to give the subject a task that requires 
the production of continuous speech: this could be the recounting of a famil-
iar story (the story of Cinderella is typically employed), or a story implicit 
in a picture. For historical reasons, the picture that is most often used is the 
‘cookie theft scene’ from the Boston Diagnostic Aphasia examination, first 
published by Harold Goodglass and Edith Kaplan in 1972 (Goodglass 2001). 
The picture shows a kitchen scene with various evolving events represented, 
such as an overflowing sink, a daydreaming housewife, and a boy falling off 
a stool as he reaches into a jar labeled ‘cookies’ behind her back.
Figure 4: Percentage of subjects successfully naming various items.
Subjects’ ability to name pictures of items is strongly influenced by how 
familiar they are with the to-be-named item.
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Here is what a typical cognitively normal 60 or 70 year old said when 
asked to describe this scene:
It looks like a very chaotic situation. Children are trying to pinch cookies. 
They are pinching them but he is falling off a stool. The sink is overflowing 
whilst mummy is drying the dishes. She seems to be ignoring the children. 
Looks like a very tidy kitchen. There is a garden outside. The girl is putting 
her finger to her lips saying Shh! so that mum will not hear. Mum seems to 
be absorbed in something else while she is at the sink while the water runs 
over. Very difficult to understand that. Her foot is in water.
This is a fluently produced account, narrative in intent, and organised into 
structurally acceptable sentences, economical in its use of words, which 
constitute a good selection of distinct nouns and verbs. Here, by contrast, 
is the output of a patient with established dementia:
The little girl is looking up to her brother. She holds up her left hand and 
puts her other hand into her mouth to help him. The boy has picked up…a 
cookie or something…. says so on the jar. Going to give it to the girl balanc-
ing in a way. The girl is just holding a plate and various pieces of …well… 
something useful. Standing at a window. Whether the window is open is not 
quite clear to me. The thing where the water is running out. The girl doesn’t 
bother. The window is open. Plate and two cups. House outside changed it 
movement.
Note that this subject utters roughly the same number of words. Despite 
one or two pauses the rate of production is similar. There is a hint of syn-
tactic disintegration (subtly in ‘looking up to her brother’, more obviously 
in the fragmentary final sentence). What is perhaps most striking, however, 
is the impoverished variety of vocabulary used: both daughter and mother 
are referred to as ‘the girl;’ the word ‘tap’ is replaced by a circumlocution; 
the sentence structure is shorter and simpler; there is little sense of narra-
tive – only of piecemeal description.
Most neuropsychologists working in the field of language breakdown 
in Alzheimer’s disease have come to the conclusion that these data imply a 
breakdown in the representation of word and object meaning in the degen-
erating brain: in neuropsychological terms this would be referred to as a 
disintegration of ‘semantic memory’ (Garrard et al. 1997). It is assumed 
further that this faculty forms part of a long-term memory system accrued 
over a lifetime of experience with the world and its contents, and repre-
sented in the brain in the form of a distributed network of information.
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 6. The Iris Murdoch Project
The patient who produced the second of the two ‘Cookie Theft’ descrip-
tions was Iris Murdoch, one of the most acclaimed writers of the twentieth 
century. Between 1952 and 1995 she published 26 novels, as well as sev-
eral volumes of poetry and (mainly philosophical) non-fiction. She died in 
1999, with a much-publicised diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease, a diagnosis 
which was later proven at post mortem. She wrote her final novel Jackson’s 
Dilemma (Murdoch 1995) a year or two before the diagnosis was made, but 
during this time, subtle evidence of cognitive difficulty was beginning to 
emerge. It seems clear, in other words, that Jackson’s Dilemma was written 
during the prediagnostic period (see Figure 2, above).
Henry James’s famous comment that a writer is ‘[…] present on every 
page of every book from which he sought so assiduously to eliminate him-
self’, is reflected in the critics’ assessments. Of her debut novel, Under the 
Net, published in 1954, Kingsley Amis wrote that it revealed a ‘brilliant 
talent’. Praise was lavished on her eighteenth novel The Sea, the Sea when it 
came out in 1978, and was later endorsed by the award of the Booker Prize 
in the following year. But the reception, in 1995, of her final work of fiction 
was altogether different. Many critics tried to hide their lack of enthusiasm 
under a cloak of respect. Others were little short of insulting, including one 
who compared the book to the work of ‘a thirteen year-old schoolgirl who 
doesn’t get out enough’ (Quoted in Porlock, 1995). 
An obvious and inescapable question, therefore, is whether the distinc-
tive quality of Jackson’s Dilemma reflected the effects that incipient Alzhe-
imer’s disease was exerting on its author’s linguistic — and a fortiori liter-
ary — abilities. The reasons why such a question may be both possible 
and interesting to answer are worth spelling out: first, it is rare indeed to 
have the opportunity to examine cognitive processes in any detail during 
this intriguing prediagnostic phase; it is rarer still to be able to do so ret-
rospectively, enabling the products of cognition to be examined while the 
subject is still blithely unaware of any problems. Moreover, the existence 
of twenty-five previous similar works provides a within-patient control 
sample of exceptional size and quality. Add to this what is known about 
Iris Murdoch’s highly individual approach to writing: she would carefully 
work out characters and plots for up to eight months before spending six 
months writing out the book in longhand (she never used a typewriter, let 
alone a wordprocessor). There is no evidence that she agonised over choice 
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of words, indulged in repeated revisions of passages, or made extensive 
use of a dictionary or thesaurus (in fact she neither needed nor owned such 
aids1). Work in progress would occupy the pages of a large pad, which she 
carried around and added to whenever and wherever she found herself 
unoccupied (for instance, while waiting for a train, or visiting her husband 
in hospital where he was recovering from a broken leg) (Bayley 1999). Her 
publishers would be sent longhand manuscripts (and often complained 
that they could not read her handwriting), but she eschewed any editorial 
interference (Wilson 2003). In other words, what we get from the published 
texts represents only a minimal change from the words that were first com-
mitted to paper during the initial act of creation.
A second, more speculative question might be to ask what the study 
of texts produced under conditions of cognitive impairment can reveal 
about the process of literary creativity. The idea that there may be a ‘neuro-
science of literature’ is likely to sound at best far-fetched, at worst heretical. 
Yet there is a burgeoning scientific literature on the effects of frontal lobe 
damage on creative potential in the visual arts (Miller and Hou 2004). In 
addition the stylistic changes in the output of Willem de Kooning, whose 
paintings became diminishingly abstract with the progress of the more 
advanced stages of Alzheimer’s disease are well documented (Espinel 1996). 
Such observations of the effects of brain damage on creativity in the visual 
sphere have given rise to hypotheses about the roles (both positive and 
negative) of specific cognitive processes — such as self-monitoring, inhibi-
tion, emotional regulation, and abstract ideation — in creative expression. 
Similar observation in the literary domain would lend justification to more 
generalised theoretical models, and perhaps also to an empirical approach 
to the neural basis of the artistic temperament. 
There is an opposing line of argument that the distinctive quality of Jack-
son’s Dilemma is the result, not of prediagnostic Alzheimer’s disease, but of a 
deliberate and ground-breaking experimentation with novelistic form: that 
the apparent lapses in maintaining a consistent authorial point of view that 
we see in Jackson’s Dilemma are deliberate and subtle artistic touches; the 
strangely inverse relationship between Jackson’s prominence in the narra-
tive and his importance to the advancement of the plot, the lack of anything 
in his fictional life that can genuinely be termed a dilemma, and his relative 
anonymity as a character, all reflect a deliberate decision on the part of the 
author to ‘privilege the peripheral over the central’ (Todd 2001). But in the 
1  John Bayley (personal communication).
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best traditions of getting one’s retaliation in first, I would point out that, in 
respect of the work on which I now report, the book was analysed at the lin-
guistic rather than stylistic level, on the basis of a priori hypotheses derived 
from two decades of study of language breakdown in Alzheimer’s disease. 
True, Iris Murdoch may conceivably have set out to write in a stylisti-
cally innovative fashion, but it seems scarcely plausible to suppose that the 
end point of this exploration should map on to language breakdown in 
Alzheimer’s disease across a range of different dimensions. Alternatively, 
just suppose that Murdoch had, with tragic foresight, set out to write as if 
she was suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, turning Jackson’s Dilemma into 
the dementia analogue of Mark Haddon’s The Curious Incident of the Dog in 
the Night Time (2003), whose fictional narrator carries a diagnosis of Asperg-
er’s syndrome. Although the latter has been praised in the literary world 
for its credibility as well as originality, such enthusiasm was not shared by 
those with special insight into the mind of autistic individuals.2 For these 
reasons it will be fascinating, if or when an Alzheimer’s disease equivalent 
does appear, to compare its linguistic characteristics to those which Kara-
lyn Patterson, John Hodges and I discovered when we subjected the text of 
Jackson’s Dilemma to a series of systematic analyses (Garrard 2005).
We began, naturally enough, by selecting the works for comparison with 
Jackson’s Dilemma, and decided to use one from the early period, together 
with a further work from the 1970s, which was the most prolific and highly 
acclaimed period of Murdoch’s writing career. Under the Net (1954), The 
Sea, The Sea (1978), and Jackson’s Dilemma (1995) are stylistically diverse 
works: the early work is energetically comic, while the middle and late 
novels rarely stray into light-hearted territory; Under the Net and The Sea, 
The Sea are both written as first person narratives, while Jackson’s Dilemma 
is written (most of the time) from the point of view of an independent and 
omniscient narrator. Jackson’s Dilemma and Under the Net are both approxi-
mately half the length of The Sea, The Sea, though the latter is divided into 
significantly fewer chapters (8, compared with 20 for Under the Net and 13 
for Jackson’s Dilemma). Clearly, these variables do not correlate with one 
another across this particular subset of books; nor, more importantly, do 
they vary in any systematic way across Murdoch’s works as a whole.
Next, dialogue was eliminated from the text to be analysed. The ration-




is likely to vary, and may be atypical, depending on the character portrayed. 
The resulting data were converted to word lists and frequency counts using 
Rob Watt’s ‘Concordance’ software.3
What about the hypotheses? We saw from the examples given above 
that word production, albeit in the somewhat unnatural context of picture 
naming, correlates strongly with the frequency and familiarity of the word 
to be produced. Moreover, in a large scale regression analysis of such nam-
ing responses given by Alzheimer’s patients, lexical frequency (the number 
of times-per-million that a given word typically enters spoken or written 
language) is strongly predictive of success, while word length has no such 
effect: few patients were able to produce the name ‘elk’ appropriately, but 
most could recognise and name an elephant.
Using the Medical Research Council’s online psycholinguistic database4 
we were able to match up to 80% of the vocabulary used in all three books 
with recorded values of written frequency. Word length was obviously 
obtainable for all words. Comparing mean word length across the three 
novels, there was a wide range of values in all three works, and consid-
erable overlap between them. In contrast, when we compared lexical fre-
quency, there was a clear and consistent pattern of difference, indicating a 
higher mean frequency in Jackson’s Dilemma than in either of the two earlier 
works; the precise analogue of the frequency effect in naming (high fre-
quency items preserved, low frequency items lost) that we had predicted 
(see Figure 5).
As I noted when discussing the Cookie Theft picture description earlier, 
deficiencies in spontaneous speech production are much more notable for 
their lexical and semantic than their syntactic properties. It is much more 
difficult to quantify syntactic integrity, and there is huge variation within 
the cognitively normal population. Moreover, even if we believe Pinker’s 
notion that the ability to use syntax is some kind of linguistic univer-
sal, whose possession may even be genetically determined (Pinker 1994), 
derangement of syntax can manifest in a rich variety of ways. One can look, 
for instance, at the relative use of different common parts of speech: in our 
study, the proportions of these did not vary, using a chi-square test, between 
the three books, when either word tokens or unique word types were con-
sidered. Other measures, such as grammatical complexity, cannot reliably 
be automated and are therefore not suitable for large-scale enterprises such 
3 www.concordancesoftware.co.uk
4  www.psy.uwa.edu.au/mrcdatabase/uwa_mrc.htm [accessed 10/12/09].
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as this, though sentence length correlates strongly with complexity, and is 
often taken as a surrogate measure of it. Here we saw a hint of a change 
not only in the form of a slight shortening of the mean sentence length in 
Jackson’s Dilemma compared with The Sea, The Sea, but also in a change in 
the opposite direction between the first and mid-career novels. 
So far so good, but my instinct is that, to exponents of digital stylomet-
rics at any rate, I might be taken to task for relying too heavily on top-down 
approaches. So it is heartening to mention that perhaps the most striking 
finding of the study came from a more data-driven analysis. 
At intervals of 10,000 word tokens, we plotted the cumulative numbers 
of different word types. Figure 6, below, provides a graphic illustration of 
the rate of introduction of novel word forms as the three works progress. 
Writing in English, a language with over a quarter of a million words, and 
possessing a wide repertoire of foreign and technical usages, we would not 
expect an author such as Iris Murdoch easily to exhaust her vocabulary in 
the course of a 100,000 word novel. These slopes suggest that Under the Net 
is characterised by a dynamic use of vocabulary from beginning to end, 
and that this quality is even more prominent in The Sea, The Sea (the effect, 
Figure 5:  Comparative mean word frequency (usages per million words).











one assumes, of twenty-five years’ experience of creative writing). Com-
pare the slope plotted for Jackson’s Dilemma, with its gentler take-off, and 
earlier and more pronounced flattening out, suggesting a much lower limit 
to the vocabulary remaining available for use.
What we do not yet know is whether these three observations, consist-
ent though they are, indicate a chaotically fluctuating range of values, or a 
consistent trend towards greater stylistic and grammatical sophistication, 
towards a wider and lower frequency vocabulary, the trend propelled for-
ward by maturity, experience, confidence and success, and then backwards 
by Alzheimer’s disease into decline. We both suspect and hope that the 
latter is the case, because if it turns out to be so, then the timing of this 
decline will provide a unique window on that elusive preclinical phase of 
Alzheimer’s disease. 
Iris Murdoch’s steady and prolific literary output over four and a half 
decades presents a unique opportunity to try to answer these questions, 
though the enterprise will be vast and time-consuming. However, thanks 
to the patience and dedication of a series of students and assistants who 
Figure 6:  Cumulative word-type counts at 103 word intervals in three novels of Iris 
Murdoch, from early (Under the Net), middle (The Sea, The Sea) and late (Jackson’s 
Dilemma) periods. The flattened rate of increase in the late book implies increased 
recycling of previously used words, presumably due to a restricted available vocabulary.
Under the Net
The Sea, The Sea
Jackson’s Dilemma
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have been associated with my research group,5 we are beginning to make 
inroads, and I would like to spend the remainder of this chapter presenting 
some preliminary data from these further (unpublished) analyses.
Starting out as we did with three novels, we felt it an acceptable invest-
ment of time to acquire fully digitised versions of each. The acquisition 
period also gave us time to think about what methods of analysis would be 
appropriate to the dataset. But a longer wait, while the remaining twenty-
three books were scanned and proof-read could not be justified. So Arnab 
Majumdar and I decided to concentrate on the final two decades of Iris 
Murdoch’s career; that is to say, on the eight novels that she wrote from 
1978 to 1995: The Sea, The Sea (1978) Nuns and Soldiers (1980); The Philoso-
pher’s Pupil (1983); The Good Apprentice (1985); The Book and the Brotherhood 
(1988); The Message to the Planet (Murdoch 1990); The Green Knight (1994); 
and Jackson’s Dilemma (1995). Our aim was to trace back the changes that 
had been found in the three book comparisons, looking for a point at which 
this change first began to emerge. If such a point could be shown to exist 
it would be reasonable to suppose that it represents the earliest changes of 
Alzheimer’s disease, and perhaps even a marker for the elusive preclinical 
phase of the disease. Alternatively, a continuous trend may be identified 
from the time The Sea, The Sea was written, suggesting that the preclinical 
phase of the disease stretched back over many decades.
Since the findings of the three book comparison were, in most cases, sta-
tistically very robust, we felt justified in using a random sampling approach 
to save time. We therefore used sequential random numbers to select pages, 
lines, and words in each text for further analysis. Two hundred words were 
sampled from each text using this method, and psycholinguistic variables 
examined as before. We looked first at the ratios of content to function 
words (which can be considered a hybrid measure of a lexical and syntac-
tic character). This ratio remained at a level of around 0.5 throughout this 
late creative period. A flat line also characterised the imageability scores (i.e. 
how concrete or abstract the words tended to be – another powerful predic-
tor of word retrieval in dementia (Bird et al. 2000)). Yet there was no indica-
tion at all that Iris Murdoch’s vocabulary became more concrete towards 
the end of her life. In fact it was, once again, only with lexical frequency 
that we found any convincing evidence of change. As illustrated in Figure 7, 
the mean lexical frequency of the random word sample remained at a 
5  For the record: Lisa Maloney, Dr. Arnab Majumdar, Helen Gould and Thurza 
Honey.
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consistent level until the publication of The Book and the Brotherhood in 1990. 
At this point, there is a marked increase in the mean lexical familiarity of 
the sampled words, a trend that continues to be reflected in the penultimate 
novel. Between The Green Knight and Jackson’s Dilemma however, the trend 
shows a partial reversal.
What might be the significance of this time series? The most uninterest-
ing explanation might be that the differences between books simply reflect 
the range of variability to be expected from random samples of 200 words, 
a possibility that we were not able to rule out on the basis of tests of statis-
tical significance. Further, similar analyses are therefore warranted, based 
either on entire novels or on larger random samples. From the pattern of 
change, however (i.e. an Alzheimer’s disease-like marked increase in fre-
quency beginning at a plausible time-frame relative to the author’s eventual 
illness) it seems likely that the data are highly informative. If genuine, the 
observed differences index the onset of Alzheimer-like cognitive changes 
between ten and thirteen years before death. Attribution of the components 
of this lead-time to preclinical and prediagnostic stages is a more speculative 
enterprise, but it is interesting to note that the sharp reversal in the trend 
towards a higher frequency vocabulary associated with Jackson’s Dilemma 
Figure 7:  Mean values of lexical frequency for randomly sampled text
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appears roughly to coincide with the emergence of what were later recog-
nised as early signs of dysfunction and may therefore represent a compen-
satory effort on the author’s part. It may be that compensatory behaviour — 
particularly if unconscious and automatic — marks the onset of this stage of 
disease progression in other patients, and/or across other cognitive domains. 
7. Hypotheses, Methods and Future Directions
Where to go next with this text corpus, and more generally with this inves-
tigative enterprise? One of the most rewarding aspects of the media blitz 
that followed the appearance of our work online in December 2004 was the 
interest that it aroused in other research fields. Through contact with the 
Centre for Iris Murdoch Studies at Kingston University I have since discov-
ered a wealth of written material — letters, annotations, notebooks — span-
ning the period of cognitive decline, which simply cry out to be systemati-
cally evaluated. Contact with the Centre for Computing in the Humanities 
at King’s College London opened my eyes to the thoroughly data-driven 
analyses which John Burrows (2007) among others have used in author-
ship studies. Now that a digital archive of the majority of the Murdoch 
novels is available, I hope to be able to implement these techniques with 
a number of aims, including replication of our findings from the original 
study, and focusing in on the elusive preclinical period and the temporal 
locus of change. Consistent and statistically robust patterns of change from 
these analyses would raise the possibility of finding similar effects in other 
bodies of text, such as letters and diary entries, whose timing can be pin-
pointed more accurately. Equally important to this enterprise will be other 
writers and historical figures who suffered from dementing illnesses late in 
life, analysis of whose work may yield results of importance to literary his-
tory and authorship, as well as to the understanding of the cognitive effects 
of Alzheimer’s disease. One body of work in particular — the verbatim tran-
scriptions of Commons and Lords debates (Hansard) — may well turn out 
to demonstrate linguistic changes referable to the presymptomatic and pre-
clinical periods of the Alzheimer’s disease that was eventually diagnosed in 
one of the most fascinating and enigmatic political figures of our times. If 
so, then one of the most enduring mysteries of British political history (the 
reasons behind Wilson’s sudden and unforeseen departure from the office 
of Prime Minister) may come a step closer to being solved.

4. The Human Presence in 
Digital Artefacts1
Alan Galey
1. What Lies Beneath
The reader wanders at leisure over smiling fields; he plays and runs and 
never stumbles; and he never gives a thought to the time and tedium it has 
cost me to battle with the thorns and briars, while I was clearing the land for 
his benefit. He does not reckon […] how great the discomforts that secured 
his comfort, how much tedium was the price of his finding nothing tedious.
Erasmus, letter to William Warham, Archbishop of Canterbury  
(1976 [1514-6]: 262)
This essay considers the tensions between the surface orderliness of scholarly 
resources and the stubborn irregularity of textual materials. Textual scholar-
ship stands to contribute two key ideas to the digital humanities: first, that 
there is more to electronic forms than what reaches the screen; and second, 
that the relationship of form to content is complex and sometimes beyond 
exhaustive modelling. These two points may seem commonsensical enough 
within a book-history context, but much of the hypertext theory that domi-
nated the previous decade gives little impression they could matter. Part of 
the burden of digital textual studies must be to counter the influence of those 
hypertext theorists who rushed to essentialize computing, the Internet, and 
digital textuality. More recent work by Katharine Hayles, Matthew Kirschen-
1  The work presented here was supported by the Social Sciences and Humani-
ties Research Council of Canada. Different parts of this article were presented at 
the conferences of the Society for Textual Scholarship and the Society for Digital 
Humanities / Société pour l’étude des médias interactifs, the University of Toronto’s 
Faculty of Information Studies, and Texas A&M University. I am grateful to those 
audiences for their questions and comments and especially to Willard McCarty, Ri-
chard Cunningham, Christopher Moore, and Stan Ruecker for their comments on 
early drafts. Any remaining errors are mine.
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baum, Lev Manovich, Alan Liu, and others associated with media-specific 
analysis and new software studies has shown what technically informed per-
spectives can bring to the study of digital textuality.2 Kirschenbaum describes 
their approach as one that ‘cultivates granular, material readings of the inevi-
table cultural and ideological biases encoded by particular applications and 
interfaces’ (2004a: 533). Such modes of reading expose continuities with past 
textual practices that some versions of hypertext theory were predisposed 
not to see — yet such ‘granular, material readings’ render new textual prac-
tices and technologies no less exciting for all that. This essay argues that it 
should be disquieting to see a deepening separation of material form from 
idealized content in our tools at the very moment when literary critics have 
established the materiality of texts to be indispensable to interpretation. As 
digital textual studies takes shape as a field, it finds itself caught between 
these divergent trends in computational practice and literary theory.
Textual scholarship has long been driven by an anxious desire to know 
what lies beneath the perceptual surface — the authorial consciousness 
embedded in written language; the original of multiple versions; the 
moments of live inscription held within inert physical artefacts. If the object 
of textual work is to delve beneath surfaces, the subjects who carry out 
that work find themselves at the threshold, negotiating between the dead 
past and living present. In Gary Taylor’s oft-quoted formulation, ‘Editing 
is a ritual we perform over the corpus of an author who has passed away’ 
(1988: 50), and all such rituals exist for the sake of the living. Digital tex-
tual scholars might well sympathize with Erasmus (quoted in the epigraph 
above) as he laments the conditions of his editorial labours on the Vulgate 
of St Jerome. Erasmus’s words capture the double-vision that texts demand 
of us with regard to their mediation of surfaces and depths. It is the same 
with our tools, digital and otherwise. Beneath any smoothly functioning 
computer interface such as a Web browser, the source code may harbour 
the ‘thorns and briars’ (in Erasmus’s words) of half-solved bugs, lingering 
after the ‘battle’ with materials and deadlines to build the digital artefact. 
In a similar manner, the monuments of textual, philological, and historical 
scholarship are often associated with what Erasmus calls ‘discomfort’ and 
‘tedium’ in their production, as is the fictional Edward Casaubon’s miser-
able Key to All Mythologies in Middlemarch, or sometimes even spring from 
terrible trauma and loss, as in the case of Alfred Pollard’s ‘punishing work 
schedule’ (Maguire 1996: 28) while he grieved the deaths of his sons in 
2  On media-specific analysis, see Hayles 2004. 
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World War I. Battlefield or cleared land: both metaphors for the edited text 
are present in Erasmus’s picture of textual labour, positing a substratum of 
textual remains beneath the reader’s feet.3 What then is ‘the price’, as Eras-
mus puts it, to be paid for the illusion of digital texts and environments as 
‘smiling fields’ where the user never stumbles? The following discussion 
approaches that question by examining some theoretical assumptions that 
shape the digital tools of Erasmus’s inheritors.
As Erasmus implies, we cannot detach technical concerns from the aes-
thetic, symbolic, and hermeneutic dimensions of textual work, and his 
preoccupation with unseen complexity takes visual form in Figure 1. This 
image shows what lies beneath the main reading room in the New York 
Public Library’s Central Building at 5th Avenue and 42nd Street, an icon 
of cultural heritage. The illustration comes from the cover of an issue of 
Scientific American published five days after the new building opened to 
the public in 1911. The genre should be familiar — a representation of the 
inner workings of an interface between readers and a massive collection 
of texts, using a visualization technique (the cutaway view) to make the 
unseen mechanism intelligible to non-specialists. In the reading room at 
the top, patrons and librarians use a system of catalogues, request slips, 
and pneumatic tubes to order books housed in the stacks below. The books, 
once located, ascend to the reading room via mini-elevator. We can also 
read a foreshadowing of the digital humanities’ open-access ethos here, too, 
since this union of aesthetics and machinery serves a public library. 
But Scientific American’s tribute to fin de siècle design and engineering 
also illuminates anxieties about what lies beneath it. The image embodies 
the kind of metaphor for archiving that Thomas Richards uses to describe 
the symbolic importance of the British Museum at the data-collecting 
height of the British Empire, and especially its basement as a chaotic 
space that was symptomatic of the material pressures of data overload 
(Richards 1993: 4-16). The stacks beneath the New York Public Library 
reading room emphasize a volume of information that, as a totality, goes 
unseen by its users. As in Richards’ metaphor, there is even a basement 
at the very bottom of the New York Public Library’s stacks, where boxes 
appear in disordered contrast to the stacks and retrieval system above. 
Such are the pressures felt by structures that must be at once monument 
and infrastructure.
3  On textual scholarship in Middlemarch, see Lerer 2002. On Pollard, see Maguire 
1996: 28, and Taylor 1988: 50-1.
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The image also displays a fixation with human presence in the form of 
the tiny figures that populate the stacks (forty-seven of them). Where Eras-
mus claimed to feel alone in his task of textual management, no such isola-
tion seems possible in this system. One could imagine this image without 
the figures, as a strictly technical blueprint, but the purposeful distribution 
of humans throughout makes this a representation not just of mechanical 
automation but also of human labour. The book is a text on a human scale, 
Figure 1. A Sectional View of the New York Public Library, Central Building, Main 
Reading Room. Cover issue of Scientific American, 27 May 1911 (Picture collection, 
The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations).
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and this image goes out of its way at least forty-seven times to reassert a 
human presence in a system that holds books, readers, and machines within 
its compass. Yet none of the humans or books are individuated anywhere 
in the image; we are shown neither individual readers nor recognizable 
books that matter in their specificity. As the accompanying article states 
approvingly, the system ‘distribute[s] the reader rather than the volumes 
which he reads’, and ‘automatically […] divides the thousands of readers 
who wish to consult the books into the intellectual classes in which they 
belong’ (Anon. 1911: 527). Even with the focus on the scale of ‘thousands of 
readers’ and their intellectual subclasses, this representation of the library 
seems to forget roughly half of the library’s potential users: only male read-
ers are represented. The living moments of encounter between individual 
readers and texts, in all their diversity and idiosyncrasy, remain deferred 
in this representation, implicit in the image but inscrutable to our eyes. The 
logic of the image, then, is as much temporal as spatial: celebrate resource-
building now; understand the particularities of material later.
This large-scale mode of representing reading stands in contrast to 
humanist depictions of individual reading and writing in Erasmus’s time. 
That instinctive humanist desire to draw closer, like Tantalus, to some ide-
alized but elusive textual encounter finds powerful expression in Vittore 
Carpaccio’s 1502-3 painting The Vision of Saint Augustine (Figure 2, below). 
Carpaccio’s painting depicts Augustine penning a letter to Jerome at the 
precise moment of the latter’s death, as the ghostly presence of the letter’s 
addressee fills the room. In Carpaccio’s probable source, a 1485 Venetian 
edition of the life of Jerome, Augustine in his cell at Hippo is attempting 
to quantify the joy of souls in the presence of God, and is just putting pen 
to paper to ask Jerome in Bethlehem for his thoughts.4  The information 
Augustine seeks comes to him in a moment of miraculously instant commu-
nication that accords more with our present than with the epistolary of the 
ancient world. Jerome, the archetype of textual scholars, rebukes Augus-
tine’s reduction of knowledge to human numbers: ‘Augustine, Augustine, 
what are you seeking? Do you think that you can put the whole sea in a lit-
tle vase? [...] Will your eye see what the eye of no man can see? [...] By what 
measure will you measure the immense?’ (quoted in Roberts 1959: 292).5 
4  On the painting’s probable source and the misidentification of the painting as a 
depiction of Jerome himself, see Roberts 1959.
5  The translation is Roberts’s from Hieronymus. Vita et transitus, Venice 1485 
(Huntington Library, transcribed by Eugene Brunelle): ‘Augustine, Augustine, quid 
queris: putasne brevi immittere vasculo mare totum [...] Que oculus nullus hom-
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Human text gives way to divine voice, and the letter to Jerome becomes the 
perfect interface, instantly receding before an unmediated presence. Where 
the Scientific American image shows a perfectly synchronic system, outside 
of time and history, Carpaccio shows us an instant of collaborative intel-
lectual work deeply embedded in history. In Alexander Nagel and Chris-
topher S. Wood’s reading, ‘The fluttering pages of the open codices, the fall 
of shadows, the alerted dog, the poised pen all suggest the momentariness 
of that moment, the evening hour of compline, as Augustine tells us. This 
is secular time, the time of lived experience, whose each moment repeats 
but differs from the previous moment’ (2005: 403).6 Most importantly, The 
Vision of Saint Augustine is not our vision, and the miraculous text Augus-
tine receives from Jerome lies beyond the limits of human representation.
Both of these scenes depict technologies for managing multiple texts — 
Carpaccio places numerous writing implements, books, and a horizontal 
reading wheel in Augustine’s study — but his painting meditates on the 
partialness of human knowledge, while the Scientific American image cel-
ebrates the abstraction of a mechanical system. Both use encounters with 
inum videre potuit tuus videbit? [...] Immensa, qua mensura metieris?’ (Roberts 
1959: 297).
6 On Carpaccio’s depiction of temporality and its relation to the history and na-
ture of reading, see Bringhurst 2006.
Figure 2.  Vittore Carpaccio (1455-1525), Vision of Saint Augustine (Alinari/Art 
Resource, New York).
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documents to reflect on orders of experience that exceed human capacities. 
Reflecting on a copy of the Carpaccio painting given to him as a student, K. 
Anthony Appiah comments that ‘the shelf of books behind the saint — his 
library — contained most of the works he would have thought worth read-
ing’; ‘he would almost certainly have read all of them’ (2005: 45).7 Today, 
Appiah notes, more is printed in a single city in a week than Augustine or 
Jerome could have read in their lifetimes: ‘we are, in short, drowning in the 
particulars we humanists study’. In essence, the Scientific American image 
is 1911’s answer to Appiah’s fears, and to the question posed in the title of 
a colloquium and article by Gregory Crane: ‘What Do You Do with a Mil-
lion Books?’ (2006).8 One could read the Carpaccio and Scientific American 
images’ differences as emblematic of the digital humanities in its present 
state, which emphasizes abstract, large-scale approaches such as linguis-
tic corpora and data mining, the social-science version of literary history 
practiced by Franco Moretti (so-called distant reading), and text analysis 
techniques that derive patterns from multitudinous low-level observations 
rather than situated acts of subjective interpretation.9 These approaches 
represent a movement away from the humanities’ traditionally idiographic 
tendency (to seek local knowledge about specific cases) and toward the 
natural and social sciences’ nomothetic tendency (to seek abstract patterns 
and general laws).10 These approaches also share something in common 
with the Scientific American image in that they place the viewer or critic in 
a superhuman position, showing systems of words and texts from a per-
spective that no single human could occupy in real space and time. Moretti 
stresses that distance can be ‘a condition of knowledge’ (2000: 57; emphasis 
7  Appiah actually refers to ‘one of Carpaccio’s great murals of Saint Jerome’  but it 
is more likely that he has the Augustine image in mind. Carpaccio’s other paintings 
of Jerome do not feature libraries, and this image was often mistaken as a depiction 
of Jerome (see note 4 above).
8  The colloquium was co-sponsored by the University of Chicago and the Illinois 
Institute of Technology; see Crane 2006 and the Million Books Project, a collabora-
tion between Carnegie Mellon University Libraries and the Internet Archive: http://
www.archive.org/details/millionbooks [accessed 19/10/2008].
9  For an early, influential critique of quantitative methods in literary studies, see 
Stanley Fish’s ‘What Is Stylistics and Why Are They Saying Such Terrible Things 
About It?’ (1980/1973). The term ‘ distant reading’  comes from Moretti 2000: 56-8; 
the opening to his more recent book, Graphs, Maps, Trees, suggests a movement be-
yond this term (Moretti 2005: 1).
10  The terms idiographic and nomothetic originate with the neo-Kantian philos-
opher Wilhelm Windelband (1998/1894: 13), and today see more frequent use in 
anthropology and psychology than in literary studies. On the tradition of thought 
about the distinction they name, including Max Weber, see Manicas 1998.
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removed), but The Vision of Saint Augustine complicates the metaphors we 
use to represent distance, proximity, and the quantifiable. The viewer of 
that painting remains all too human. Carpaccio invites his viewers just to 
the threshold of human experience, inviting us to cast our eyes, like Augus-
tine in the painting, beyond the frame of human perception even as we 
accept its limits. The scale of the human is the preoccupation of both images.
Such is the power of tools and representations alike: to shape thinking, 
both through the conclusions they enable and the metaphors they deploy. 
The concerns this essay advances have tended to remain tacit in the dig-
ital humanities, a field whose sustaining progress narratives and invest-
ments in fundable projects foster a sense of itself as an onward march into 
the future — an avant garde that was the first to embrace computing as a 
tool for humanities scholarship. Yet the tool-building enterprise risks fall-
ing into a binary in which digital tools represent innovation, dynamism, 
and provocative instability, while the materials they operate upon — very 
often literary texts — represent availability, continuity, and unproblematic 
stability. This binary makes it easy to forget textual work always has an 
interpretive dimension that depends upon the complexity of humanities 
materials, especially after bibliographically aware literary scholarship in 
the wake of D.F. McKenzie and Jerome McGann has established the value 
of joining interpretation with the materiality of texts. Our understanding 
of that relationship has become intertwined with another, less obvious one: 
the tension between tools and materials in the digital humanities. 
2. Digital Textual Scholarship
Every tool is a weapon,
If you hold it right.
Ani DiFranco, ‘My IQ’ (2002)
Whenever we ask what new technology can do for textual scholars, we 
must not lose sight of a deeper question: what is at stake in the work 
textual scholarship does, digitally and otherwise? What makes this work 
worth doing? Progress narratives almost always leave something impor-
tant behind, and information culture itself has been accused of system-
atically forgetting its own history (Day 2001: 3), and of succumbing to a 
‘rhetoric of newness’ and ‘rhetoric of amnesia’ (Rabinovitz and Geil 2004: 
2). Indeed, we have been here before. The digital humanities now occupy 
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much the same position that W.W. Greg and the other New Bibliogra-
phers did in the era when the New York Public Library’s Central Build-
ing first opened its doors. At that time, the cultural pressures that went 
with social and technological change required the assimilation of vast 
amounts of technical knowledge about the transmission of texts — and 
by extension, the seemingly transmissible parts of culture itself — into a 
coherent progress narrative. This narrative had to account not only for 
the literary documents that had survived, but also for the practical means 
by which culture could be preserved and disseminated into the future 
through editing (and through the related activities of historical bibliog-
raphy and bibliographic appraisal, enumeration, and preservation). Like 
digital humanists today, the New Bibliographers lived in a time of new 
media and information technology; they had to articulate their work to a 
changing academy that often did not understand it; they were obliged by 
their material to command a detailed knowledge of how texts, humans, 
and machines interact; and they had to respond to the often-contradictory 
imperatives of explaining and making. 
Today, textual studies stands not only as a beneficiary of new tools to 
solve old problems — and, let us hope, to find new problems — but also as 
a well-developed perspective on new kinds of cultural artefacts. Through-
out this essay, the term artefact encompasses products of human artifice 
that can be studied for interpretative purposes, like books, but also what 
McKenzie somewhat awkwardly called ‘non-book texts’.11 (Digital artefact 
can also mean an instance of visual noise in a digital image, but that usage 
does not enter this discussion.) The terminological challenge is to find a 
noun that includes books as easily as cultural productions like video games, 
films, and paintings, but avoids the scientific and programming connota-
tions of the term object. Anthropologists and archaeologists have also 
thought about this problem. For example, Anders Andrén makes a distinc-
tion between artefacts and texts, though not a rigid one (1998: 146-53), and 
Karin Barber takes text to include artefacts and verbal performances (2007: 
1-29). Book historian Matthew Brown helps to focus the concept by describ-
ing artefact as ‘a term which suggests an authentic, extant source, not a 
copied, transcribed, and edited version’ (2004: 702-3). However, Brown’s 
description becomes complicated when we consider whether a copy of 
a video game can be an artefact, since there are no instances of, say, the 
11  See McKenzie 1999/1985: 13, as well as his chapter on ‘The Broken Phial: Non-
Book Texts’ (31-53).
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game Myst in the world that are not copies — or can such cultural works 
never attain artefactual status? What then of a copy of the Shakespeare First 
Folio, itself an edited text created in part from scribal transcriptions, but 
which advertises itself as ‘Published according to the True Originall Copies’ 
(Blayney 1996: 3)? A thorough definition of artefact is beyond the scope of 
this essay; instead, it may be more useful to consider the intellectual con-
texts in which we define a term like digital artefact.
On its present course, digital textual scholarship may well turn out to 
be a continuation of the project of D.F. McKenzie. By the time of his death 
in 1999, his work and influence had gone a long way toward disentan-
gling the field from the orthodoxies of the New Bibliography, and had 
reintroduced historical and interpretive perspectives into editorial theory, 
which predecessors such as W.W. Greg had tended to regard as a closed 
system of transmissible texts, human agents, and mechanical constraints.12 
This essay takes its title from a phrase of McKenzie’s, for whom bibliog-
raphy’s great virtue was that it could ‘show the human presence in any 
recorded text’ (1999/1985: 29). These are words to conjure with: the phrase 
‘any recorded text’ opens the scope of textual scholarship’s materials to 
all manner of what McKenzie called ‘non-book texts’, including ‘films, 
recorded sound, static images, computer-generated files, and even oral 
texts’ (1999/1985: 4), to which we could add software, born-digital fiction 
and poetry, and now blogs, wikis, and social networking websites — the 
kinds of intensely socialized digital texts whose existence in a Web 2.0 
world would likely have fascinated McKenzie had he lived to see it.13 It 
is worth noting that he tended not to describe computers simply as new 
tools for the textual scholar’s toolbox, but rather as a welcome challenge 
in a continuing professional obligation to account for new forms of com-
munication. As McKenzie suggested in his centenary lecture for the Bib-
liographical Society in 1992, 
12  These currents run throughout most of McKenzie’s work, but see in particular 
his chapter ‘The Book as an Expressive Form’ (1999/1985: 9-30). For an overview of 
responses to McKenzie’s position see van der Weel 2005; the most pointed criticisms 
may be found in Tanselle 1991.
13  See also McKenzie 1999/1985: 13 and 39. This broad scope has proven easier to 
embrace in theory than in critical practice. For example, David Greetham’s review 
of Burnard, O’Brien O’Keeffe, and Unsworth (2006) highlights several problems 
with the collection’s overall conception, particularly that ‘the absence of painting, 
dance, film, television, video games, music (about all of which there has been some 
very challenging discussion of late) makes the collection almost relentlessly text- (or 
linguistics-) based’ (2007: 135).
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That obligation has acquired a new urgency with the arrival of computer-gen-
erated texts. The demands made of bibliography and textual criticism by the 
evolution of texts in such forms, the speed with which versions are displaced 
one by another, and the question of their authority, are no less compelling 
than those we accept for printed books. By the logic of our discipline, we’re 
equally committed to acknowledge that these textual artefacts also embody 
the conditions of their construction. (McKenzie 2002/1992: 272-3)
This is a remarkable statement for being both progressive and conserva-
tive at once. In the progressive sense, McKenzie naturalizes the expansion 
of textual scholarship’s circle of knowledge to encompass the digital, such 
that the modifier digital becomes redundant in digital textual studies. By his 
logic, to reject inquiry into digital artefacts is to reject the very essence of 
textual scholarship. But this vision of textual studies also conservatively 
extends the traditional concerns of print and manuscript bibliography to 
digital artefacts, with McKenzie’s first thoughts tending toward the enu-
meration of versions and the establishment of authority among them. 
Does digital textual scholarship then consist of applying existing 
descriptive and analytic methods to digital artefacts? To an extent, this con-
servative approach works, and the single most edifying example so far may 
be Kirschenbaum’s article ‘Editing the Interface: Textual Studies and First 
Generation Electronic Objects’.14 Taking as his subject canonical electronic 
literature such as Michael Joyce’s afternoon Kirschenbaum deftly applies 
a McGannian awareness of bibliographic codes in reading the material 
nuances of born-digital objects. This mode of reading raises a question the 
field is still working to answer: ‘what if a textual scholar, well-versed in 
theories of textual editing, were […] to be given the task of preserving the 
original text of afternoon in some stable and standardized electronic for-
mat for the sake of the scholarly record? How would our scholar go about 
it?’ (Kirschenbaum 2002: 33). This is the kind of question that should keep 
textual scholars awake at night, not to mention librarians, archivists, and 
literary scholars. 
Two ways of approaching the answer emerge: first through interpreta-
tion, by showing how interface elements such as icons and windows in dif-
ferent operating systems and versions may affect how we understand the 
work; and second through description, adding to our vocabulary terms such 
14  When it appeared in 2002, this article had a catalyzing effect on many tex-
tual scholars, especially those of the generation that had grown up with personal 
computers in the home. Its importance was recognized with the Society for Textual 
Scholarship’s prestigious Fredson Bowers Memorial Prize in 2003. The ideas pre-
sented in the article were developed in Kirschenbaum 2008.
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as layer, version, release, object, state, instance, and copy. These terms bridge 
the formalized languages of programming and descriptive bibliography, 
two worlds that make remarkably similar investments in precise language 
and meaningful distinctions. The bibliographical edge to Kirschenbaum’s 
approach allows him to delve beneath the surfaces of digital artefacts, illu-
minating the facets of material construction and software design that many 
literary hypertext enthusiasts and cyberculturalists have tended to pass 
over or ‘mystify’ (Kirschenbaum’s word) with weak, off-the-shelf interpre-
tations of poststructuralist theory (2002: 25). Searching for an exemplar of 
digital textual scholarship, Kirschenbaum’s article hearkens back to two 
recognizable strengths of the past century’s bibliographical tradition, one 
being McGann’s materialist hermeneutics, and the other, the New Bibliog-
raphy’s rigour in accounting for the physical features of books.15 
Yet for all its innovation, this early example of digital textual scholarship 
also relies upon a conservative view of scholarly editing as fundamentally 
preservational — an updated version of Greg’s 1932 dictum that ‘Books 
are of value in proportion as they preserve the past’ (1998/1932: 136). As 
textual scholarship extends its scope to include digital artefacts, it must 
do so while itself changing from within. In seeking to avoid the weak ver-
sion of poststructural criticism, with its ill-informed descriptions of digital 
texts as inherently unstable and non-physical, Kirschenbaum’s analysis 
risks jettisoning what we might call strong poststructuralism, whose influ-
ence on textual studies has prompted resistance to the idea of stable origins, 
interest in texts as mediators of power and not just as bearers of aesthetic 
worth, questioning of the construction and uses of canons, and valuing of 
multiple authority as richness.16 If hypertext theory in the nineties failed 
to understand how digital texts work beneath the surface, the computing 
humanists who did understand tended to underestimate poststructural-
ism’s abiding influence. Susan Hockey, for example, mischaracterizes the 
relationship between textual studies and electronic editing: ‘the major dif-
ference between a printed and an electronic edition is that a fairly standard 
and well-documented model has developed for a printed edition, but no 
such thing exists for an electronic edition’ (2000: 133). Even eight years later 
this remains an insightful statement about electronic editions, but it over-
looks the profound changes the print ‘model’ underwent in the wake of the 
15  The appendix to Kirschenbaum’s article, titled ‘Towards Some Principles of 
Computational Description’, is a deliberate echo of Fredson Bowers’s landmark 
1949 book, Principles of Bibliographical Description.
16  The phrase ‘multiple authority is richness’ comes from McLeod 1982: 421.
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New Bibliography’s dethroning through the eighties and nineties, which 
drew force from the influx of poststructuralist theory in literary studies. 
Although textual scholarship often presents itself in a conservative light 
as a conduit of tradition and guardian of cultural heritage, its own future 
depends upon recognizing, pace Greg, that all recorded texts are also of 
value in proportion as they provoke thought and change in the present. 
3. Interface and the Stakes of Design
Long-term preservation of digital heritage begins with the design of reliable 
systems and procedures which will produce authentic and stable digital 
objects.
UNESCO Charter on the Preservation of Digital Heritage, article 5
Tensions between tools and materials in the digital humanities manifest 
themselves in both the design and analysis of digital artefacts. In particu-
lar, the preservation imperative described above brings cultural pressures 
to bear upon all textual scholarship, digital and otherwise, such that Greg 
uses loaded words when he speaks of books as a ‘precious inheritance’ 
(1988/1932: 136). Digital texts lack the same symbolic status as documents 
like the Magna Carta, Shakespeare First Folio, or United States Declaration 
of Independence, each of which confers a sense of material origin upon 
master narratives. We can see tensions at work in some of these documents’ 
digital counterparts on the Web, specifically by reading their URLs for con-
notations of stability and authenticity. Here are two examples:
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
www.un.org/Overview/rights.html
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/
In both cases, human-readability coincides with machine-readability in the 
form of the Web address, which in turn confirms the stability of the content 
of these foundational documents. Future stability of such digital artefacts 
is the concern of UNESCO’s Charter on Preservation of the Digital Herit-
age, which states that ‘The purpose of preserving the digital heritage is to 
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ensure that it remains accessible to the public’ (article 2). But contrast that 
document’s own URL with the ones above:
UNESCO Charter on Preservation of the Digital Heritage
portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13367&URL_DO=DO_
TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html
Although it is possible to find a slightly simpler URL that brings us to a PDF 
version of the document (UNESCO 2003), this unwieldy chunk of code is 
the closest thing we have to a stable address for the Charter in the native 
format of the Web. As a digital document, the Charter says one thing but 
does another, creating a contradiction between its content and form: the 
aspirations of cultural heritage pull in one direction while the design of the 
code pulls in another.
These tensions become visible in digital objects through the double-
vision that characterizes textual scholarship: to see at once both the signi-
fying surface and what lies beneath. By nature textual scholarship resists 
the fallacy of screen essentialism, the tendency to essentialize digital text 
as ‘easily erasable pixels of light flickering on the screen’, as Marie-Laure 
Ryan does in one of the canonical articles of hypertext theory (1999: 95). 
In Kirschenbaum’s definition, screen essentialism depends upon ‘the bias 
towards monitors and display devices in new media studies, where the 
vast preponderance of critical attention has been focused on what happens 
on the windowed panes of the looking glass’ (2004b: 95). The term comes 
from Nick Montfort’s critique of certain biases in new media studies: 
When scholars consider electronic literature, the screen is often portrayed 
as an essential aspect of all creative and communicative computing — a fix-
ture, perhaps even a basis, for new media. The screen is relatively new on 
the scene, however. Early interaction with computers happened largely on 
paper: on paper tape, on punchcards, and on print terminals and teletype-
writers, with their scroll-like supplies of continuous paper for printing out-
put and input both. (Montfort 2004: [n.p.])
Under such conditions there was a more consequential distinction between 
input and output processes than we generally experience with PCs, some-
times involving a gap of days between the submission of input and the 
receipt of output from a large, shared mainframe. This is not to suggest 
that screens are unimportant, but rather that critics need to balance their 
attention to computers as objects with an understanding of computing as 
process, in which the screen is but one layer of interface. To see the algo-
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rithm within the UNESCO document’s cumbersome URL is to understand 
the contextualizing system, just as the Scientific American illustration makes 
a point of revealing the system that humans normally cannot see (at least 
without a wrecking ball). When reading digital artefacts, textual scholars 
might question the conventional wisdom that the only good interface is a 
transparent one. 
If textual scholars tend to position themselves at the threshold between 
the surfaces of texts and their mysterious depths — between Erasmus’s 
‘smiling fields’ and the New York Public Library’s buried stacks — then 
digital materials may lead them to new kinds of thresholds. As in bibliog-
raphy, questions about preserving and reading digital artefacts lead inevi-
tably to the topic of their design. Reading the human presence in a digital 
artefact requires knowledge of markup, encoding, and even programming, 
raising the problem of negotiating multiple fields: on the one hand, textual 
scholarship (which some take to include book history, or at least to overlap 
substantially with it); and on the other, interface design as a catch-all term for 
a practice that brings together human-computer interaction, information 
design, usability studies, and programming. Textual scholarship’s close ties 
with book history significantly complicate its relationship with design — 
though such complexity can be productive.
The greatest conceptual difference between book history and interface 
design lies in their temporal orientations. If textual scholarship remains 
focused on the past, interface design is naturally oriented toward the 
future. Interface design is all about how things should be, how to improve 
the deliverable yet to be delivered. This temporal orientation manifests 
itself rhetorically. Design gurus like Jakob Neilsen and Bruce Tognaz-
zini tend to intone their advice in the imperative, often synthesizing vast 
amounts of data into PowerPoint bullets. For example, Neilsen offers the 
sensible dictum that ‘Error messages should be expressed in plain lan-
guage (no codes), precisely indicate the problem, and constructively sug-
gest a solution’.17 In this sentence Neilson implicitly looks forward to a time 
when error messages make sense, when cryptic ‘404: not found’ errors in 
web browsers no longer lead novice users to wonder if there were really 
at least 403 other mistakes they could have made. This orientation spans 
the continuum from professional to academic writing on design, including 
work that is not overtly part of the ‘how-to’ genre.18 
17  Jakob Neilsen, ‘Ten Usability Heuristics’, UseIt.com http://www.useit.com/pa-
pers/heuristic/heuristic_list.html (2005) [accessed 19/10/2008].
18  For example, see Dillon 2004 and any of Tufte’s books, such as Visual Explanations (1997).
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By contrast, book history is just that: history. It looks back to how things 
were, even in the very recent past, and how they came to be as they are. To 
those ends, its chief products are narratives in the form of scholarly books 
and articles. Increasingly though, the term history of the book is expand-
ing into history and future of the book, generally a positive development but 
by no means a straightforward one, since the future is not available for 
study in the same way as the past. The digital humanities’ most produc-
tive response to this difficulty has been to ask ‘why speculate when we 
can prototype?’; that is, to regard the future of the book as something we 
create, not just observe and comment upon.
This difference in temporal dispositions does, however, lead to trade-
offs. If traditional textual scholarship can seem too historical, with its pres-
ervation imperative acting as a brake on any experimental tradition from 
within, then so too can interface design be accused of not being historical 
enough, sometimes uncritically assuming a synchronic view of readers 
and texts that ignores cultural, historical, and political contexts. This is not 
to suggest that design lacks an historical discourse of its own; quite the 
contrary. For example, the history of design is a core component of most 
degree programs in the field, and Edward Tufte’s books on information 
design exemplify a breadth of historical and cultural materials that most 
textual scholars would admire. However, a substantial part of computer 
interface design has nonetheless developed in a way that disregards his-
torical understanding as central to the knowledge it produces. Similarly, 
Tufte himself draws on the work of book historians to offer his insightful 
readings of ‘visual confections’ in seventeenth-century English books (1997: 
122-5, 134-6), and Andrew Dillon begins a chapter on reader studies with 
an epigraph from Bacon’s essays (2004: 3), but neither really contextualizes 
his argument within the specific concerns of the seventeenth century, the 
way a literary critic or cultural historian would. History here is not even 
background, let alone context; it is only a source of materials. Writing like 
a cultural historian is not Tufte’s nor Dillon’s purpose, since the epistemo-
logical context for their approaches is not history but cognitive science, just 
as it is with the interface design coming from computer science. That is by 
no means a weakness — both of their works cited here are excellent intro-
ductions to their topics — but it is a difference that must be acknowledged.
For digital textual scholars the problem is not that the humanities and 
(social) sciences are different, but that a psychological or historical per-
spective may present itself as the only valid one. This essay sides with the 
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historical perspective mainly because it has been neglected in interface 
design, which looks instead to cognitive science for its epistemological 
framework. Ronald Day suggests that the origin of this trade-off between 
disciplines was the constitution of information studies in response to cor-
porate and military needs in postwar America, resulting in 
willful ignorance of Marxist, nonquantitative, non-‘practical’, and, largely, 
non-American analyses of information — analyses of information and soci-
ety and culture have almost totally been given over to so-called informa-
tion specialists and public policy planners, mainly from computer science, 
business and business schools, the government, and the quantitative social 
sciences. (Day 2001: 5)
The consequence for related fields such as human-computer interaction has 
been what Day calls a problematic ‘focus on quantitative methods of analy-
sis, a neglect of critical modes and vocabularies for analysis, a dependence 
on naive historiographical forms […], and a neglect of art and culture out-
side of conceptions of historical transmission (that is, “cultural heritage”)’ 
(2001: 5; emphasis added). Tufte’s work deftly bridges the cognitive and the 
qualitative, but the overall disciplinary trade-off Day describes may well 
account for blind spots such as the design of the UNESCO Charter as a 
digital artefact, as well as problems in other digital projects that lock their 
materials in a conceptual box labelled cultural heritage. Many of the literary 
texts which bear that label — Hamlet, Ulysses, The Canterbury Tales, The Prel-
ude — have complex histories of transmission intertwined with interpretive 
concerns, and textual scholars may receive new kinds of illumination from 
the material histories of films, audio recordings, graphic novels, and video 
games. The humanities’ investment in the inner complexity of materials 
productively complicates the task, as McGann describes it, ‘of re-editing — 
of representing — in digital form the entirety of our received textual and 
documentary archive’ (McGann 2001: 194). Digital textual scholars have 
found themselves charged with building a new humanities archive using 
someone else’s tools.19
19  This sentence paraphrases McDayter 2005. McGann makes a similar argument 
in several places; see 2001: 169-70, 2004a: 409-10, and 2005a: 114. For an analogous 
critique of the related field of archival studies, see Brothman 1999: 67-8.
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4. Religious Issues: Form and Content
The sonnets of Shakespeare remain the sonnets of Shakespeare even in the 
most abominable edition. Nor can the finest printing improve their quality.
Aldous Huxley, Introduction to Printing of To-Day (1928: 1) 
With a few exceptions, accounts of the intellectual and institutional trans-
formations of the digital humanities often overlook the tension that results 
from using other disciplines’ tools: pulling in one direction, computational 
practices mandate the abstraction of content from the details of its presen-
tation; pulling in the other direction, literary studies now values those very 
presentational details as integral to the interpretation of texts. Many of the 
software tools computing humanists use today embody the design prin-
ciple of treating form and content as not only distinguishable (as literary 
critics do in order to talk about them), but also as divisible into components 
like �ML (e�tensible Markup Language) files and stylesheets. Such mat-
ters reach beyond pragmatics; as Alan Liu argues, the ‘cardinal needs of 
transformability, autonomous mobility, and automation resolve at a more 
general level into what may be identified as [a] governing ideology […]: 
the separation of content from material instantiation or formal presenta-
tion’ (2004: 58; emphasis changed from original). Liu names this ‘governing 
ideology’ transcendental data, in which the separability of data from their 
presentation via technologies like �ML means that ‘our interfaces today 
are ever more transparently just […] skins or, put technically, templates, 
schemas, style sheets, and so on, designed to be extricable [from content]’ 
(2004: 62; emphasis in original). This ideological formation, when mani-
fested in pragmatic terms, confronts digital textual scholars with the kind 
of dilemma known as a ‘religious issue’ in programming jargon: is it desir-
able, let alone possible, to divide the content of a text from its material form 
for the purposes of machine-readability and large-scale computation?20
It may be helpful to consider first a related question: how did this prob-
lem overtake digital textual scholarship? The answer lies in how the theo-
retical and practical conversations about digital texts have unfolded in the 
humanities. The topic of interface arose late in the critical discourse, arriv-
ing only after others like hypertext and multi-linear narrative had asserted 
their centrality. A case in point is the final paragraph of McGann’s influen-
tial ‘Rationale of Hypertext’ (2001, itself a gesture back to Greg’s ‘Rationale 
20  On religious issue and related terms, see the Jargon Lexicon, http://www.jargon.
net/jargonfile/r/religiousissues.html [accessed 19/10/2008].
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of Copy Text’). In his conclusion, McGann points to something missing: 
this discussion of the decentered text has left out of account the actual imple-
mentation of the theoretical design. It has left out of the account the user 
interface that organizes and delivers the logical design of the archive to spe-
cific persons. […] A major part of our future work with these new electronic 
environments will be the search for ways to implement, at the interface 
level, the full dynamic — and decentering — capabilities of these new tools. 
(McGann 2001: 74; emphasis in original)
This frank admission is belated in more ways than one, since the paragraph 
exists only in the latest published version of McGann’s ‘Rationale’ in Radiant 
Textuality (2001), not in the earlier versions published in the journal TEXT 
(1996a) and the book collection Electronic Text: Investigations in Method and 
Theory (1997). The textual history of McGann’s own ‘Rationale’, one of the 
most influential critical examinations of hypertext, thus stands as a synec-
doche for the critical discourse as a whole. 
No less significant, however, is that McGann ends on the word ‘tools’, a 
term that marks the borderline between the older hypertext theory and 
newer digital humanities. Hypertext theorists observe the effects of dig-
ital technologies; digital humanists actively develop them, embodying the 
design ethos of thinking through making. (Some, like McGann, do both.) Yet 
the no-nonsense pragmatism of digital humanists has not insulated them 
from repeating the mistakes of their predecessors. The late arrival of inter-
face to the theoretical conversation has replicated itself in the lateness of 
interface design tools native to the humanities.
Although the belatedness of interface has not received due attention, 
neither has it gone unremarked.21 Kirschenbaum notes two dangers of 
deferred interface design in a digital humanities project: first, that a hasty, 
under-resourced design phase is disproportionate to the influence of that 
design in the reader’s experience; and second, that deferring the interface 
assumes content is distinct from, and precedes, form (2004a: 524-5). Pres-
ently, the first of these two dangers is diminishing as textual projects like 
digital scholarly editions incorporate the lessons of usability studies from 
fields like human-computer interaction (HCI).22 The more insidious danger 
21  For example, McGann brings up interface as a way of grounding a recent ex-
change about databases and archives (2007: 1588). From within archival studies, 
Hedstrom (2002) offers one of the best explorations of the links between interfaces, 
archives, and digital resources.
22  An example is the Electronic New Variorum Shakespeare (described in Wer-
stine 2008), whose prototype interface was the subject of a Killam Trust-funded 
usability study in 2007-8 (Moore, Galey, and Ruecker 2008). See also the Orlando 
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is the methodological creep toward the separation of form and content, 
which runs counter to the humanist tendency to see the two as distinguish-
able but fundamentally indivisible. For example, McGann points to Steven 
DeRose’s proposition that a book is the same regardless of variables such as 
format (quarto versus octavo) and font (Garamond 24-point versus Times 
12-point): ‘So far as I can see, nearly all the leading design models for the 
scholarly treatment of imaginative works operate from a naive distinction 
between a text’s “form” and “content”’ (McGann 2001: 185).23 Kirschen-
baum elaborates on why McGann’s word ‘naïve’ might be warranted:
the weight of established wisdom in a field like interface design rests on 
a fundamental disconnect with the prevailing intellectual assumptions of 
most humanists — that an ‘interface’, whether the windows and icons of a 
website or the placement of a poem on a page, can somehow be ontologically 
decoupled from whatever ‘content’ it happens to embody. (Kirschenbaum 
2004a: 524)
However, what McGann and Kirschenbaum describe here is not merely 
loose thinking on the part of designers, nor a matter of critical inattention 
to discipline-specific theoretical discourses, but a basic conflict of values 
between the text-oriented humanities and other, data-oriented disciplines. 
Methodology reflects epistemology, and tools can invisibly import assump-
tions from other fields into the humanities.
What makes the ‘religious issue’ of form and content so fraught is 
that non-textual scholars like DeRose have only been repeating what had 
become conventional wisdom in their knowledge domains.24 That con-
Project’s usability research in Brown et al. 2006: 17-21.
23  McGann cites DeRose in a presentation titled ‘ Structured Information: Navi-
gation, Access, and Control,’  given at a 1995 conference and available at http://
sunsite.berkeley.edu/FindingAids/EAD/derose.html [accessed 18/10/2008]. For a 
more thorough explanation of DeRose’s position, see DeRose et al. 1990, one of the 
opening salvos in the OHCO debate (see note 23 below).
24  Specifically, DeRose invokes the idea that all texts have an essential structure 
in the form of an Ordered Hierarchy of Content Objects (OHCO), a tree structure 
of non-overlapping nodes that conveniently matches the structure of all XML docu-
ments. The debate over the OHCO theory of text divided critics along the ques-
tion of the materiality of texts — though some participants might characterize the 
debate differently — with DeRose, Allen Renear, and their co-authors on the pro-
OHCO side, and opposing them McGann, Hayles, and others with links to textual 
scholarship. From a textual studies perspective, the OHCO thesis lost in theory but 
won in practice. The materialist hermeneutics and media-specific analysis of Mc-
Gann and Hayles, respectively, have lost no ground in literary and textual studies, 
but the OHCO model is everywhere in our digital tools, from the structure of XML 
documents, to the historical core of the TEI guidelines (see http://www.tei-c.org/
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ventional wisdom has made its way into the humanities, for example in 
James Cummings’s explanation of XML’s usefulness to the Records of Early 
English Drama project: ‘The increasing separation of content from pres-
entational aspects has been fundamental for the interoperability and flex-
ibility that makes �ML so valuable’ (2006: 181). But how do we determine 
value? Practically, such separation is a welcome convenience; intellectu-
ally, its value is suspect since it impairs textual scholars’ ability to use text 
encoding to model the complexity latent in their materials. Although Cum-
mings accurately describes XML’s advantages over HTML for the encoding 
of born-digital documents like academic articles, his description becomes 
deeply problematic when applied to the encoding of non-digital materi-
als like manuscript poems (he takes many of his examples from Chaucer). 
Cummings’s explanation overlooks the crucial distinction between pre-
scribing presentational details and recording them — a non-trivial distinc-
tion in textual scholarship, which searches for the human traces left upon 
material artefacts.25 
The seductiveness of form-content abstraction derives from its ability 
to simplify the task of encoding, even for those trained to appreciate com-
plexity in texts. We can see the different temporal orientations of design 
and book history mirrored here, as the conventional wisdom governing 
the design of new digital documents extends, anachronistically, to the read-
ing of textual materials from the past. Cummings and DeRose represent a 
tradition which, in the spirit of the Huxley epigraph above, regards content 
as literally that — meaning contained in the language of a text. (Tom Davis, 
in a tongue-in-cheek paraphrase of Karl Popper, terms this attitude toward 
information as the ‘bucket theory’ of communication [1998: 106].)26 On the 
other side of the doctrinal divide, McKenzie’s simple dictum stands in con-
trast: ‘forms effect meaning’ (1999/1985: 13).27
Guidelines/ [accessed 11/2/2010]), to the Document Object Model that underpins 
browsers and other Web technologies. See Schreibman 2002 for a balanced over-
view of the positions; for key entries in the debate, see DeRose et al. 1990; Renear 
1997; Renear, McGann, and Hockey 1999; McGann 2001, as cited elsewhere here; 
Hayles’s chapter on ‘Translating Media’ (2005); and Robinson 2009a.
25  Peter Robinson, for example, argues for the value of encoding the minutest de-
tails of presentational information in Chaucer’s manuscripts (1996a). The problem 
is not that Cummings is unaware of editorial theory; evidence to the contrary may 
be found in Cummings 2007.
26  The history of the term information is also relevant here; see Nunberg 1996 and 
Capurro and Hjørland 2003. For a discussion of the concept of information within 
the context of theorizing tools, see McCarty 2002: 382-3 and 2005: 110.
27  As if to prove McKenzie’s point by accident, a recent book history anthology 
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Paradoxically, the digital humanities have produced valuable practical 
venues for thinking through such religious issues (for example, the Text 
Encoding Initiative), but also communities of practice whose theoretical 
assumptions are now difficult to dislodge (for example, again, the Text 
Encoding Initiative).28 McGann’s closing argument about interface in the 
‘Rationale’ (2001), however belated, was all the more valuable for pointing 
a way out of hypertext theory’s closed circle of self-confirmation. In retro-
spect, hypertext theory now seems like a part of the conversation about 
digital textuality that mistook itself for the whole conversation, but the dig-
ital humanities’ practical orientation should not mean a dismissal of theory. 
‘The implementation of the theoretical design’, as McGann (2001: 74) calls 
it, has become no less a moment of theoria for the digital humanities, in the 
sense of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s distinction of theoria as more than pas-
sive observation: ‘It does not mean a mere “seeing” that establishes what is 
present or stores up information. […] Theoria is not so much the individual 
momentary act as a way of comporting oneself, a position and condition. 
It is “being present” in the lovely double sense that means the person is 
not only present but completely present’, as when one is present in an 
audience that is fully ‘engrossed in their participation as such’ and fully 
aware of each other (1998: 31). In this sense of theoria and presence as syno-
nyms, the modelling of human presence in interface design becomes not 
just the implementation of a theory, but an act of theoria that enables one 
to think through these complex relationships. Textual scholarship has long 
exemplified this philosophy, as in Bernard Cerquiglini’s pithy formulation, 
‘every edition is a theory’ (1999: 79). Unfortunately, humanities computing 
practice has bypassed such moments of theoria in its tendency to think of 
interface design and text encoding as separate activities, each happening at 
opposite ends of the research plan. As Kirschenbaum points out, interface 
design too often comes as an afterthought, late in the project schedule as 
time and resources run out.29 The deferral of interface thus represents not 
so much work left undone as a missed opportunity to articulate what’s at 
stake in how the humanities understand texts.
subtly changes the meaning of this statement by altering its orthographical form to 
‘forms affect meaning’; see Finkelstein and McCleery 2006: 36.
28  For discussions of the structural impositions of the TEI tagset, with particular 
reference to the sometimes-vexing <fw> (forme-work) tag, see Lancashire 1996: 123-
4, and Bjelland 2000: 24-6.
29  See Kirschenbaum 2004a: 524-5.
4. The Human Presence in Digital Artefacts 115
5. Serving the Particular
[T]he universal in the humanities is in the service of the particular.
K. Anthony Appiah, ‘Humane, All Too Humane’ (2005): 42
The search for human presence in digital artefacts is also the search for the 
humanities’ place in digital scholarship. Both searches are underway even 
as the design of digital tools is moving in one direction while the theo-
ries of textual scholarship are moving in another. Digital humanists caught 
between the tensions described in this essay should be wary of two species 
of the same essentialist fallacy: one, perpetuated by theorists with only a 
screen-deep understanding of technical matters, asserts that digital texts 
are inherently unstable (productively or otherwise); the other, perpetuated 
by computing practitioners who neglect theory, asserts that that the only 
aspects of texts worth knowing are those which may be modelled digitally. 
Screen essentialism thus has its counterpart in computational essentialism, 
and digital textual scholars must somehow navigate between the two. The 
challenge is to design interface tools that do not force business or (social) 
science models upon humanists. This step involves developing traditions 
of programming native to the humanities, and recognizing that program-
ming and computer science are not the same thing.30 A further challenge is 
to determine how designing and prototyping, as keystones of the experi-
mental tradition within the digital humanities, should relate to the archival 
and historical strengths of textual scholarship.
To put all this another way, what does the conjunction and signify in a 
term like history and future of the book? Is it merely a hasty splice between 
disciplines, or an expansion of an established field into new territory? In 
the most optimistic light, the and represents the imperative to find a syn-
thesis between reading historical artefacts and designing for the future. 
Although interface is by no means the only important aspect of digital tex-
tuality, it is the area where such a synthesis is most needed. The response 
of textual studies should therefore be more strategic than simply pointing 
out when computing practitioners do not understand humanities materi-
als. For a text encoder working under a computer science model to treat 
data as extricable from their presentation is consistent with best practice. 
For a literary scholar to treat texts as inextricable from their presentation 
30  On the importance of decoupling programming from computer science in the 
digital humanities, see Crane et al. 2007: 54; for a pedagogical perspective on pro-
gramming in the humanities, see Rockwell 2003.
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is also consistent with best practice. This is the methodological crux facing 
digital textual scholars of the present and future. 
The solution lies partly in rearticulating a simple but fundamental idea 
to all sides: even as we design new digital artefacts, we are still learning 
how books work, as well as manuscripts and other textual materials. By 
looking for something more than the authorial genius loci in texts, McKen-
zie introduced new ways to answer the question of what is at stake in 
textual scholarship’s search for ‘the human presence in any recorded text’ 
(1999/1985: 29). The phrase human presence implies no less complexity than 
any recorded text, and digital artefacts, like any other kind, bear traces of the 
social worlds they occupy, not just of their creators. Just as Kirschenbaum 
rightly questions the easy binary that produces digital texts as unstable, 
so must we also be vigilant against the myth that, with the rise of digital 
technology, the human record is now moving from a period of fundamen-
tal stability to one of instability. As print- and manuscript-oriented textual 
scholars have long argued, past textual forms were never so immutable to 
begin with.31 Textual scholarship may be the contrarian voice within the 
digital humanities, resisting those progress narratives which, in order to 
justify investments in tool-building, make texts computationally tractable 
by sacrificing their complexity on the altar of expediency. The serious study 
of digital artefacts does not replace that of pre-digital materials; rather, the 
two must progress together or not at all.
Readers of the May 27th, 1911 issue of Scientific American were shown 
a figure of the New York Public Library that revealed to them the textual 
depths beneath their feet. In the same gesture, the figure asserted a sense of 
mastery over the space of the archive, rationalizing it by means both of the 
retrieval mechanism and of the image’s power to depict it. Digital human-
ists today are presented with similar representational systems promis-
ing a similar mastery. ‘What do you do with a million books?’ remains a 
worthwhile question, but only if we remember that the humanities’ great 
advantage is the power to produce new knowledge using only a few books 
— sometimes even one text. That uniquely powerful economy of scale 
defines what Appiah calls the humanities’ ‘deeply idiographic character’: 
discovery comes from ‘a particular poem, a particular painting, a particular 
sonata’ (2005: 42).32 For digital tools and methods to share in that distinctly 
qualitative power, they must be able to serve the particulars of texts with-
31  For example, see the recent debate between Elizabeth Eisenstein and Adrian 
Johns in American Historical Review, mediated by Anthony Grafton (Grafton 2002).
32  On the term idiographic as opposed to nomothetic, see note 9 above.  
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out sacrificing them to the exigencies of the universal. The digital humani-
ties now face a paradoxical challenge: being digital comes naturally; it’s the 
humanities we have to earn.
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Since Peter Robinson published the first electronic edition in a series 
designed to accommodate all of Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, he has been 
theorizing and writing about the nature and definition of electronic edi-
tions. Along with Jerome McGann and others, he has been at the centre of 
the debate on electronic textual editing since he began work on the colla-
tion and textual criticism of Icelandic manuscripts, for which he developed 
programs collectively called Collate. Because of his accessible papers on the 
subject of electronic textual editing, his software for automatic collation and 
his models realized in commercially available editions, Robinson has been 
the logical starting point for many a scholar wanting an introduction to the 
concept of electronic textual editing.1 However, rather than looking for a 
general definition of an electronic edition, Robinson has consistently been 
specific about what kind of editions he wants to produce, first of the Old 
Norse Svipdagsmál, later of Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales and Dante’s Comme-
dia, and more recently of the Greek New Testament. Since he admitted that 
he was mistaken to abandon the single (edited) text in the edition of The 
Wife of Bath’s Prologue (Robinson 1996c) in favour of a set of different views 
of the text, he has moved from advocating the reader’s freedom of choice 
among many texts, to recognizing the function of the one text, to looking 
for the ideal model of an electronic edition and its functions. Currently he 
1  It would be informative to examine in how far this is true for non-Anglo-Amer-
ican digital scholarship, for instance in the work of French and German scholars.
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advocates ‘fluid, co-operative and distributed editions’ that are strongly 
interactive and that are indebted to Peter Shillingsburg’s concept of ’knowl-
edge sites’ (Robinson 2003a: 125, 2007c). At the same time, Robinson’s ideas 
of ‘electronic editions for everyone’ (2007b, ch. 6 in this volume) correspond 
with Shillingsburg’s concept of the convenient and the practical edition that 
must bridge both the theoretical and practical differences between textual 
and literary critics (2005). This concept recalls Fredson Bowers’ idea of the 
‘practical edition’ (1969).
Shillingsburg’s and Robinson’s ideas for distributed editions do not, 
however, provide a general model for electronic editions or a generally 
applicable and stable interface. These ideas may well be suited for classical, 
medieval, and Victorian Anglo-American textual traditions and may well 
respond to the needs of the broad communities interested in them. They 
seem unlikely to be successful for editors of texts from smaller traditions, 
such as the modern Dutch and Flemish. Editors of texts from such tradi-
tions work for an audience of only a few interested academics and a small 
reading public who for the most part want simply to read texts from printed 
books. The idea of the active involvement of a computer-literate and critical 
community with a knowledge site built around a modern Dutch or Flemish 
text is but an idle fantasy.
It is tempting to advocate a standardized interface to electronic editions 
for the convenience of the user. From a theoretical point of view, however, 
such an interface is as absurd as Stefan Graber’s defence of the historical-
critical edition as the only legitimized type for scholarly editing (1998). An 
interface should rather be conceived as an aggregate of means by which the 
user can interact with the text, commentary, and ancillary material. What 
the interface is called upon to provide is very much dependent on which 
underlying mechanisms have been provided to assist the manipulation of a 
particular text or set of texts according to the nature of that text and the edi-
tor’s interpretation of it. Hence, imposing a general interface would render 
some perspectives difficult to impossible to realise. The electronic edition 
would then be reduced to a publication tool demonstrating a fixed set of 
options rather than a modelling tool for exploring the text and generating 
meaning with it.
Is it possible to define what an electronic edition is, given that it may be 
called upon to do so many different things? The range of requirements is 
large – from demonstrating ‘the considered act of reproducing or altering 
texts’ (Tanselle 1995a: 10) to providing tools to online communities for the 
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enhancement of knowledge sites; from the digitization of a printed edition to 
the provision of user generated editions; from the publication of one text to 
the presentation of a textual archive. How should this question be answered? 
By a guide to good practice? By a survey of current theoretical positions 
and case studies, e.g. in the recent volume on Electronic Textual Editing (Bur-
nard et al. 2006)? By normative guidelines like those of David Gants (1994), 
Susan Hockey (1996), Jerome McGann (1996a), and Peter Shillingsburg (1993, 
1996b)? By several meditations on the technologies, functions, building 
stones, or characteristics of electronic editions (e.g. Karlsson & Malm 2004)? 
My aim here is to propose a definition of an electronic textual edition 
and frame it in the historical context of earlier defining efforts. 
2. Research Assistant
Robinson’s edition of The Wife of Bath’s Prologue on CD-ROM (1996c) is likely 
the first generally acknowledged example of a published electronic edition 
providing a real example of the rationales and principles articulated in the 
mid-1990s. At the time the new HTML-driven World Wide Web and the 
desktop computer seemed to support the widely proclaimed democratiz-
ing character of hypertext. The feasibility of electronic editions, for which 
these documents provided blueprints, was determined by the technologi-
cal knowledge of textual scholars who had been looking into the advan-
tages of computational techniques. The production model of encoding 
text-critical research in a platform independent markup language and pub-
lishing the scholarly edition in a hypertextual environment seemed to be a 
fair trade-off between the use of manageable text-based technology and the 
popular(izing) hype of hypertext publishing.
Although the idea of hypertext was devised by Theodor Nelson in the 
mid 1960s (2003/1965), it first became a useful technology with the release 
of the programmable hypermedia authoring tool and information organ-
izer HyperCard in the mid-1980s. Before then the computer had been used 
extensively as a ‘research assistant in scholarly editing’ (Shillingsburg 1980: 
31), relying on programs and tools developed for concordancing, collation, 
analysis of variants, stemma determination, reconstruction, building, and 
photo composition. In the 1980s sophisticated and integrated packages for 
textual editing, such as Shillingsburg’s CASE, Robinson’s COLLATE, Wil-
helm Ott’s TUSTEP (1988), Francisco Marcos Marín’s UNITE and Robert 
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Cannon and Robert Oakman’s URICA! were developed.2 However, with 
HyperCard and the introduction of the personal computer came a new 
contingent of less technically sophisticated scholarly users. Consequently, 
computer applications in the field of textual editing consisted of ‘sophisti-
cated word processing’ (Potter 1985: 95) whose most proclaimed advantage 
was the elimination of the need to retype documents whenever a correc-
tion was inserted.3 Towards the end of the 1980s Hans Walter Gabler sum-
marized the computer’s function in textual editing nicely by saying that: 
‘l’ordinateur n’est donc pas instrument de recherche, mais un simple outil 
pratique qui peut, il est vrai, améliorer de manière notable l’efficacité et la 
qualité de nos travaux’ (1989: 55).
This was corroborated by a survey of scholarly editors conducted in the 
fall of 1990 by Cathy Moran Hajo, mentioned by David Chesnutt (1991). 
This survey showed that computers were mainly used as word processors 
in the preparation of critical editions and their critical apparatus. ‘[E]ditors 
working in 1991’, Chesnutt concluded, ‘continue to use computers in many 
of the same ways they adopted in the late 70s and early 80s’ (1991: 377). As a 
matter of fact, the 1970s and 1980s saw few new insights. When presenting 
TUSTEP as a suitable suite of software tools for critical editing in 1988, Wil-
helm Ott confessed that the basic ideas and techniques presented were not 
new: ‘Most of it could have been told (and has in part been told) ten years 
ago. [...] So you must be content with a more than ten-year-old concept, and 
with some results and experiences which we have achieved since then.’ (Ott 
1988: 82). Charles Faulhaber agreed: ‘To date, most computerized textual 
criticism has conceived of the computer primarily as a tool to facilitate the 
production of printed texts both by automating the procedures of textual 
criticism, as well as by permitting a much greater consistency in the appli-
cation of editorial criteria.’ He further pointed out that the goal of the proc-
ess was still the printed text itself, and he observed that ‘as a byproduct, but 
only as a byproduct, the computer also produces an electronic version of 
the text’ (1991: 123).4
2  The main difference between the integrated packages and other programs is 
that each program in such a package produces an output that can be used as input 
for follow-up programs so that a continuous editorial procedure from text compari-
son to typesetting the scholarly edition becames possible.
3  Even if the manuscript had been prepared on a word-processor, it was com-
monly retyped by the publisher in a second machine-readable version that included 
formatting codes.
4  Already in 1967, Martin Kay optimistically claimed that ‘[i]n a few years every 
printing house which wishes to remain competitive will produce a machine-read-
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With respect to the application of computational techniques to textual 
editing up to the beginning of the 1990s, Thomas Tanselle is probably right 
in commenting that ‘[w]hen people say that the computer makes possible 
certain kinds of textual research, such as locating all the appearances of 
particular words in a given text or group of texts, they are using the word 
possible inexactly to mean ‘practically feasible’’ (2006: 3). It is indeed true 
that when Miriam Shillingsburg claimed back in 1983 that her edition of 
Washington Irving’s The Conquest of Granada ‘could not have been produced 
without the aid of the computer’ (1983: 654), she did not mean that it had 
been impossible to produce an edition of this complexity and size without 
the aid of the computer, but that it was unlikely a project to happen since 
it would have occupied a substantial part of one’s academic career. ‘The 
misuse of possible is not a trivial matter,’ Tanselle argues, ‘for it is symp-
tomatic of the exaggerated claims one often hears about computers, and 
these claims do not provide a useful foundation for thinking productively 
about just what computers can in fact do for us’ (2006: 3). In this respect 
also, Tanselle’s conviction that ‘[p]rocedures and routines will be differ-
ent; concepts and issues will not’ (2006: 6) seems to be true. Fifteen years 
before Tanselle’s claim, Jean-Louis Lebrave had already observed that the 
computer-assisted edition did not affect the concepts and issues of edit-
ing: ‘les charactéristiques et la structure du produit imprimé ne sont pas 
modifiées par l’utilisation de l’ordinateur dans les phases de mise en page. 
De ce fait, la P.A.O [Publication Assistée par Ordinateur] n’affecte pas la 
problématique de l’édition’ (Lebrave 1994/1991: 171).
3. Publication Medium 
The exaggerated claims to which Tanselle reacted were also present in 
hypertext theory of the late 1990s. The introduction of the computer as 
a publication medium, however, and thus, in a way, as a modelling tool, 
started the transition from computer-aided or computer-assisted editions 
able version of a text as a natural by-product of the printing process, and it is to 
be hoped that a systematic effort will be made to insure that this material is not 
destroyed as it usually is today’. The question is then: what can be done ‘to make 
this data available to linguists and literary scholars and to enable them to profit as 
they should from the computer facilities that are so rapidly becoming cheaper and 
more powerful’? (Kay 1967: 171).
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to true electronic editions that exploit the possible beyond the feasible.5
The idea of publishing scholarly editions electronically, then, began to 
gain ground, thanks to the wide availability of personal computer software 
and hardware, economically sound solutions to the ‘input bottleneck’ by 
the development of affordable scanning services and optical scanners with 
OCR software, the improvement of digital imaging equipment and tech-
niques, the availability and exponential growing capacity of magnetic and 
optical storage devices and the overall falling cost of data processing and 
storage.
The ambiguity in the association of the concept of electronic edition with 
the photo-composition of printed editions, rather than with the production 
of editions for the screen, was criticized by Roger Laufer who proposed the 
concept of the édition-diffusion éléctronique (electronic distributed edition) 
as an alternative to l’édition automatique which was what computer-assisted 
editing was called in France (Laufer 1989: 115). Disappointed by the illeg-
ibility of his own edition of Alain René Le Sage’s Diable Boiteux and inspired 
by translation software used on Apple Lisa and Macintosh machines, 
Laufer, at an international meeting in 1984,6 promoted the implementation 
of the technique of multi-fenêtrage or multiple windows in a program which 
could turn the computer itself into a publication medium (Catach 1988). 
This technology would overcome the economic and static limitations of the 
elitist construct that is the printed scholarly edition, and introduce a social 
alternative for the dynamic and full realization of the promise of the critical 
synoptic edition that claims to offer the option of reading multiple versions 
simultaneously in the form of the apparatus of variants:
Le recours à l’informatique permet d’obvier à ces inconvénients. Le lec-
teur choisit son texte de base et son ou ses textes de comparaison pour les 
lieux qui l’intéressent. Ainsi devient réalisable une édition critique entière-
ment variable selon demande. (Laufer 1989: 115)
5  As long as the printed paradigm remains the model by which the computer 
is used in assisting text-critical research, this transition will never take place fully. 
Statements about the computer as a mere tool to facilitate the text-critical process 
are mostly made by scholars who do not intend to explore the possibilities of the 
computer as a modelling tool, and who stick to the assistant role of the computer 
in existing areas of study. Reasons for this attitude can be manifold and include ig-
norance, resistance, peer pressure, and intentional compliance with certain schools 
and traditions.
6  Table ronde internationale portant sur ‘Les problèmes techniques et éditoriaux 
des éditions critiques’, 28-29 June 1984, Paris: CNRS. The proceedings of this meet-
ing are published in Catach (1988).
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The use of the multiple frames on the screen as a manipulation tool for 
the dynamic reading or consultation of parallelized documents (versions, 
variants, facsimiles, annotations...) was the original idea Laufer added to 
existing technology.
Around the same time, George Logan, David Barnard, and Robert Craw-
ford described the critical edition of Thomas More’s Utopia that aimed to 
publish a machine-readable text not merely as a series of computer files 
which could be distributed and analysed in conjunction with (non-system) 
analytical software,7 but as ‘files linked to software that can display sections 
of text in desired configurations, maintain interconnections between the dif-
ferent files, and provide other appropriate services’ (Logan et al. 1986: 319-
20). The authors describe a variety of uses of the electronic edition, ranging 
from consulting the isolated component files of the edition, to dividing the 
screen into multiple windows for the simultaneous consultation of different 
component files, to simultaneously scrolling parallelized component files. 
Unlike Laufer, however, Logan et al. propose to publish the electronic edi-
tion alongside the printed edition. Because all the components of the printed 
edition are also present in the electronic version, the latter can be used as 
a replication of the printed edition, but as the authors point out, the great-
est advantage lies in its ‘power to facilitate coordinations which, though 
explicit, are virtually impossible to discover in printed books’ (Logan et al. 
1986: 322). They explain: ‘the windows of the electronic edition can replace 
not one but several place-holding fingers [...] they allow appropriate tem-
porary rearrangements of the pages of the edition’ (Logan et al. 1986: 322). 
Jean-Louis Lebrave commented that: ‘[l’]innovation principale est peut-
être que l’utilisateur devient partie prenante dans l’élaboration des matéri-
aux qu’il consulte, et contrôle librement les cheminements qu’il effectuera à 
travers les documents’ (1988: 127). He added that one of the implications of 
this technology was that the exclusive choice between a critical edition and 
a facsimile edition disappeared because ‘on peut consulter simultanément 
un fac-similé du brouillon et telle ou telle forme d’édition ou interprétation 
de ce brouillon’ (Lebrave 1988: 127). As an alternative to the conjunctive use 
of analytical software with the machine readable text in Logan et al. (1986), 
Roger Laufer predicted the integration of several analytical software tools 
such as collation and concordance software in this kind of electronic edi-
7  Towards the end of the 1980s machine-readable texts of literary titles became 
available as separately distributed products on CD-ROM or as part of electronic 
text centres. Often, the texts were encoded for use with specific analytical software 
packages such as WordCruncher or Micro-OCP.
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tion (Laufer 1989: 124). However, as he pointed out, the specific software 
that would facilitate all this still had to be written.
Like Laufer, Lebrave saw recent computer technology as an alternative to 
the traditional codex. He described the electronic edition as ‘a multi-media 
data base, giving access to facsimiles, to various transcriptions, to interpreta-
tion tools, like dictionaries or programs for automatic comparison of textual 
fragments’ (Lebrave 1987: 142). The advantage of such a ‘pluralistic system’, 
according to Lebrave, is that it ‘would allow any reader to construct his own 
reading according to the hypothesis he wants to build up’ (1987: 142).
Although neither Logan et al. nor Laufer and Lebrave ever use the terms 
hypertext or hypermedia in their early presentations and writings, – Logan et 
al. speak of ‘interconnections between the different files’ (1986: 319) – their 
descriptions of the mechanics by which users of their editions could walk 
‘à travers les données génétiques sans être prisonnière d’aucune des formes 
de représentation utilisées’ (Lebrave 1988: 136) undoubtedly describe the 
functionality of hypertext.
The explicit link between Gérard Genette’s (1982) concept of hypertext as 
a form of intertextuality8 – already in use in genetic studies (Marantz 1988) 
– and Nelson’s concept of hypertext as non-sequential writing (2003/1965)9 
was made by Lebrave in a series of articles on hypertext and avant-texte in 
the early 1990s. Here, Lebrave highlighted the advantages of hypertext for 
the organisation and visualization of the dossier génétique and reported on 
some early experiments with the hypermedia authoring tool HyperCard.10
Although the concept of hypertext was considered to provide the ideal 
metaphor and technology to reconstitute the dynamics of the writing proc-
ess (by the visualization of a number of documents and their regrouping 
according to several principles such as resemblance, difference, teleology, 
and chronology) the resulting edition was a closed hypertextual universe 
and remained as static as its printed counterpart. In other words, it only 
offered dynamism within its own pre-set boundaries and according to the 
enabled features of the hypertext application.
8  ‘J’appelle donc hypertexte tout texte dérivé d’un texte antérieur par transforma-
tion simple (nous dirons désormais transformation tout court) ou par transforma-
tion indirecte: nous dirons imitation.’ (Genette 1982: 16).
9  Nelson describes: ‘a body of written or pictorial material interconnected in such 
a complex way that it could not conveniently be presented or represented on paper’ 
(Nelson 2003/1965: 144).
10  Namely genetic editions of the beginning of Flaubert’s Hérodias by Lebrave 
and a genetic path through one of Joyce’s Finnegans Wake notebooks by Daniel Fer-
rer (Ferrer 1995).
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4. Analytical Tool
An interesting early suggestion of a dynamic system was provided by Todd 
Bender in 1976 and was echoed by Donald Ross Jr. in 1981. Both scholars 
conceived of formal textual editing as a computer project that ‘should be 
set up and preserved in such a way that future scholars can return to it 
and use it in its electronic form’ (Bender 1976b: 194). After analysing the 
Platonic orientation of modern textual criticism, as advocated at the time 
by the CEA (College English Association), and the incompatibility of this 
method in the case of modern literary texts where ‘the printed page is 
inherently incapable of representing the work accurately or fully’ (Bender 
1976b: 194), Bender introduced computer technology as offering the possi-
bility of retaining ‘a version which more closely approximates the essence 
of a work without disregarding all the mutations which exist in the manu-
script and printed representations’ (1976b: 194). He proposed to recognize 
the electronic text as the primary form of the work and the ‘‘‘real” reposi-
tory of information’ from which any printed expression and any form of 
textual analysis could be generated. With the publication of the concord-
ance to Conrad’s Heart of Darkness in 1973, Bender (1973) had demonstrated 
the generative power of this approach. Instead of basing the concordance 
on a printed text, which Bender argued is but ‘one among many possi-
ble provisional, incomplete, and arbitrary formats of information’ (1976b: 
194-5), he based the concordance on the basic input data which included 
transcriptions of all significant printed and manuscript versions of the text 
and their collations. This genetic and transmissional information turns the 
repository into a three dimensional data pool that, although it cannot pro-
duce definitive editions, ‘can easily search out for us and note every case 
in which a literal or punctuation variant occurs in this three dimensional 
matrix’ (Bender 1976a: 333-4). As any printed edition is a two dimensional 
and ‘simplified expression of a matrix of complex variables’ (Bender 1976a: 
336), Bender envisioned that the role of the textual editor might be the con-
struction of the multidimensional model of variables which could be con-
sulted from any ‘scholar’s desk console anywhere in the world’ connected 
‘through radio or telephone circuitry’ to ‘one central data bank’ (Bender 
1976b: 195). The reader, Bender noted, will come to the electronic reposi-
tory and ask for ‘a provisional expression shaped to his needs’ (1976a: 337). 
In order to facilitate a dynamic consultation and analysis of the data bank, 
Bender developed a system by which relationships among words or signs 
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are represented not by positional notations, but by arithmetic notations 
that are semantic-neutral representations of the language. This system 
would allow the representation of interrelations in a set of complex vari-
able information in which a word is seen as a constellation of significations 
(Bender 1976b: 196).
Some years later, Donald Ross Jr. proposed to turn Bender’s model 
inside out. Instead of a textual database containing the transcriptions of 
the witnesses of the transmissional and genetic history of the text and 
their collations, Ross suggested storing the copy text as data together 
with collation information and expressing the traditional footnotes or 
apparatus of a printed edition as algorithms or a series of programs that 
manipulates the copy text into a representation of any selected stage of 
the textual history (1981: 159-61). This means that every single stage of 
the textual tradition or genesis, including the critical text established by 
the editor, would then be assumed data which could be called upon and 
produced by these algorithms. Editors would be responsible for the valid-
ity of the commands invoking the algorithms that produce a stage of the 
text and they would also have to document the procedures so that users 
of the edition could access any perspective on the textual history. The 
use of such a system would be threefold in Ross’ view. First, this data 
organisation could produce traditional printed editions presenting any 
stage of the text. Second, the assumed data could easily be analysed, for 
instance to determine stylistic patterns by the generation and collation of 
concordances of various stages of the textual history. Just as in Bender’s 
database proposal, statistical analyses of other stylistic features would 
also be options as well as an automatic analysis of genetic features. Third, 
the database could function as a ‘front-end’ for a document retrieval 
system that not only displayed the assumed data assembled by specific 
user-driven commands graphically, for instance to represent the author’s 
working process, but that also provided access to all information stored 
in this database. ‘Assuming this were possible,’ Ross concluded, ‘then the 
kind of information in the data base could be displayed to the scholar 
working at a terminal, where passages from all sources could be called 
up’ (Ross 1981: 161).
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5. Hyperedition/Database
Almost two decades after Bender’s proposal, Marilyn Deegan and Peter 
Robinson (1994/1990) came to similar conclusions regarding the fact that 
traditional scholarly editions inevitably present a selection of the informa-
tion used and produced in preparing such an edition, especially when the 
computer is used for the transcription, preparation, encoding, and collation 
of texts which produce much intermediate data that are not represented in 
the final result. The selection and presentation of data is traditionally left to 
the judgement and experience of scholarly editors who endorse scholarly 
editions with their authority. In Deegan and Robinson’s proposal, however, 
all data on which editorial decisions are based could be presented in what 
they called ‘an electronic hypertext edition’ which would not substitute for 
but supplement the traditional edition. As Deegan and Robinson argued, 
‘viewed in the light of certain reasonable reading expectations, the legiti-
mate exercise of editorial selectivity imposes arbitrary and subjective limits 
on the interpretation of texts, and what is a justifiable and intelligent limi-
tation from one scholarly angle may appear, from another, an unnecessary 
restriction of possibilities’ (Deegan and Robinson 1994/1990: 35-36). Less 
radical than Bender, who emphasized that the real information was located 
in the electronic memory, Deegan and Robinson preferred the on-screen 
representation of information with the aid of hypertext as a referential man-
agement and navigating system. By their proposal to not only present the 
results of critical research such as the edited text and several commentary 
sections and apparatuses, but also the research materials, such as encoded 
transcriptions and digital facsimiles of the documentary witnesses, they 
introduced the edition/archive issue which was commented on by Peter 
Shillingsburg (1996a: 161-71). However, they clearly expressed the need for 
the electronic hypertext edition to preserve the features of the traditional 
scholarly edition alongside the presentation of these data, as did Logan et 
al. (1986) and the 1997 CSE Guidelines for Electronic Scholarly Editions which 
claimed that the ‘content of an electronic edition differs little from that of a 
print edition.’
In an instructive and elaborate essay on ‘Textual Criticism in the 21st 
Century’ Charles Faulhaber agrees with Deegan and Robinson on the con-
tent of a hyperedition. He describes the concept and function of what he 
calls ‘the electronic critical edition’ as follows:
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In an electronic critical edition the critical text will be the locus of a set of 
data connected to it by various kinds of links, some established specifically 
by the editor, others established automatically by software tools. The criti-
cal text will not exist as a self-sufficient isolate but rather as part of a rich 
environment which will enable users to study the text’s internal structure 
– graphemic, phonological, morphological, lexical, semantic, syntactic, dis-
cursive – as well as its relationship to its genre, to its linguistic and literary 
tradition, to the interpretive tradition which surrounds it, to its historical 
moment, to its society, and, eventually, to significant aspects of its culture, 
understood in anthropological as well as artistic terms. (Faulhaber 1991: 128)
Deegan and Robinson (1994/1990) draw the attention to two issues that also 
feature in the later propositions and normative guidelines for electronic 
editions already mentioned in the introduction to this essay. The first was 
the requirement for a platform independent and non-proprietary markup 
language that could deal with the linguistic and the bibliographic text of a 
work and that could guarantee maximal accessibility, longevity, and intel-
lectual integrity in the encoding of texts and textual variation. This was 
found in the work of the Text Encoding Initiative, which had issued their 
first Guidelines for the Encoding for Machine-Readable Text in 1990. The second 
issue was the need for a hypertextual navigation tool that could guide the 
user through an enormous amount of documentation and proof of textual 
variation, and that would overcome the shift from the singularity of the 
edited text to the multiplicity of the archive. Already in 1993 (although not 
published until 1996), John Lavagnino boasted that textual scholars were 
‘the avant-garde when it comes to the use of hypertext’ (1996: 109).11
This vision is typical of the overall tendency in the 1980s and 1990s to 
ignore Donald Ross’ generative database proposal, which took an algorith-
mic approach to produce assumed data in favour of Todd Bender’s archive 
suggestion, which took a presentational approach towards articulated 
data. However, Manfred Thaller, in line with his perspective on humani-
ties computing as a humanistic computer science, proposed to consider 
electronic editions as computer systems that are able ‘to support historical 
research, as opposed to administering, in a convenient way, results of histori-
cal research’ (1996: 254), which is what hypertext editions do. In Thaller’s 
vision, the underlying structure of an electronic edition is best organised as 
a database system that browses texts as extended string data types. Using 
this data type as a replacement for the concept of a simple string in pro-
gramming application systems enables the acceptance by the database sys-
11  The paper was writt en in 1993 but published in 1996.
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tem of external information ‘which is browsed into the internal extended 
string representation, processed in that form and re-converted into some 
kind of external representation before being displayed on an appropriate 
medium’ (Thaller 1996: 252). Thaller is backed up by Dino Buzzetti (1996), 
who favours a database representation of the entire textual tradition that 
contains processable representations of text. But he also warned that ‘the 
dynamic form of a database representation – a form of representation that 
affords a more faithful reproduction of the varied and diversified expres-
sions of textual fluidity – should not be mistaken for the accomplished form 
of its edition’ (Buzzetti 1996: 255). Like Ross, Buzzetti proposed to docu-
ment the sequential textual tradition in a unique and consistent non-lin-
ear representation in database form, for which he used Thaller’s extended 
string concept:
A database representation can thus act as a consistent and unifying 
model of all different sequential representations of a text, a congruent struc-
ture onto which they can all be mapped simultaneously and consistently, 
and from which they can all be separately derived and individually dis-
played. (Buzzetti 1996: 255)
This entails a double economy of encoding a single sequential representa-
tion and processing a multiplicity of structurally different representations.
However, probably because of its embedding in computer science rather 
than in the humanities, this database model was not generally considered 
by humanities scholars who came to think about electronic editions. The 
hypertext edition, on the other hand, with its focus on the edition as an 
object and its realization of associativity and intertextuality, was cham-
pioned by many a project. As Lou Burnard (1992: 17) explained: ‘Where 
true database systems require a formalization of the information content of 
text, hypertext systems return us the view of information as an emergent 
property, resulting from a connection between one piece of discourse and 
another.’ 
6. Edition/Archive
The database concept, however, did turn up in Deegan and Robinson’s 
description of hypertext as ‘a document which is essentially a database 
with active cross-references allowing non-sequential reading and writ-
ing’ (1994/1990: 36). This inspired Peter Shillingsburg (1993, 1996b: 31) to 
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conceive of the electronic edition mainly as a database attached to a net-
work. Next to the concern that the design of the electronic edition and 
the storage capacities of the archive must anticipate the desires of the tar-
geted user community, Shillingsburg mainly addressed issues of usabil-
ity, transportability, security and order, integrity, and expandability. The 
networked database model was shared by Susan Hockey (1996), who put 
more emphasis on the need for encoding strategies that could also handle 
documentation of meta-information about the text and the images. ‘Ide-
ally’, Hockey argues, ‘the master copy would consist of transcriptions of 
the text and digital images of the source material’ (1996: 13-14). Deegan 
and Robinson likewise proposed that the electronic edition should contain 
encoded transcripts of all the manuscripts and ‘possibly digital images of 
some or all manuscripts’ (1994/1990: 36). Shillingsburg (1996b) turned this 
desirability of a full accurate transcription and a full digital image of each 
source edition into a condition of the electronic edition, echoing Tanselle 
who stated that ‘[d]igitized images of the original manuscripts and printed 
pages should always be provided along with the more manipulable elec-
tronic texts’ (1995b: 591-2) – something which Lebrave (1987) had already 
requested before. Tanselle also required the inclusion of ‘critically recon-
structed texts [...] within the collection of texts available in a hypertext edi-
tion’ (1995b: 592),12 a suggestion picked up by Shillingsburg in his defence 
of ‘both types of editing’ (1996a: 95), that is historical and critical editing. 
In the context of his envisioned knowledge sites, Shillingsburg defends the 
logic behind the inclusion of a critical text in a documentary archive and 
asks: ‘In what sense is it a gain to have in an archive a historical text that 
was poorly produced and represents the hasty and not-so-careful editorial 
work of a commercial publisher rather than the thoughtful, careful work of 
a scholarly editor – who just happens to pursue editorial goals with which 
you don’t agree?’ (2006b: 157). Interestingly, Shillingsburg designed his 
knowledge sites as documentary archives in which scholarly editions have 
12  In ‘Critical Editions, Hypertexts, and Genetic Criticism’ Tanselle makes two 
explicit points about hypertext. First he defends the graphical possibilities of hy-
pertext: ‘Just as a scholarly edition in codex form is considered deficient if it does 
not provide a record of variant readings, a hypertext edition (or ‘archive’) should be 
regarded as inadequate if it does not offer images of the original documents, both 
manuscript and printed’ (1995b: 591). Secondly he defends the inclusion of a critical 
text in a hypertext edition/archive: ‘Indeed, the point can be made more positively: 
that critically reconstructed texts ought to be included within the collection of texts 
available in a hypertext edition’ (Tanselle 1995b: 591-2).
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their place. Curiously, he seemed to have forgotten Tanselle’s defence of the 
inclusion of a critical text in a hypertext edition ‘or ‘archive’ (Tanselle 1995b: 
591) when he reported ‘I have yet to hear anyone suggest that the electronic 
scholarly archive should have a critical edition of each sort added to the 
collection of historical texts’ (Shillingsburg 2006b: 157).
In his influential essay ‘The Rationale of HyperText’, Jerome McGann 
pointed out that the Rossetti Hypermedia Archive (McGann 2005b) is ‘an 
archive rather than an edition’, claiming that its indefinitely expandable 
‘webwork of relations’ escapes the ‘bibliographical limitation’ of the edi-
tion which ‘closes its covers on itself’ (1996a: 27). McGann’s concept of the 
archive is directly linked to the function of hyperediting, the result of which 
is ‘theoretically open to alternations of its contents and its organizational 
elements at all points and at any time’ (McGann 1996a: 29). Furthermore, 
‘[u]nlike a traditional edition, a hypertext is not organized to focus attention 
on one particular text or set of texts. It is ordered to disperse attention as 
broadly as possible’ (ibid.). In this discourse, McGann clearly used the word 
‘edition’ when he referred to the traditional codex edition, and ‘archive’ to 
emphasize the hypertextual nature of the electronic edition. That this is not 
a useful distinction is proved by his own use, in the same essay, of the terms 
‘Hypereditions’ and ‘Hypermedia editions’ when he refers to the results of 
‘hyperediting’ (and not ‘hyperarchiving’). The somewhat awkward distinc-
tion between edition and archive is not used consistently by McGann him-
self and it seems to reflect his aversion to the mechanics of the traditional 
critical edition shown in the following quotation:
Editing in codex forms generates an archive of books and related materials. 
This archive then develops its own meta-structures – indexing and other 
study mechanisms – to facilitate navigation and analysis of the archive. 
Because the entire system develops through the codex form, however, dupli-
cate, near-duplicate, or differential archives appear in different places. The 
crucial problem here is simple: the logical structures of the ‘critical edition’ 
function at the same level as the material being analyzed. As a result, the 
full power of the logical structures is checked and constrained by being 
compelled to operate in a bookish format. If the coming of the book vastly 
increased the spread of knowledge and information, history has slowly 
revealed the formal limits of all hard copy’s informational and critical pow-
ers. The archives are sinking in a white sea of paper. (McGann 1996a: 14)
As McGann later reflected on this essay, ‘[t]he immediate focus of the 
argument was the debate among editorial theorists about the possibility 
of creating, in scholarly form, the ‘social text’ – that is, a critical edition 
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that would not privilege the authority of one particular text or document’ 
(2001: 25). In order to achieve this, McGann (1996b) sought to ‘integrate for 
the first time the procedures of documentary and critical editing’. The Ros-
setti Hypermedia Archive, then, was created by McGann to demonstrate the 
practical feasibility of his social theory of the text that was at the heart of 
A Critique of Modern Textual Criticism (1983), and to promote the view that 
digital forms were open and interactive as opposed to the static and linear 
qualities of the traditional codex form (2001: 25).
Robinson (1996b) interestingly ranked McGann’s Rossetti Hyperme-
dia Archive together with Richard Finneran’s Hypermedia Yeats project 
(Finneran & Bornstein 1994) in a ‘more is better’ kind of electronic edition 
which he opposed to the ‘less is better’ group in which he situated his own 
edition of the Wife of Bath’s Prologue (1996c) and Anne McDermott’s edi-
tion of Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language (1996). The distinction 
between these two kinds of editions is made on the basis of their respective 
intent to include all the relevant multimedia materials or only a selection. 
According to Robinson, editors of editions in the ‘less is better’ group aim 
‘to identify a particular textual domain and a particular audience, and to 
present that text for that audience as clearly, as richly, and as accurately, as 
is possible with the resources available’ (1996b). In the case of The Wife of 
Bath’s Prologue (1996c) the textual history under consideration is limited 
to the pre-1500 witnesses only, and the Johnson edition only presents the 
first and the fourth edition of the Dictionary. Further, Robinson pointed out 
that these editions are also ‘rigorously exclusive: there is no discussion of 
the importance of Johnson’s lexicographic work on the CD-ROM, and the 
Wife of Bath’s Prologue CD-ROM contains no glossary and no study of the 
Wife of Bath herself’ (1996b). Together with the explicit editorial presence 
in the text, this function is one of Robinson’s arguments that an electronic 
edition should not be an archive, resource, or ‘an accumulation of materi-
als without any editorial “interpretation”’ (1996a: 110). In a later reflection 
on the editions of the Wife of Bath and the General Prologue, however, he 
called them ‘repositories of information, from which skilled scholars might 
quarry what they need’ (Robinson 2003b). Robinson (2007a: 8) summarizes: 
‘for a digital edition to be all it can and should be, then it will let the editors 
include all that should be included, and say all that needs to be said.’
The distinction between editions and archives, however, is not made by 
Tanselle who observed that ‘[u]p to now, scholarly projects for publishing 
electronic texts have tended to take the form of archives’ (2006: 5). Elec-
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tronic editions and electronic archives, in Tanselle’s view, are therefore syn-
onymous.
At the same time, it is true that the meaning of the word ‘archive’ in 
connection with electronic textual editing has changed over the course of 
time. Originally denoting a mere repository of digital surrogates of mate-
rial artefacts and processed data, the concept has come to include schol-
arly and critical material such as edited texts, annotations, scholarly essays 
and the like, alongside the digital resources. This transition has happened 
organically.
7. Critical Edition
The distinctions discussed so far such as print versus electronic, archive 
versus edition, database versus hypertext, or ‘more is better’ versus ‘less is 
better’ have been useful in the debates in which they feature, but they are 
problematic with regard to defining the electronic edition. Just as point-
ing to a tree does not define one, comparing a tree with something which 
is apparently not a tree does not work either. The discussion above illus-
trates that a definition as crude and basic as the one John Lavagnino sug-
gested, writing in 1993, as the core of all hypertext editions, was even at 
the time of writing theoretically problematic: ‘a system that would store 
both electronic texts and images of all the versions of the works in question, 
and offer the ability to display parallel texts of any two versions, as either 
images or electronic texts’ (Lavagnino 1996).
Although it might have been true that this is ‘[w]hat a number of schol-
ars have imagined a hypertext edition would be’ (Lavagnino 1996), this 
definition clearly describes a very specific type of electronic edition and 
a very specific type of hypertext edition which requires a specific archival 
basis and a specific display. Toby Burrows (1997), in his proposal for build-
ing a typology of electronic editions, did not include any requirement with 
regards to the contents or the display of the edition, but instead looked at 
five more neutral characteristics of electronic texts, namely the markup 
scheme employed; the extent to which the edition is dependent on specific 
software; the method of distribution or publication; the overall structure 
or architecture of the edition; and the type of edition involved. Although 
this checklist could produce informative metadata on the edition as a bib-
liographical object which should evidently be documented as part of the 
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edition, theorists of the electronic edition have focused on describing more 
functional requirements. John Lavagnino (1996) argued that the hypertext 
edition should facilitate four tasks: ‘selecting versions to look at; comparing 
versions; constructing new and possibly more representative versions of 
the text on the basis of the information available; and integrating all this 
study with other scholarship and criticism.’13 A fifth possible task ‘consult-
ing a critical text’ is not listed here. By excluding the explicit requirement 
of the inclusion of a critical text, Lavagnino defended an electronic edition 
that is different from Faulhaber’s ‘electronic critical edition’ (1991) which 
is centred on a critical text. The reason for this can be found in McGann’s 
definition of critical editing: in an interesting discussion – at least from a 
historical and theoretical point of view – on the ESE (electronic scholarly 
editing) mailing list in 1994 (ESE 1994), about what critical editing is and 
what the nature of the electronic archive is, McGann made the following 
claim:
critical editing is a mechanism whereby, through a programmatic study 
of textual variance in extant documents, one hypothetically reconstructs lost 
or absent documents (which may themselves be hypothetical). period. that 
IS what it is and that’s all it is. [...] now although this editing tool is obviously 
designed for use in dealing with ancient texts, it was adapted by scholars 
to certain ‘modern’ circumstances where the documentary record was once 
again relatively broken and problematic. it was then re-adapted (by bowers) 
to situations where the documentary record was hardly damaged at all, i.e., 
in cases where one did not need the special tool of ‘critical editing’ to clear 
the texts of errors. simple collations would take care of the errors. the tool 
was used rather to construct ‘eclectic editions’ that represented hypothetical 
forms of some hypothesized ‘authorial intention’ (original or final, usually). 
(ESE 1994)
McGann continues: ‘with the coming of electronic text, however, the use of 
‘critical editions’ in the proper sense, for modern texts, changes.’ Therefore, 
the real question in connection with electronic archives and critical editions, 
McGann argued, is: ‘would a critical text be useful?’ In other words, ‘are 
there any cases where such an edition would be called for, where it has any 
point; what would make one want to produce such a text?’ According to 
McGann, the documentary record of texts, as presented in digital archives, 
13  When rereading his essay in 1997, Lavagnino pointed out that ‘this es-
say looks to the future because most of its suggestions about things we need to 
be able to do with texts have not been implemented’ http://hdl.handle.net/2027/
spo.3336451.0003.112 [accessed 8/3/2010].
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seldom demands such a text. Nevertheless he argues in favour of the inclu-
sion of critical texts in digital archives such as his Rossetti Archive, but, he 
adds, ‘I won’t make such a reconstruction myself.’14
Robinson (2002) accepts McGann’s reservation about the inclusion of a 
critical text in an electronic edition or archive, and mentions the presenta-
tion of an edited text as a mere possibility of a ‘critical digital edition’. With 
the ‘critical digital edition’ Robinson proposes to extend the functions of 
a traditional printed critical edition in the traditional print library to the 
digital realm. Its main function is thus, according to Robinson, to ‘think 
critically, and to help others think critically’ (2002: 59) or, in other words, ‘to 
help editors edit, [...] to help readers read’ (Blake & Robinson 2000). Robin-
son’s proposal reintroduces critical editing into the model of the hypertext 
edition as an archive whose main function is the creation of accessibility to 
certified materials. In an earlier meditation on the electronic edition, Robin-
son (2009; written 1997-2002) had defined the electronic edition in general 
terms as ‘an edition conceived and executed exclusively for electronic pub-
lication, and impossible in any other form’. Here, he discussed six require-
ments which supplement this definition and which he sees as ‘co-ordinates 
by which critical editions might be located’ (Robinson 2002: 51). An elec-
tronic critical edition, then: 
• is anchored in a historical analysis of the material
• presents hypotheses about creation and change
• must supply a record and classification of difference over time, in 
many dimensions and in appropriate detail
• may present an edited text
• must allow space and tools for readers to develop their own hypoth-
eses and ways of reading
• must offer all this in a manner which enriches reading
Scholarly editions, as Ray Siemens (1996: 43) has reminded us, have a 
certain dynamic: ‘The contents of a scholarly edition, to some degree, show 
the influence of previous scholarly work and, because scholars will rely on 
and refer to it, its contents also influence future study.’ The quality and rel-
evance of the scholarly edition depends on its capacity to document the no 
longer and to facilitate the not yet. Robinson’s co-ordinates are all situated 
in this continuum with the first three leaning towards the documentation 
14  In this ESE discussion, Morris Eaves asks McGann whether he thinks critical 
editing is dead? McGann answers that critical editing is certainly not dead and that 
a ‘full bowersian critical editing process’ is justified ‘to clear a problematic docu-
mentary record’.
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of the past and the last leaning towards the empowerment of the reader 
and user who are invited to conduct future study, part of which could be 
the creation of a critical edition. A critical digital edition is thus minimally a 
well-documented digital archive that overcomes the dangers of what Már 
Jonsson has called ‘Utgeverisk impotens’ or ‘editorial impotence’ (cited in 
Ore 2004: 35).
If McGann and Robinson are right in their assumption that the documen-
tary records of texts in such archives or editions seldom ask for the inclu-
sion of a critical text but are incubators for future scholarship, the digital 
archive should be an icon representative of the tangible and original docu-
mentary archive – Flanders (2009; written 1997-2002) called representation 
the textual condition of the edition/archive. The idea goes, then, that this 
representational archive of digital images, encoded transcriptions, records 
of difference over time, and contextual information provides the building 
stones from which different kinds of editions – which Robinson (1994: 93) 
calls ‘nothing more than compilations of materials’ and McGann (1994: 104) 
considers ‘specialized organizations of materials’ contained in the archive – 
are generated for different audiences. Mats Dahlström, however, has called 
this assumption ‘overidealistic’ (2001: 69). When taking into account Julia 
Flanders’ observation that in an electronic edition ‘the representation of 
documentary evidence is attached, conceptually, to the mode of knowing 
that the edition is offering’ which substantiates in ‘different theories about 
what counts as textual knowledge’ and different internal economies of ‘evi-
dence, of substantiation, of utility’ (1998: 306) we can begin to understand 
Dahlström’s reservation. His reticence has nothing to do with a fundamen-
tal suspicion towards the reliability of reproductions15 as voiced by Tanselle 
(1989), nor a distrust of the accuracy of the transcriptions – transcriptions 
of which text, one could ask, for no text is self-identical, as McGann has 
argued in Radiant Textuality. Literature after the World Wide Web (2001) – but 
with his analysis of the nature of editions, as he explained in his essay ‘How 
Reproductive is a Scholarly Edition?’ (Dahlström 2004). Dahlström’s main 
argument is that the claim of reproductivity as a result of the scholarly 
edition’s supposedly scientific nature ignores the limitations of the genre. 
The nature of a scholarly edition, Dahlström contends, is determined by its 
historical, medial, social, and rhetorical dimensions:
To sum up, the SE [scholarly edition] is a subjective, rhetorical device. It 
15  Issues of digital surrogacy, authentication of digital images, and questions of 
photographic truth, are passed over in this essay.
5. Defining Electronic Editions 139
is moreover both a result of and a comment on contemporary values, discus-
sions and interests. It is situated in time, in space, in culture and in particular 
media ecologies (of both departure and target media). To all bibliographical 
genres, using derivative target documents as representations of departure 
documents, these are factors imposing constraints on their iconic force. The 
situatedness limits the representational and moreover the remediating force 
of bibliographic tools, including the SE. There are no absolutes here. The SE 
obviously has representational and reproductive force, the very abundance 
and undisputable value of SEs throughout history testify to that truism. The 
interesting question is what factors are at work to limit or to enhance this 
force. Another important matter is what force and purpose the remediated 
material itself might have, that is, to what degree the SE is valuable as labo-
ratory, as working material for new scholarly editorial endeavours. I am not 
talking about the value of SEs for historians, for literary critics, for studies 
in the history of ideas, etc., but for the making of next SEs based on textual 
criticism. (Dahlström 2004: 27)
And he continues:
If such archives are to be used as laboratories for generating new schol-
arly presentational documents such as critical editions, i.e. turning the target 
documents into departure documents, one would have to stay alert to the 
derivative status of the archived material in the first place. An SE based pri-
marily (if not solely) on the derivative documents of such a digital archive 
will always to some extent depend on the inevitable choices made by the 
persons building the archive, on the historical, socio-cultural, cognitive, and 
media particulars and on the pragmatic purposes and theoretic values defin-
ing and framing the final derivative documents in the archive. (Dahlström 
2004: 28)
In the same essay, Dahlström mentions the ‘mimetic fallacy’ and the ‘com-
plete encoding fallacy’16 as implicit and problematic assumptions of the 
electronic scholarly edition that aims to be reproductive. He also reminds 
us that the scholarly activities of transcribing and text encoding are sub-
jective moments of selection. Since they are governed by one’s theory of 
the text which, on the pragmatic level, is translated to ‘thought, method, 
and decision’ (Robinson, 2002: 55) and since they are straining after rhe-
torical and political effects, we could call them editorially intentionalistic.17 
16  Willard McCarty defi ned ‘mimetic fallacy’ as ‘the idea that a digitized version 
will be able to replace its non-digital original’ and ‘complete encoding fallacy’ as 
‘the idea that it is possible completely to encode a verbal artefact’ (McCarty 2003, 
cited in Dahlström 2004: 24).
17  See also Peter Shillingsburg’s discussion of fi ve formal orientations in editing, 
in particular the documentary, sociological, and bibliographic orientation (1996a: 
15-27).
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Tanselle (1995a: 14), however, has warned that the resulting texts ‘may be 
inappropriate for certain purposes’ and Dahlström argues that striving for 
a universal aim of the digital archive ‘is doomed to failure because it is 
rooted in an assumption that both textual material and scholarly editing 
are context-free phenomena’ (Dahlström 2004: 28).
Espen Ore advised that a basic archive – ‘grunnarkivet’ (1999: 143) – be 
a self sufficient digital archive whose creation ‘is done as a goal in itself, 
not as a step in the creation of an edition’ (2004: 42). Therefore, he requires 
that all documents have explicit source descriptions and that their creation 
as digital artefacts is documented.18 Further, Ore stipulates that the docu-
ments are sufficiently described in terms of file types, resolution, character 
set information, and encoding schemes. This information must articulate 
the authority of the archive and must guarantee the preservation of the 
archive as a bibliographic artefact, as Marilyn Deegan has claimed as well: 
Deegan (2006: 366) suggests that a thorough documentation of data, meta-
data, links, programs, and interfaces may enhance the chances that the dig-
ital edition is preserved as a functional scholarly environment.
Interestingly, Ore (2004: 42) adds that digital archives may move on from 
being basic archives ‘if they offer editing tools and make it possible for 
users to mark up texts’, that is, allow users to apply their own theory of 
the text on the textual model. However, contrary to Shillingsburg (2006b), 
Ore does not consider this a formal requirement of the digital archive: ‘The 
archive should be a possible data source for zero or more editions’ (Ore, 
2004: 42).
Elsewhere I have argued that an electronic (scholarly) edition should be 
processed from a platform-independent and non-proprietary basis or dig-
ital archive of encoded transcriptions, high–resolution image files, metadata 
etc. which can be stored for archival purposes and can be used as a repro-
ductive basis for more editions. But I have also emphasized that this archive 
differs from and precedes the generation of the edition proper, which is the 
immediate result of textual scholarship; the edition proper is intended for a 
specific audience, is designed according to project-specific purposes, repre-
sents at least one version of the text or the work, and its creation and edito-
rial status are explicitly articulated and documented (Vanhoutte 2006: 163).
18  ‘For digital facsimiles this would include the techniques used for photograph-
ing and/or scanning and information about post-scanning processing of the image 
files. For texts, transcription work and encoding (including proofreading) should 
be documented.’ (Ore 2004: 42)
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8. Ergodic Editions
In their fullest realizations, Robinson’s model of co-operative and distrib-
uted editions and Shillingsburg’s knowledge sites aim to incorporate both 
Ore’s self-sufficient archive and Robinson’s and McGann’s models of the 
reproductive edition against the background of the history of electronic 
textual editing as recounted in this essay. The eventual product would no 
doubt have to qualify as an ergodic19 text where the reader behaves as ‘a 
user in a transcending, cocreative, author mode’ (Aarseth 1997: 183) and 
from which electronic editions, as I have defined them, could be generated. 
Paraphrasing Aarseth (1997: 1), in an ergodic edition or text, nontrivial 
effort is required to allow the reader to traverse the text.20
Espen Aarseth developed his textonomy mainly for literature, but I argue 
here that his typological model is applicable to electronic editions and can 
help in typifying the different genres of editions as they exist today and as 
they are envisioned in the writings of McGann, Robinson, and Shillingsburg, 
and discussed by Ore and Dahlström. Aarseth’s textonomy is especially help-
ful in describing these different genres because it uses a vocabulary that is 
not common to the humanities. By applying this textonomy to the province 
of electronic textual editing, he supplies the field with a better model for the 
defining debate than the dichotomous positions described so far between 
print and electronic editions, archives and editions, hypertext and dynamic 
editions, or critical and non-critical editions. It also explicitly incorporates 
the user in the descriptions which is relevant especially for those editions 
which, as target texts, present themselves explicitly as departure texts for 
future scholarship. The active interactivity and the fluidity of the edition as 
a co-operative and distributed model, then, is substantiated in the tension 
between the textons or ‘strings as they exist in the text’ (Aarseth 1997: 62) and 
scriptons or ‘strings as they appear to readers’ (ibid.). These two concepts 
are central to Aarseth’s model.21 Since textual editions are constructed with 
19  Ergodic is derived from the Greek ��γ�� - work and �δ�� - path.
20  Further paraphrasing Aarseth (1997: 1-2): if the ergodic edition is to make 
sense as a concept, there must also be non-ergodic editions, where the effort to 
traverse the text is trivial, with no extranoematic responsibilities placed on the read-
er except (for example) eye movement and the periodic or arbitrary turning of the 
pages or scrolling of the screen. Examples of such editions can be printed reading 
editions that are linear documents or simple text archives that only represent one 
version of the text.
21  This opens up the possibility not only of seeing the electronic edition as an 
electronic infrastructure for script acts, but also of applying Shillingsburg’s Script 
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an implied or ideal reader or user in mind, often an avatar of the editor, the 
traversal mode of the edition as text should be of concern to its creators.22 In 
his typology, Aarseth identifies seven variables ‘which allow us to describe 
any text according to their mode of traversal’ (Aarseth 1997: 62). Adapting 
the model of the traversal mode to the electronic textual edition results in 
the following schematic overview:
Variable Possible value





Linking Explicit, conditional, none
User function Explorative, configurative, interpretative, textonic
This expands as follows:23 
1. Dynamics: In a static edition the scriptons are constant; in a dynamic 
edition the contents of scriptons may change while the number of textons 
remains fixed (intratextonic dynamics), or the number (and content) of tex-
tons may vary as well (textonic dynamics). In a knowledge site where users 
can add new markup, new variant texts, new explanatory notes and com-
mentaries, and have their personal note space, the number of textons is 
not known. An edition produced on the basis of the archive provided can 
have a fixed or a variable number of textons, depending on the editorial 
model and technology implemented. The editorial model, introduced by 
Lancashire (1989) and discussed by Siemens (2001, 2005), with integrated 
advanced textual analysis software constitutes a dynamic edition.
2. Determinability: This variable concerns the stability of the traversal 
function. An edition is determinate if, for every scripton its adjacent scrip-
tons are always the same. If not, the edition is indeterminate. As a scholarly 
Act Theory to the edition proper (Shillingsburg 2006b: 40-79) – the electronic edition 
as a model of self-reference.
22  Aarseth defi nes the traversal function of a text as ‘the mechanism by which 
scriptons are revealed or generated from textons and presented to the user of the 
text’ (Aarseth 1997: 62).
23  This expansion applies Aarseth’s original model to electronic editions and 
quotes, paraphrases, and adapts Aarseth’s original text (1997: 62-64). Aarseth him-
self has suggested to readers to ‘use these terms in any way you find pleasurable, 
please rewrite them, refute them, or erase them, if you want’ (Aarseth 1997, 183).
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product, stability and hence determinacy appears to be a conditio sine qua 
non. However, one could envision an edition, probably based on game 
models, which is self reflective and generates simulated forms of meaning 
resulting in indeterminate text as Jerome McGann and Johanna Drucker’s 
Ivanhoe Game attempts to do for literary criticism.24
3. Transiency: If the mere passing of the user’s time causes scriptons to 
appear, the edition is transient; if not, it is intransient. Most, if not all, edi-
tions are intransient and do nothing unless activated by the user. However, 
one could conceive of a play mode which showcases the contents of the edi-
tion to the user as a recorded movie.
4. Perspective: If the edition requires the user to play a strategic role, then 
the edition’s perspective is personal; if not, it is impersonal. Editions which 
present the user with no other possibility of action but reading are imper-
sonal. In a reproductive edition, the user is (in part) responsible for what 
happens with/to the texts.
5. Access: In an edition or archive with random access the scriptons of 
the text are readily available to the user at all times. If this is not the case, 
then access is controlled. Random access is typically a quality of the printed 
edition. But electronic editions which have all data pre-processed qualify 
as random access as well. This is closely related to the perspective of the 
edition. Personal editions will generally offer controlled access.
6. Linking: An edition may be organized by explicit links for the user to 
follow, by conditional links that can only be followed if certain conditions 
are met, or by none of these (no links). 
7. User functions: Besides the interpretative function of the user, present 
in all editions, some editions may be described in terms of additional user 
functions: explorative, in which the user must decide which path to take, 
and configurative, in which scriptons are in part chosen or created by the 
user. If textons or traversal functions can be (permanently) added to the 
edition, the user function is textonic. If all the decisions of a user about an 
edition concern its meaning, then there is only one user function involved, 
here called interpretation. When users must make choices about alternative 
paths and actions, the user function is explorative. Some editions allow the 
user to configure the scriptons by rearranging textons or changing vari-
ables. And finally, in some cases the user can extend or change the text by 
adding their own writing or programming.
24  McGann and Drucker’s Ivanhoe Game can be found at http://www.ivanhoe-
game.org/ [accessed 10/3/2010].
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Aarseth has calculated that these seven variables create a multidimen-
sional space of 576 unique genre positions for text, applied in this case to 
electronic editions (Aarseth 1997: 64-65). This space offers an alternative to 
the legacy typologies from conventional editorial theory with which cur-
rent theory on electronic editions is wrestling. As Aarseth points out, ‘the 
model works both on an abstract, synthesizing level and on a particular-
izing, predictive one’ (1997: 74). He further explains that the ‘open catego-
ries approach also allows for a prediction of hypothetical textual modes, 
by combining functions that are not found together in any existing texts’ 
(Aarseth 1997: 74). On the synthesizing level, correspondence analyses 
of existing and envisioned electronic editions on the basis of this traver-
sal model could shed new light on the defining debate and show that the 
recent participatory models of Robinson and Shillingsburg occupy just one 
of these genre positions each, next to many others. On a predictive level, the 
model offers a toolbox for the combination of functions into new genres of 
editions. But the main advantage of the adoption of this traversal model is 
probably that its reductionist perspective ‘makes it easy to check, criticize, 
modify, or even reject if necessary’ (Aarseth 1997: 74) conceptions of texts, 
readers, editions and their limits. As such, this textonomy of electronic edi-
tions does not offer a decisive end to the defining debate, but feeds it with 
another method of analysis, description, and definition.
6. Electronic Editions for 
Everyone
Peter Robinson
1. Books Defy the Digital Revolution
In January 2004, I gave a lecture on electronic scholarly editing at the Uni-
versity of Virginia.1 At the beginning of the lecture I asked the audience, 
of around 60 people, three questions. The first question was: who among 
them had bought a movie on DVD in the last year; who had bought a piece 
of music on CD-ROM or by download in the last year; who had taken dig-
ital photographs? Almost everyone in the audience had done all three. The 
second question: who in the last year had bought an electronic book? Only 
three people — around 5% of those present — had done this. The third 
question was: how many people had bought a conventional, print book? 
Everyone had done this.
One could guess the answers to further questions. We may doubt that 
as many as three people in the group had bought a film on videotape, or 
music on vinyl record, or taken a photograph using film. In film, music 
and photograph, the digital triumph is near complete. Yet books — despite 
the frequent proclamation of the ‘death of the book’ — remain stubbornly 
locked into non-digital, old-style, analogue printed and bound paper for-
mat. Gutenberg would recognize a modern book; Monteverdi would be 
puzzled by a CD-ROM (let alone an iPod). Even among a highly-select 
1  A version of this paper was given by myself with Barbara Bordalejo in the Dig-
ital Texts seminar organized by Willard McCarty at the University of London in 
March 2007. Although I am credited as the only author of this paper, much of Dr 
Bordalejo’s contribution remains: particularly, the ‘bird nesting in a rainbow’ trope. 
As so often, acknowledgement is scant justice to the debt I owe (and owe to many 
others, some mentioned in the citations in this article, with whom I have discussed 
digital editions over the years).
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audience at the heartland of digital texts, the University of Virginia, just 
five percent of the audience bought electronic books, while everyone 
bought print books, and everyone bought digital films and music.
Why have books defied the digital revolution? What implications does 
this have for those of us who are engaged in the making of scholarly edi-
tions in digital form? 
2. No Problem with the Digital
One response is to deny the premise: one could argue that it is mislead-
ing to base this argument on the relative numbers of people buying films, 
music and books. It could be argued that the correct measure is readership, 
not ownership. By this measure, it is certainly true that we daily absorb 
massive quantities of textual information, of the sort that used to be exclu-
sively printed, via computer screens: think of emails, news sites (many set 
up by traditional print organizations, such as newspapers), academic jour-
nals, online resources of all kinds (encyclopaedias, search engines), and the 
daily working deluge of memos, notices, circulars, papers, which arrive in 
our electronic inbox each day — not to mention SPAM mail. But this argu-
ment only points out, even more sharply, the contrast between the relative 
failure of electronic books and the success of every other digital medium. It 
appears we have no problem with digital text: we read digital texts all the 
time, just as we listen to digital music and watch digital films. So why is 
it so few of us buy digital books? Nor is it that digital books do not exist: 
publishers and computer companies have spent fortunes on trying to per-
suade us to invest in specialized machines to read electronic books, and on 
converting printed books into the forms required by these machines (see 
the Appendix). Yet, none of these machines have achieved anything like 
acceptance, few of us buy electronic books, and airport bookstalls continue 
their thriving trade. The determination of millions of people to go on buy-
ing print books is even more striking when one considers that the text of 
very many of these books (indeed, of almost every book of any popularity 
published before 1900) is available free on the internet. So why do we — 
hundreds of thousands of us a year — go on buying copies of Pride and 
Prejudice when we could get the same text, very likely in identical wording, 
from the Web (indeed, from the University of Virginia) — or even, just find 
the copy we bought a few years ago, which is probably lying somewhere 
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around the house. Compare, again, the situation with films and music. 
Film and music publishers each year have to spend a fortune on stopping 
people illegally downloading digital films and music, in order to force us 
to buy what they sell. But print publishers (who, nowadays, are likely to be 
film and music publishers also) have to spend very little on stopping illegal 
book downloads, while the public continues to flock to bookstores. 
3. Media of Distribution and Media of Performance
We can see, too, that there is a difference between books and both films 
and music. To enjoy films and music we need a player: the electronic file 
(or, in the pre-digital age, the film reel or the vinyl record) is firstly a dis-
tribution medium, requiring a separate performance medium. The per-
formance medium might be a computer, an I-Pod, a Discman, or portable 
media player, or a home hi-fi or cinema system. The point is that distri-
bution and performance media are separated in films and music, as they 
are not in print books. For digital films and music to succeed, they need 
only to provide a more efficient distribution medium — which, of course, 
the digital form does easily. One could phrase this in terms of ‘compel-
ling advantage.’ Simply as distribution medium, digital media in film and 
music have compelling advantages in terms of cost, fidelity, portability and 
convenience. Add to these advantages in terms of content (‘add-ons’ such 
as deleted scenes, director’s commentaries, interviews, alternate endings), 
and add too advantages in the ultimate performance, in terms of accuracy 
and detail of sound and image, speedy movement to any part of the work, 
replay, freeze-frame and magnification, and it is no wonder that in film and 
music digital media have, in just a few years, driven their vinyl and tape 
predecessors to the edge of extinction. We note too that, in essence, the 
film or music on DVD or CD is the same film or music as on the outdated 
analogue. There are a few additions, and a few improvements, but these 
are not decisive. Even without these, the digital distribution medium itself 
constitutes a compelling advantage. There is no need for the film or music 
itself to be fundamentally rethought. It is sufficient just to present the same 
film or music: just better, cheaper.
Let us now apply this distinction between distribution medium and per-
formance medium to books. Firstly, let us consider distribution medium. 
For the great majority of books, digital methods carry little advantage in 
Peter Robinson148
terms of distribution medium. Yes, digital methods might compress the 
book onto a computer chip, and might allow this to be sold for a few pennies, 
and might allow it to be instantly available, for download to your compu-
ter. But most books are already very small and convenient, and one could 
argue that a book on a computer chip is actually too small: how would you 
shelve it? (and, reader, consider too how many flashsticks — portable com-
puter storage on a chip — you have lost). Further, books are already cheap: 
the difference between the few pounds most books cost and a few pence is 
not a compelling advantage.2 Finally, books are already widely available: 
not just at bookstalls, or newsagents, but increasingly at supermarkets, 
pharmacists, anywhere selling anything — not to mention the immense 
success of online booksellers such as Amazon. There is an exception to this 
in the case of large, multi-volume publications: dictionaries, encyclopae-
dias, catalogues, scholarly journals etc. In these cases, the printed volumes 
are so large, and usually so expensive, that digital distribution constitutes 
a compelling advantage. There is a rule of thumb here: if the computer on 
which you want to read the book is smaller and more convenient than the 
printed book, then you will very likely read the book on the computer. Now, 
even quite small encyclopaedias are larger than laptops, and hence their 
disappearance from the bookstalls, while most scholars with appropriate 
access will routinely read scholarly journals online, not in print (or, will 
print from the online version and read that). However, these are exceptions: 
for most books, digital distribution is not a compelling advantage.
Secondly, as a performance medium, most printed books are far supe-
rior to any digital form of those books yet in existence. It is a cliché com-
monly repeated that one cannot read a computer in bed (or the bath, or 
on a beach). As with most clichés, this statement is much more than half-
true, much more than half the time. Inescapably, we must conclude that 
for many kinds of book — literary and popular fiction, biographies, self-
improvement or religious tracts, all kinds of specialist magazine — people 
prefer print books to electronic books for most forms of recreational read-
ing. Indeed, we should not be surprised by this. The modern print book 
builds on five hundred years of refinement since Gutenberg, and indeed on 
2  I here betray that I am writing as a reasonably comfortably-off citizen of the 
developed world. Where there is a desire for the book, but very little money, even a 
small difference in price might be critical: so that it is not surprising that a high pro-
portion of  downloads from the University of Virginia electronic text centre were, in 
2001, to IP addresses in the less-developed world (personal communication, David 
Seaman).
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more than a thousand years of the codex before that, and on many centu-
ries of the roll before that. The major effect of the technological revolution 
on book publishing has been to bring this development to a new perfection, 
so that books are better printed, more attractive, and cheaper, than ever 
before (see the Appendix). Further, advances in paper, font, print and bind-
ing technology mean that publishers can tune the physical book to its con-
tent as never before. Reading a book is more pleasant (and cheaper) than 
ever before. Compared to such rich diversity, books on computer screens 
are bland and monotonous. 
In summary: books are both distribution medium and performance 
medium. They both carry the text and allow it to be read. For electronic 
books to succeed they must have an overwhelming advantage in either or 
both of the distribution medium and the performance medium. Electronic 
books have a marginal (if any) advantage only as a distribution medium, 
and they are at a considerable disadvantage as a performance medium. 
Considered in this light, it is not at all surprising that print books are pros-
pering in the digital age. Indeed, it is only surprising (and, a measure of the 
blindness of technological hyper-enthusiasm) that so many otherwise sen-
sible and capable people should have thought that electronic books could 
completely replace print books (see the Appendix).
4. Scholarly Editions, Then and Now
So far I have been considering the general case of all kinds of text-based 
publication. Our primary concern, as textual scholars, is with scholarly 
editions. Given the context I describe above, how might scholarly editions 
fare? In the early days of the academic discovery of digital text (a whole 
decade ago, around 1995) the answer seemed clear. For scholarly editions, 
the future — then — was digital. Articles by myself, Jerome McGann, Susan 
Hockey, and others, laid out what seemed to us — then — to be the compel-
ling advantages of digital editions (McGann 1995, Hockey 1996, Robinson 
and Deegan 1994). We could include all the material — all the images, all 
the transcripts, all the collations — which print editions have to leave out. 
By the magic of hypertext, we could do away with all the cumbersome 
mechanics of footnotes, appendices, front and back matter: everything the 
reader could possibly want could leap out at a mouse movement. In this 
analysis, digital scholarly editions would be superior both as distribution 
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medium (all that information on a single disc!) and as performance medium 
(hypertext!). How could they not succeed?
Looking back, we failed to see some critical factors which might have 
undermined our confidence. Firstly: it appears that rather few readers 
(indeed, rather often, only the editors) actually want to see all the images, 
all the transcripts, all the collations. Traditional print editions acted as fil-
ters, straining out all this information so that readers did not have to see 
it: if readers do not want to see it, then including all this is no advantage at 
all. Secondly: as with other kinds of print book, scholarly editions in print 
form have developed highly sophisticated means of both compressing and 
expressing information. A superlative example of this is the Nestle-Aland 
edition of the Greek New Testament (Nestle et al. 1993). The 27th edition of 
this packs into a single volume, small enough to fit into a largish pocket, 
all the information anyone working to a high level of detail with the tradi-
tion of the Greek New Testament is likely to need: a full record of all sig-
nificant variants in some thirty key manuscripts, including even marginal 
and other corrections found in these manuscripts, and a conspectus of key 
variants across the versions of the New Testament in other languages and 
in patristic and other citation (Nestle et al. 1993). Of course, one has to learn 
to understand the highly-abbreviated forms used by the Nestle-Aland, but 
each year thousands of students do just that. On this analysis, the advan-
tages of digital editions as distribution media (people do not want what 
digital editions can distribute) and as performance media (print editions 
are really rather good) are less compelling than we supposed. 
Further, we failed to reckon with some other points. There is the demon 
of copyright. Some of the most exciting digital edition projects focussed on 
modern authors. It can be difficult enough gaining permission for print edi-
tions for these; for digital editions, in some notorious cases, it has proved 
impossible. But even for older texts, where there should be no copyright 
issues, there have been problems. Arranging for digital photography and 
reproduction rights is, with very rare exceptions, arduous and too often 
forbiddingly expensive. Further, co-operative projects involving different 
scholars at different institutions can founder on copyright, as individual 
scholars or institutions (for whatever reason) attempt to enforce control 
over what they see as ‘their’ work. There is also the sheer expense and 
difficulty of making digital editions. For years, the audience for scholarly 
editions in any form has been shrinking. In this context, the commitment 
of resources necessary for making an electronic edition is difficult to justify 
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— and indeed, is likely to be justifiable only in a very few cases, usually 
of flagship texts by flagship authors. Finally, there is the conservatism of 
our community, which might long continue to use print forms even where 
the advantages of digital forms are decisive. There is a rather spectacular 
instance of this conservatism in the case of the Parliament Rolls of Medieval 
England, on which I advised. This is now available in two forms for insti-
tutional use. It is available in print, in sixteen rather large volumes, from 
Boydell and Brewer, at a little under £2000 a set (Given-Wilson 2005a). It is 
also available in electronic form, from Scholarly Digital Editions, by inter-
net license to institutions for approximately half the price (Given-Wilson 
2005b). By any reasonable standard, the internet version is superior to the 
print version: it is easier to use, it consumes no valuable shelf space, it can 
be used by any number of students and scholars, anywhere in the univer-
sity, anytime. Yet up to August 2007 around three times as many institu-
tions have opted for the print version as have subscribed to the electronic 
version.3
This appears to be leading us to a rather depressing conclusion: that the 
effort of making scholarly editions in digital form is not worth the candle. 
Is there a future for this work? Is there a place for digital methods, in the 
making of scholarly editions?
5. Imagination, Powerful Tools and Familiar Objects
Here, we offer two answers to these questions. The first, brief, answer is: 
there is certainly a place for digital methods in the making of scholarly 
editions, even though the final mode of publication is print, not electronic. 
Scholars may use computers to gather, order and explore data, while mak-
ing an edition. In particular, they may gather information on variation 
between witnesses and submit this to different analytic programs to gain a 
rapid and clear sense of the development of the textual tradition. We have 
ourselves used computers very effectively in this way, and we can expect 
that computers may continue to be so used. In this respect, scholarly edi-
tors may be little different to many other scholars, who use a wide variety 
3  Up to August 2007 Scholarly Digital Editions had sold 38 internet licenses of 
the Parliament Rolls of Medieval England. Boydell and Brewer printed 100 copies of 
the 16 volume edition, retailing at £1950, and had sold out by May 2007, and were 
printing additional copies to meet the demand (SDE company records; personal 
communication from Boydell and Brewer staff).
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of computer tools (including standard email, word processing, internet and 
e-journal applications), but whose output goes through the normal chan-
nels of print. In this view, we would be using some new tools, and our 
scholarly editions will be better for them, but the editions themselves will 
not be very different from those scholars have made for centuries.
This falls far short of the kind of revolution we imagined ten years ago, 
and far short of what we thought scholarly editions in electronic form 
might do. However, I think that the potential of scholarly editions in elec-
tronic form remains as great as scholars first imagined it, though I and oth-
ers were naïve about the difficulties of realizing this potential. The potential 
remains, and there may be ways this potential can be unlocked. But I think 
it cannot be in any form which looks and behaves substantially like any 
printed book, or any scholarly edition we have seen so far. I am reminded 
of the Chilean poet Vincente Huidobro. He initiated a literary movement 
called ‘creationism’ (completely unrelated to anti-Darwinian babble) about 
which he said ‘when I say ‘The bird nests in a rainbow’ I present you with a 
new fact, something that you have never seen, that you will never see, and 
that however you would really like to see.’4 
We could say that scholarly editions in digital form are rather like Hui-
dobro’s bird nesting in a rainbow: a wonderful idea that we would all like 
to see. Yet, anyone who has seen a Dreamworks film knows that in Hol-
lywood — and so in every movie cinema in the world and in every home 
with a computer or a television — birds can nest in rainbows. All you need 
is imagination, and some powerful tools. So here is our second answer: we 
can make scholarly editions which do all that we have dreamed. All we 
need is imagination, and some powerful tools. 
What can we imagine, then? Consider, further, Huidobro’s bird nest-
ing in a rainbow. The point of this is that we can imagine a bird nesting 
in a rainbow, because we know what birds are, what nests are, what rain-
bows are. These are familiar objects: it is the combination which is startling. 
One can extend this further, more generally, to the virtual world of the 
Web. Where the Web is at its best, transforming and enriching lives, it takes 
familiar objects and puts them in a new and liberating context. The world 
we call ‘Web 2.0’ is particularly rich in examples. For generations people 
have written diaries, people have sent messages to each others, people 
4  ‘Cuando escribo: “El pájaro anida en el arco iris”, os presento un hecho nuevo, 
algo que jamás habéis visto, que jamás veréis, y que sin embargo os gustaría mucho 
ver.’ Huidebro 1925; I owe the idea and the reference to Barbara Bordalejo (who, 
however, is not responsible for the development of the trope in this paper). 
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have collected albums of photos and other personal memorabilia. These are 
familiar activities. But in the world of the internet, these familiar activities 
have been transformed into blogs, MySpace and FaceBook; all examples of 
‘social networks’ on the Web. At the very least, the countless hours spent 
by millions now on these activities have the virtue John Shirley ascribed to 
reading Chaucer: they prevent people doing worse things.5 But of course, 
they have far more virtue than this, as anyone who has spent more than a 
few minutes in these intoxicating environments can testify: they offer the 
sense of belonging, of being sustained by a myriad of contacts, built on 
near-instant communication in many forms. To take another example: for 
centuries, we have had all kinds of compendia of useful knowledge, usu-
ally in the form of encyclopaedias. In the Web, these have been turned into 
a new kind of compendium, the Wikipedia, written and endlessly rewritten 
by its readers. Here, the ordinary object has indeed been transmuted into 
something very new, an encyclopaedia with some of the characteristics of a 
social network, as its readers are also responsible for making and sustain-
ing it. Recently, we have become familiar with scholarly web communities, 
such as the Digital Medievalist and Digital Classicist groups, which incor-
porate aspects of wikis, blogs, newsfeeds and other elements familiar from 
social networks into invaluable new environments for collaborative work. 
If we can create digital editions on the internet which have even a frac-
tion of the impact of these extraordinary objects, then indeed we may have 
made a new bird nesting in a new rainbow. How, then, can we imagine 
these? We have some clues. Firstly, we should identify the fundamental 
familiar objects which will constitute our bird in a rainbow. Secondly, we 
should imagine how these might be combined in a new way. 
For we textual scholars, the first fundamental familiar object is this: 
knowledge about texts. We know where texts come from, how they were 
made and distributed; we know how their meaning is shaped by the cir-
cumstances of their creation and dissemination. Show us a book, or a 
5  Shirley’s remarks are in the ‘The prologe of the knyghtes tale’ prefaced to the 
copy of the Tales preserved in British Library Harley MS 7333. His words are: ‘O . 
yee so noble and worthi pryncis and . princesse other estatis or degrees . what euer 
yee beo th[a]t haue disposicione , or plesaunce . to rede or here the stories of olde 
tymis Passed to kepe yow frome ydelnesse and slowthe . mescheuing other folies 
that might be cause of more harome filowyng’ [O ye so noble and worthy princes 
and princesses or estates or degrees: whatever ye be that have disposicion or pleas-
ure to read or hear the stories of old times past, to keep you from idleness and 
sloth, mischief or follies that might be cause of more harm following] (Published in 
Solopova 2000). 
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manuscript: we can tell you about how they were made and the texts they 
contain, and about other books and manuscripts containing those texts. 
Show us a text, and we can tell you about the books and manuscripts which 
contain it, and how they differ, and what these differences mean. The sec-
ond fundamental familiar object is the methods we use to discover what we 
know; the painstaking work of finding and analyzing the forms of the text. 
So we can offer anyone interested in texts two things. We can offer what we 
already know; and we can offer means to find what we do not know. 
6. Mediating Textual Scholarship
Most of the time, this knowledge, this method, comes to us in a second hand 
way through books, articles, notes, catalogue entries etc. Indeed, we have 
become so used to receiving knowledge of texts in this way that it seems 
to us that textual scholarship is, actually, printed textual editions. But of 
course it is not: the print editions are simply the way in which most of us 
receive textual scholarship, most of the time. Textual scholarship precedes 
print editions, as what textual scholars know and do. Usually, we know 
textual scholarship only in severe print. But it does not have to be this way. 
In 2001 I had the extraordinary experience of being in the National Library 
of Ireland with Hans Gabler and Danis Rose as they examined a page of 
the Joyce’s draft of the Circe episode of Ulysses, then on display there.6 This 
is a very difficult page to interpret, and the two scholars fell into an intense 
discussion on exactly what Joyce wrote, in what order, how he changed it, 
why, and how these writings connected to the rest of the novel. Not only 
was I fascinated: in a few moments everyone in the gallery had gathered 
around Gabler and Rose, to hear what they had to say. One can suppose 
that few of these onlookers would think of reading (say) any of the Joyce 
editions made by Gabler or Rose, but that day they were rapt (Gabler 1984; 
Rose 1997).
This incident suggested that not only are there other ways of commu-
nicating textual scholarship beside print, but that print may not even be 
6  This was on 15 June 2001. The following day (Bloomsday), Gabler and Rose 
together examined the Eumaeus notebook of Ulysses, on display in the Sotheby’s 
showroom in Dublin prior to its auction, again before a large and impromptu au-
dience. The notebook has since gone into private hands, giving extra significance 
to this public examination (Private communications, Hans Gabler 7-10 September 
2007).
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the best way to communicate textual scholarship. Consider how one might 
read (say) the first page of Joyce’s Ulysses. You might have your reading 
text; then you might (if you are fortunate) have a copy of Gabler’s and 
Rose’s editions close by; you might also have the relevant volumes of the 
Joyce Archive, with copies of the key Rosenbach (1975) manuscript, and of 
various typescripts and galleys.7 These could be spread out on a large desk, 
open at various pages, with an apparatus of bookmarks pointing at other 
pages. It has been a commonplace of commentary on hypertext editions 
that the advantages of the digital medium could allow any reader to have 
access to all this material, with a rapidity and convenience never before pos-
sible. But I think our early attempts to do this have foundered, on exactly 
the lack of imagination which cannot see a bird nesting in a rainbow. What 
we have done in the digital form is mimic the way all the materials on this 
first page might be accumulated in print form. For example — to change 
the example from Joyce to my speciality, the Canterbury Tales — we have 
made digital copies of single manuscripts, with transcriptions, collations, 
descriptions and analyses (Canterbury Tales Project, Robinson 2003b). This 
is a rather comprehensive collection, but it is still only one collection, of 
only one aspect of the Tales, presented from only one point of view. There 
are many other materials one might want to consult which we have not 
included. Particularly, one might look for a tale-by-tale, line-by-line com-
mentary, such as is found in the Variorum volumes. One might also wish 
to examine other editions, beside our own, and hunt down discussions of 
particular lines by various scholars. 
So far, digitization (where it has happened, and there are many areas 
where it has not) has presented all these disparate resources as distinct 
from each other. Just as the scholar in the library must find the various vol-
umes he or she wants and lay them out on the desk, ready to consult, so the 
digital scholar has to locate the various resources he or she wants, work out 
how each one works, and spread them across the digital desktop. There are 
advantages, in speed and convenience, but there are also significant disad-
7  The James Joyce Archive has, in 63 volumes, facsimiles of almost all Joyce’s 
notes and drafts for the novels and other creative works, and was published by 
Garland in 1977 and 1979 (Groden, 1977-79). Only 250 copies of this were published 
and these are now rare. There is an excellent account of the making of the archive 
(and other matters) in Michael Groden’s ‘Perplex in the Pen – and the Pixels: Reflec-
tions on the James Joyce Archive, Hans Walter Gabler’s Ulysses, and ‘James Joyce 
in Hypermedia’ (Groden 1998). The major exclusion from the James Joyce Archive 
is the Rosenbach manuscript of Ulysses, published in three volumes of facsmile in 
1975 (Rosenbach 1975).
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vantages. The greatest is that while all books work in much the same way, 
this is emphatically not true of digital resources. We have all experienced 
the sinking feeling, when opening up the latest grand digital resource, that 
there are wonders here which cannot be found: or, even more frustrating, 
having found them once, being unable a few weeks later to find them again. 
Further, the cataloguing of digital resources is uneven, at best: a search 
engine is not a catalogue, but that is what we have to use most of the time. 
So, we are looking at the first line of the Canterbury Tales, in the Heng-
wrt manuscript. We have the splendid Estelle Stubbs edition of this, which 
includes a collation of every line of Hengwrt with the Ellesmere manuscript 
(Stubbs 2001). We ask ourselves: is there somewhere, out there on the net, 
an alternative transcription to this line, as given by Stubbs? There is: in the 
University of Michigan Corpus of Middle English Prose and Verse. We ask 
ourselves: is there somewhere an image of the first page of the Ellesmere 
manuscript? There is: at the Huntingdon Library website, in San Marino, 
California. We know that Norman Blake edited the Tales from the Hengwrt 
manuscript. Is there an electronic version of this first line, in that edition, 
somewhere? There is: at the Oxford Text Archive (though, unfortunately, 
with restricted access). We could ask: are there electronic versions of other 
editions, including this first line? There are: for instance, at the University 
of Virginia, and in the Michigan Corpus of Middle English Prose and Verse. 
It is up to the reader to find all these.
From this sketch, one can see how far digital scholarship remains bound 
by the model of print: each scholar (or group of scholars) makes a separate 
digital object. It is up to the individual reader to locate all these separate 
objects, and make sense of them. In the worst cases, this is like one of those 
wonderfully circular games: you can only find what you want if you know 
what it is you want and where it is. As most readers know only the text in 
front of them, they are unlikely to find the riches lying about them, and are 
unlikely to be able to make sensible use of them, if they do find them. 
7. Imagining Otherwise
It is time to imagine a bird nesting in a rainbow. The way we have it now, all 
these transcripts, descriptions, facsimiles, commentaries, translations wait 
passively on the Web for someone to find them, just as print books wait 
in a library for someone to read them. Suppose instead that they did not 
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wait, but they went out over the Web to find someone who was reading 
something closely related to them. Imagine you are reading the first line of 
the Canterbury Tales. In Michigan, a computer server thinks: that person is 
reading the first line of the Tales. I have a transcription of the first line, and 
it sends a message to the computer on which you are reading to that effect. 
Simultaneously, in Oxford, in Virginia, in San Marino, other computer serv-
ers realize they have something relevant to what you are reading, right now, 
and they too send messages to your browser: we have something for you. 
Instantly, on your browser, a message appears, indicating that there are 
relevant materials waiting for you, at all these sites. With a little intelligence, 
the materials could be sorted, into transcripts, images, commentaries, etc, 
and the message on your browser tuned (or removed altogether) to reflect 
just what information you are interested in. This is the equivalent, if you 
like, of books in the library shelves realizing that you are reading Chaucer, 
and unobtrusively shuffling off the shelves onto your desk.
Does this sound like science fiction? It should not. Something like this 
already works every time you do a Google search: the links in the margins 
of your screen are generated by Google itself, calculating from your search 
just what you are interested in and creating links accordingly. Every time 
you log into Amazon, you will see a list of books which Amazon has chosen 
for you, based on your past purchases. There are many other instances. All 
these are examples of a key aspect of ‘Web 2.0’: expressions of the principle 
that web applications should not simply wait for the user to do something, 
but should try to anticipate what the user might desire and should set to 
drawing together resources to satisfy that desire.8 
This vision has many implications for readers. In our study, or our 
library, we take books from the shelves and spread them on the desk. In 
the digital world, the reader may choose from the resources supplied by 
servers around the world, and spread them out, as he or she chooses, on 
the digital desktop. Again, we can see something like this in personalized 
pages such as that offered by Gmail, where you can populate your live 
desktop with newsfeeds, reports on the weather, stock market updates, 
clocks, and more. In the examples I have given so far, I have spoken of 
access via the text: through the first page of Ulysses, or the first line of the 
Canterbury Tales. Equally, access could be by the source object. I am looking 
8  See the Wikipedia definition of ‘Web 2.0’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_2.0 




at a digital image of the first page of the Hengwrt manuscript. Around the 
world servers gather material relating to that manuscript (descriptions, dis-
cussions, commentaries), to that page (digital images, observations), and 
to the text on that page, line by line and word by word (including, other 
versions of that text on that page). All this is then available for the reader, to 
explore as he or she wishes. 
There are implications for scholars, too. Up to now, if scholars wished 
to make a digital edition, they had to do everything, from initial encoding 
to final publication. In particular, they had to create a publication inter-
face, so readers around the world could read what the scholars had made 
on their computer. This required access to considerable resources, usually 
only available to a few well-funded projects, and in turn meant that each 
of the editions so made were digital islands, entire in themselves and sepa-
rate from others. In the vision here offered, scholars have only to make the 
individual components of the edition: the transcription of this line in this 
manuscript; the collation of the various versions of these words in this line; 
the commentary on this line etc. These are then placed on servers, from 
where they are harvested into each reader’s browser. This removes entirely 
the need for the scholar to provide any kind of interface (though they still 
might, if they wish). The effect is to open up scholarship: no longer will 
scholars need to be part of an elaborate and expensive project to contribute 
to digital scholarship. This raises further questions: if anyone can make 
a transcript of the Hengwrt manuscript and put it on the Web, how will 
the reader choose which of these to read? The restriction of scholarship to 
the academy provided forms of control and quality assurance; do we need 
these; how could they be provided if we do, and if we do not need them, 
how will we fare? And where will publishers be in this world?
We said above that to make the bird nesting in the rainbow, we would 
need imagination and powerful tools. Here is what we have imagined. 
What tools will we need to make what we have imagined? In fact, most 
of the tools already exist. There are many protocols, in the form of ‘web 
services’, which allow computers to talk to computers, and then send infor-
mation back and forth between them, exactly as described here. It is now 
straightforward to embed commands into browser interfaces to access 
these web services. Thus: you start reading a text, any text, of the Canter-
bury Tales. As each line of the text is loaded into the browser, a command 
is triggered: find materials related to this line. The browser broadcasts a 
message: what do you have for me? Around the world, servers are waiting 
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for such a message. They send replies; the browser gathers the responses, 
and adjusts the display accordingly. The technical infrastructure for this is 
widespread. However, we do lack a key component. We need agreed refer-
encing schemes, so that the browser knows exactly what it has, and servers 
recognize that they have relevant materials. Again, the fundamental encod-
ing infrastructure for such agreed referencing schemes has been laid down 
by the Text Encoding Initiative in general, and more particularly by the 
Canonical Text Services project.9 These are not yet worked out in sufficient 
detail to support applications of the sophistication here described, and this 
is work to be done.10
8. Realizations
In a previous article, I characterized this model of editions as ‘fluid, co-
operative and distributed’ (Robinson 2004). Some key elements of this 
model can be seen in the ongoing work on the digital edition of the 28th 
Nestle-Aland Greek New Testament, on which I am advising the Deutsche 
Bibelgesellschaft and the Münster Institute for New Testament Research.11 
This is described in more detail in an article I have written for Ecdotica (Rob-
inson 2007b). In summary, this is arranged so that for any verse of the Greek 
New Testament, the reader may choose what elements should appear on 
the screen: the Nestle-Aland text; the conventional apparatus, as printed; a 
new digital apparatus, providing more detail for key manuscripts; full tran-
scripts of the key manuscripts; a German-Greek dictionary; and an ‘expla-
nation’ window that gives a brief summary of the symbols and conventions 
used by the edition. In the Nestle-Aland work, all the elements are being 
provided by a single editorial group. However, the design of this work is 
such that it could be opened out by allowing other elements to be added 
to the desktop which are not provided by the editors (for example, dif-
ferent dictionaries for different languages, different commentaries). In the 
reverse of this, elements from the Nestle-Aland could be exported to other 
9  See http://www.tei-c.org/index.xml and http://chs75.chs.harvard.edu/projects/
diginc/techpub/cts-overview respectively [accessed 12/3/2010].
10  A draft paper prepared by the author on the encoding and technical infrastruc-
ture needed to realize what is discussed in this article was placed at http://www.
interedition.eu/index.php/WG2:Architecture [accessed 12/3/2010].
11  The ongoing work, and the final edition, may be seen at http://nestlealand.uni-
muenster.de/ [accessed 12/3/2010].
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interfaces. This deconstruction of an edition into separable parts, possibly 
held on different servers, each capable of being made by separate scholars, 
and each capable of being linked with others in an infinity of ways, takes 
us a considerable way towards our vision.
I believe that this model of editions provides the compelling advantage 
which will (at last) lead to readers routinely consulting digital editions on-
line, and to large-scale creation of digital editions for readers. For readers 
this will provide immediate and convenient access to information about 
the text they are reading, with the ability to order, filter and arrange this 
information onscreen as they wish. For scholars this will remove the need 
to build complex publication interfaces for the editions they make. Rather, 
they can concentrate on the intellectual work of making transcripts, colla-
tions, analyses, commentaries (indeed, just as they would have done for 
print publication), leaving it to the well-organized magic of the Web to 
bring these to the readers. Such editions will be our bird nesting in the rain-
bow: familiar things, in a remarkable combination. They will be electronic 
editions for everyone.
Appendix
The first part of this article advances the premise that books that we read 
(such as novels, biographies, recreational literature), as opposed to books 
that we reference (encyclopaedias, dictionaries), have failed to cross the 
digital divide. Publishers produce books in print; we buy them and read 
them in print, much as we have for six hundred years.
There have been determined, and very expensive, efforts to break this 
pattern, so that printed books would go the way of the vinyl record. There 
was a particular flurry of activity around the turn of the millennium. In a 
1999 article written for The Economist, with the somewhat menacing title 
’Beyond Gutenberg’, Bill Gates promoted the advantages of eBooks, with-
out going quite so far as to suggest that they would drive print books out 
of existence (article available on http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/
ofnote/11-19billg.mspx, accessed 14 August 2007). (Gates is rather fond of 
declaring obsolescence: besides books, a Google search for ‘Bill Gates obso-
lete’ shows that he has declared television, DVDs and US High Schools 
obsolete.) On 6 January 2000 Barnes and Noble and Microsoft released a 
press release proclaiming that ‘the sale of electronic books will reach US 
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$1 billion in 3-4 years, and could overtake the sale of print books in ten 
years.’ (Reported in Wired, 6 January 2000; http://www.wired.com/techbiz/
media/news/2000/01/33488, accessed 14 August 2007). A 2001 review article 
on eBooks and eBook readers by Sarah Ormes in the online journal Ariadne, 
10 January 2001 (http://www.ariadne.ac.uk/issue26/e-book/, accessed 14 
August 2007) lists a range of e-book providers and technologies.
In retrospect, Ormes’ article marks a high-point of what now appears 
as misplaced confidence (though even in this, she strikes a note of caution: 
‘But finally these electronic dreams seem to be about to come true’: note the 
‘seem’). What did happen to the Barnes and Noble/Microsoft prediction? 
Industry sources (http://www.mbendi.co.za/notices/ebooks.htm, accessed 
14 August 2007) suggested that in 2002 500,000 eBooks were sold in the 
US. While this number is not negligible, it should be compared to the 1.6 
billion print books estimated as sold in that year. The same site estimates 
eBook sales in February 2004 as $900,000, and cites a figure of $2,591,469 
for eBook sales for the third quarter of 2003. This would give an annual 
figure of around $10 million for 2004. According to the Barnes and Noble/
Microsoft prediction, electronic book sales in 2003-4 should have been $1 
billion, not $10 million. Barnes and Noble ceased electronic book sales in 
September 2003 (http://handheldlib.blogspot.com/2003/10/electronic-book-
web-weekly.html, accessed 14 August 2007).
Electronic book readers have fared no better. The Rocket reader, in 2001 
the market leader according to the Ormes article, was taken over by Gem-
star, to become the Planet eBook reader, which appears to be no longer 
available: the Planet eBook site now does not mention the reader at all, and 
the company appears to have adopted Adobe pdf technology (http://www.
planetebook.com/, accessed 14 August 2007). Franklin Electronic Publish-
ing (http://www.franklin.com, accessed 14 August 2007), who created the 
eBookman, still exists, though the device does not.
One cannot say that the failure of electronic books is due to a lack of sup-
ply. There are a very large number of books available in electronic form, to 
be read using software on general computer devices (some of the software 
is tuned for particular platforms, such as Franklin’s Mobireader, intended 
for mobile devices). Franklin lists over 25000 fiction titles and nearly 12000 
nonfiction titles on its website, available for individual download at prices 
generally somewhat lower than the equivalent print book (e.g.: the Oxford 
Advanced Learner’s Dictionary is $29.95 on Franklin, $34 on Amazon, 
against an Oxford list price of $46; The Best American Erotica 2006 is $9.99 on 
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Franklin, against $11.20 on Amazon and a list price of $14. It is revealing, 
however, that from the Franklin web homepage it appears that this com-
pany concentrates on ‘niche markets’ (particularly of language students, 
for whom they offer a range of handheld dictionary readers) rather than 
on their general eBook offerings. Many more titles are available in Netli-
brary (over 100,000 titles, according to http://www.netlibrary.com, accessed 
14 August 2007), but Netlibrary appears to concentrate on supplying the 
library market rather than retailing direct to consumers.
The experience of Microsoft appears particularly relevant. Microsoft 
continue to offer their eReader software, able to run on any handheld using 
the Microsoft Pocket PC standard. The Microsoft Reader website (http://
www.microsoft.com/reader, accessed 14 August 2007) offers outlines of 
popular titles and an extensive catalogue of eBooks (over 29000 fiction 
titles – The Da Vinci Code is third on their list, at $5.94). Again, prices for 
books listed on the Microsoft site are only slightly lower for eBooks than 
for print books: Nancy Gibbs’ The Preacher and the Presidents: Billy Graham in 
the White House is listed as an eBook for $16.14, against a new price listed of 
$26; Amazon had the title at $17.81. For both Franklin and Microsoft, how-
ever, one has to dig rather deep on their websites to find the electronic book 
catalogues. It appears that electronic books are ancillary to the main busi-
ness of both companies. One could draw a similar conclusion from the way 
in which Amazon treats electronic books (at least, for www.amazon.com 
on 10 September 2007): where electronic books are available, their presence 
is signalled as a note against the listing for the print book, rather than as 
saleable items in their own right. There is a section ‘Digital downloads’ on 
www.amazon.com but this leads only to downloads of films and music, not 
books (10 September 2007).
One could summarize this state of affairs as follows: there are a very 
large number of eBooks available, able to be read on the most-widely used 
computer platforms. However, there appears no imminent likelihood that 
these eBooks will completely supersede print books. They appear to coexist 
with print, targeting a niche market of particular users, rather than the gen-
eral reader. (Since first drafting this Appendix in August 2007, the launch of 
the Amazon Kindle reader has dramatically increased the profile of eBook 
readers. However, the determinedly print-like presentation of the books on 
the reader, and the marketing of print and eBook versions together, suggest 
co-existence rather than replacement.)
On the other side of the ledger, there is plentiful evidence to document 
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the thriving state of printed books. Statistics gathered by the International 
Publishers Association (IPA) suggest that in the period from 1990 to 2000, 
the number of individual titles published across the world increased by 
around 50%. The figures offered by the IPA are incomplete, with some 
countries not providing data for all years. However, there are comparable 
statistics for a few typical countries: in the UK, individual titles published 
grew from 63756 to 110155; in Spain, from 42207 to 60426; in the USA from 
46743 to 64711 (see http://www.ipa-uie.org/statistics/annual_book_prod.
html, accessed 13/8/07). For the period after 2000, Bowker reported that 
book production in 2004 showed a 14.1% annual increase in titles pub-
lished, with a 43% increase in fiction titles. Even university press output 
– often cited as a problem area for academic publication – was higher, at a 
12.3% increase (Press release May 24, 2005; see http://www.bowker.com/
press/bowker/2005_0524_bowker.htm); the Bowker figures, available on 
their website, for 2006 and 2007 suggest a slight decline from this all-time 
high; see also the cautionary notes concerning the difficulty of counting 
titles at http://www.pushthekey.com/2007/08/09/british-book-production/, 
accessed 14 August 2007. There is an extremely useful summary of sta-
tistics relating to world-wide publishing, with links to websites and com-
ments, at http://www.parapublishing.com/sites/para/resources/statistics.
cfm (accessed 14 August 2007). Overall statistics on the number of publish-
ing houses (for example, on the ‘parapublishing’ site) give a similar pic-
ture to those on individual titles published. Statistics on print runs and on 
actual books sold (let alone read) are harder to come by, and do not appear 
to be available in any systemized form. It is possible the overall increase in 
titles published in the last decades has been accompanied by smaller print-
runs, with the rise of ‘print-on-demand’, so that fewer books overall are 
sold but a larger number of titles. The ‘parapublishing’ site gives somewhat 
anecdotal information on actual numbers sold (e.g. 1.6 billion books sold in 
the US in 2001, around 7 for every person in the US). Overall, these figures 
hardly suggest an industry in decline. 
Useful articles on this subject are Robert Darnton’s New York Review 
of Books article ‘The New Age of the Book’ (46.5, March 18, 1999; http://
www.nybooks.com/articles/546, accessed 14 August 2007) and Mark Moss’ 
The Future of the Book’, College Quarterly, 7.3 (2004), at http://www.sene-
cac.on.ca/quarterly/2004-vol07-num03-summer/moss.html, accessed 14 
August 2007.

7. How Literary Works Exist: 
Implied, Represented, and 
Interpreted
Peter Shillingsburg
This essay is a companion to another titled, ‘How Literary Works Exist: 
Convenient Scholarly Editions’ (Shillingsburg 2009), which together exam-
ine the nature of the ‘things’ that textual scholarship tries to identify and 
analyse, in order to see how best to represent them in electronic scholarly 
editions and archives. The other essay focuses primarily on electronic prob-
lems and solutions for edition and archive representation. This essay pre-
pares the ground for the other by examining the nature of textual existence 
and representation.
1. Physical Texts and Electronic Representations
The description of the seminar series in which this essay began states that 
the presentations were ‘meant to engage all those who are interested in 
a digital future [my italics] for the book.’ I hope it is engaging in that way, 
but I wish also to engage those who are interested in a future for the book 
in a digital world. If we ever come to believe that a digital representation 
of a physical book is an adequate or complete representation then textual 
studies, bibliography, and history of the book will have lost the battle to 
persuade us to understand how books exist, how communication happens, 
and how understandings of texts are achieved. If, on the other hand, tex-
tual studies, bibliography, and history of the book fail to embrace the chal-
lenge of electronic representations of books, they will have lost a valuable 
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opportunity to broaden and enhance the understandings they have devel-
oped of books as physical objects, media of communication, and loci of 
understanding.
When one looks at the development of public policy as represented 
in the expectations of funding agencies for electronic dissemination of 
research results in the fields of scholarly editing and archive accessibility, 
one can see the enormous importance of getting the relationship between 
physical texts and electronic representations right. If we get it wrong by 
missing out on the proper preservation of physical books, and, no less so, 
if we get it wrong by missing the opportunities for electronic potential, we 
will be remembered by future textual scholars for these failures. Our ability 
to get it wrong is not limited to some simple opposition between physical 
and electronic books. We can make disastrously wrong choices in the prac-
tical ways we embrace electronic books, even if we continue, as we must, to 
collect and protect physical books.
Funding agencies tend to base their judgments, about what editions and 
archives to fund, upon the soundness of the scholarly investigations and upon 
the importance of the works selected. A completion date is set, and a request, 
almost as an afterthought, is made for electronic access and dissemination. 
Scholars comply because they primarily care about the texts and textual 
scholarship. Electronic dissemination all too often seems a relatively simple 
job of porting to the screen what traditionally was printed. For this, technical 
assistance in the form of a ‘techie’ seems sufficient. But agencies and scholars 
alike are missing out the third wheel of the tricycle by supposing that there 
are thoughtfully constructed long-term electronic vehicles for presenting the 
fruits of editorial scholarship; despite �ML, TEI and SSLT, there are not. No 
one with funding for an editorial project has asked for very long the ques-
tion, ‘What is the best way to construct an electronic scholarly edition?’ That 
question is swept away almost immediately by the far more practical ques-
tion, ‘What is the best way, given our deadlines, to mount a presentable ver-
sion of this research project?’ Furthermore, funding agencies famously hive off 
research questions from dissemination questions, thus failing to see that, in 
the electronic world, catering to differing audiences such as fellow researchers 
on one side and students on the other is no longer a matter affecting the treat-
ment or construction of foundational texts and analytical results but is, instead, 
an aspect of interface design, offering options for tailored access to common 
research materials. The results of existing funding policies have been projects 
that invariably provide only local solutions to local problems.
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It is the aim of this essay, and of its companion on ‘Convenient Schol-
arly Editions’, to survey the issues at stake in the crossover period when 
momentous and expensive decisions are being made about libraries, about 
electronic access to books, and about the construction of electronic schol-
arly editions and scholarly archives.
2. Goals of Critical Editing
It is now generally believed among textual critics that in former times, 
under the influence of Lachmann in the nineteenth to Bowers in the twen-
tieth centuries, editors believed their job was either to restore the text of a 
work to the form it once had in a now lost archetype or to emend an exist-
ing text so that lexically it would resemble what its author aspired to but 
was prevented from achieving by various agents or circumstances. Put sim-
ply, editors strove either to reconstruct the text of a lost archetype or con-
struct a text that achieved its author’s intentions for the first time. Whether 
anyone ever actually saw the work of editing in these ways, the two con-
cepts at least provided clear goals, though neither could be achieved defini-
tively because both frankly and explicitly required the exercise of critical 
judgment and what Fredson Bowers once declared was, ‘the boldness to 
edit’. (Parenthetically, and provocatively, let me insert a little worm in the 
argument to come: To these two types of critical editing there are being 
proposed, by those seeking to minimize or eliminate critical judgment in 
editing, alternatives that might be more adequately achieved by photocopy 
machines and scanners than by scholarly editors.)
At least two important shifts in thinking about literary works and criti-
cism of them have intervened to alter the goals of critical editing or at least 
to alter how editors talk about them. The first shift replaced a quest for lost 
archetypes and unachieved ideals with practical materiality and a search 
for order in extant documents. The second replaced the ideal of original 
authenticity and of aesthetic sensitivity with social awareness. These two 
shifts have focused the attention of both literary critics and textual critics 
onto extant documentary texts as intrinsically interesting because of their 
historical status and their ability to index through time the social condi-
tions of authorship, publishing, and reading. Gone are the romantic gen-
ius of the author, the noble hand-maidenly efforts of the editor to restore, 
construct, or reconstruct ideal texts, and with them the hopes for urtexts or 
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well-wrought urns. Presumably, also gone is the subjectivity that bolstered 
genius, construction, and ideal texts.
The new editorial order appears to be on much safer ground, for it has 
minimized its reliance on the editor’s critical acumen, a quality unfortu-
nately distributed unevenly by fate amongst historians and textual critics. 
The new goals of textual scholarship are grounded in the materials, eco-
nomics, and social actualities of book production, not in the airy mists 
of aspirations, intentions, or séance-like efforts to commune with dead 
authors. Thus, fevered agitation about irrecoverable intentions has been 
replaced by calm analyses of material documents. This double move was 
self-reinforcing because the extant material documents appeared to form 
corroborating, if not sufficient, evidence for new interests in cultural and 
social forces affecting authorship, publishing and reading. Aesthetic con-
cerns for the integrity of art achieved through ideal, intended texts (so 
rarely achieved in extant texts) have taken a back seat or been forced off 
the bus entirely. 
Two related shifts have taken place in the last forty years that bear 
strongly on current notions of the work. The first shifted attention from the 
author to the reader, from intention to reception. The second shifted atten-
tion from questions about how to edit in print to those about how to edit 
for electronic publication and distribution. 1
The present paper does not trace the history of these shifts but rather 
takes them for granted as having taken place. It does not, however, take 
for granted that the shifts have been beneficial, successful, or without loss. 
Obviously, they have been sufficiently beneficial to be successful enough 
to have affected the profession of letters. But enthusiasms often come at a 
price and can blind one, at least at first, to the losses involved.
So, in looking at how literary works exist, I am eager to see if these shifts 
have entailed losses and, in particular, if a re-examination of how literary 
works exist might help us to see how they should be or could be edited for 
electronic representation.2
1 Key texts in the shift of attention from author to reader include Barthes (1986 
/1968), Foucault (1989/1969), Fish (1980), Tanselle (1990), and Greetham (1991). My 
own discussion of the shift from print to digital forms, in From Gutenberg to Goog-
le (2006), is just part of ancient and continuing discussion. The arguments in the 
present essay did not occur to me, unfortunately, until after I had published the 
book.
2 Arguments about the nature of ‘work’ in relation to ‘texts’ and ‘documents’ and 
about whether editors should concern themselves with a notion of a work as a con-
cept rather than as a physical object, such as a manuscripts or printed text, form 
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3. How do Literary Works Exist?
At first glance it would seem that, if the goal of editing and of critical analy-
sis is to examine material documents as socio-cultural and historical evi-
dence, then the original documents themselves or high-resolution digital 
images of them are basic beginnings. That is so because any transcript or 
new edition would be a witness to the social conditions of its own pro-
duction, rather than of the production of the original it was trying to (re)-
present. Likewise, it would seem, in that case, that we need not be overly 
concerned with what forms the text might have taken in documents that no 
longer exist or with what forms the text might have taken had the vicissi-
tudes of history not interfered. Those lost or unachieved forms do not exist 
and any attempt to ‘see’ them would be mediated by speculative emenda-
tion and new representation. But that seeming logic may be superficial, and 
the shift in editorial goals outlined above may fail to address the full range 
of critical needs for texts of works.
My purpose, then, is to ask ‘how do literary works exist?’ and to explore 
that question by applying to textual works the words ‘implied,’ ‘represented,’ 
and ‘interpreted.’ The essay will end with some suggestions about how lit-
erary works might be edited and represented electronically if researchers 
were but given the time, money and expertise to pursue such issues before 
undertaking the daunting task of producing a literary research project by 
a particular date. Perhaps what is wanting is a call for project proposals 
where the outcome is to be an analysis of current best electronic practice, 
recommendations and prototypes for a new electronic environment (where 
fundamental questions are addressed about interface design, coding prac-
tices, file structures, analytical and presentation tools) and the economics 
of development, dissemination, access and maintenance. Though I have 
recently published a book, From Gutenberg to Google: Electronic Representa-
tions of Literary Texts (2006), which is about the nature of literary texts and 
about electronic editing, I have tried to take a different tack here toward 
issues explored in that book.
I speak not primarily or only as a textual critic, but as a student of liter-
ary works. I believe I speak for many students of literature who are inter-
ested in the materials that contain or convey literary works; who are inter-
ested in the authors, publishers, and production personnel that constructed 
the chief dividing lines separating editorial methods. Key texts are Greg (1950-51), 
Tanselle (1989), McGann (1991), Martens (1995b), Plachta (1999), and Greetham 
(1999). An introductory analysis of competing theories is in Shillingsburg (1996a).
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those materials; who are interested in the discourse communities in which 
the words were written; who are also interested in the people who bought 
and read the works, not only at the time of first publication but through the 
years and into our own time; who are interested in literary works as cur-
rently re-imagined and marketed material objects; and who are concerned 
about how our modern identities and ‘presentness’ affect our reception of 
literary texts. In short, one way to put the problem of electronic editing 
is that we wish to serve the needs of people who want to understand the 
work of art in a variety of artistic, critical, historical, material, social, and 
intellectual ways. Funding for literary projects (the works of Thackeray, the 
Canterbury Tales, the poems of Jonathan Swift), each with a deadline loom-
ing, normally omits funding with which to re-examine and revamp the 
computer infrastructure within which to mount archives and editions of 
Thackeray, Chaucer, Swift or what have you. But here I want to consider the 
question of electronic editions in that latter light. The aim is definitely NOT 
to establish how our understandings of literary works can be contained in 
humanities computing. The question is, rather, how can humanities com-
puting support and enable our understandings of literary works -- though 
perhaps it would be even better to think of it as a two-way street.
To extend and attempt to explain this problem, I hit upon the title of 
my presentation: ‘The Work Implied, the Work Represented, and the Work 
Interpreted.’ The work, the literary work, to be understood has these three 
characteristics, and the interesting thing about this division of the problem 
is that in every case the two excluded characteristics invade the chosen 
focus at every point. Nevertheless, any computer solution would need to 
address these characteristics. 
4. The Work Implied
When I was revising the first edition of Scholarly Editing in the Computer Age 
in 1986, my fellow scholar, Price Caldwell,3 in an attempt to understand 
what I was getting at by talking about notes, drafts, manuscripts, maga-
zine publications, and book publications, asked if I meant that the work 
consisted of the sum of all these things. I imagined he was suggesting an 
3 Caldwell’s interest in ordinary language led him to develop a system he calls 
‘molecular sememics’ as a way of understanding the functional dynamics of natu-
ral languages (1989, 2000, 2006). I applied this theory to editorial concerns in From 
Gutenberg to Google (2006). 
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edition that somehow added all the bits from all the versions to produce 
a work that was a sum of its parts and of course rejected the notion out 
of hand. ‘Oh,’ he said, ‘Perhaps what you mean, then, is that the work is 
implied by these material documents but is not equivalent to any one of 
them?’ That is, no one copy was the full and definitive container of or rep-
resentative of the work, but that each contained or represented it in some 
way. I thought perhaps that way of putting it might get me into trouble, but 
I liked it. The work is not equivalent to any material representation of it, but 
is (partially and particularly) represented by each version of it. 
If the work is implied by the documentary text, it cannot itself be the 
documentary text. But if it is (partially and particularly) represented by 
each documentary copy of it, do we not mean that a version of the work 
is the text found in some document? Well, yes, at some rudimentary level 
each document represents a version (though it must be said that some 
documents are incomplete and do not represent a whole version) and fur-
ther, that some documents (manuscripts for example) often contain more 
than one version: original, intermediate and last. And sometimes a version 
becomes recognized as a version only when it has been extracted and con-
structed from texts found in more than one document.
But to speak of the Work Implied in this simplistic way as if it consisted 
of a series of snapshots of a THING, a static object, or as if it consisted of a 
developing series of attempts to construct a final static object, is to under-
stand the processes of composition, of production and of reading in only 
one of their potentially interesting ways. If we are talking – in an everyday 
sense – about a work of art, whether as short as a sonnet or as long as War 
and Peace itself, then we are generally talking not about a thing as a whole, 
for which some document can stand as a snapshot, but rather we are talking 
about what Willard McCarty has called a machine: a tool for making our 
way bit by bit sequentially (mostly) through the work that is only implied 
by any one form of the machines that represent it (2006). It is worth pausing 
to meditate on the notion that a literary work is never looked at as ‘a thing’ 
that can be taken as ‘a whole’. Literary works are travelled through more or 
less linearly with a focus of attention on smaller sense units in a sequence 
that achieves a sense of wholeness only in our memory of the experience of 
reading. That process is similar to the processes of writing and of manufac-
turing literary works as well. So, the idea of a snapshot version of the work 
as a whole is at best a metaphor on the verge of collapse. 
I leave the question of representation for a moment to focus first on 
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the processes of composition, production and reading. When one reads 
one version alongside another, rather than reading a single text in isola-
tion, one frequently gets a bigger bang for the buck. My colleague, Profes-
sor Julia Briggs, recently brought two good examples to my attention. The 
18th chapter of To the Lighthouse (the last in the first section titled ‘The Win-
dow’) in the American edition ends with Mr. Ramsey’s aloof detachment 
registered as his ability to know; the same chapter in the British edition 
ends instead with Mrs. Ramsey’s triumph. Both versions contain approxi-
mately the same statements but in different climactic orders. Alone, each of 
these versions has whatever effect the reader derives from that particular 
arrangement of the details. In opposition to each other, a reader encounters 
tensions of dissent and difference that raise a range of questions: who did 
this; why; what difference is being made; was it an accident; do the ver-
sions target different audiences as conceived by the author; do they just 
represent different potentials; or, is one actually the ‘right one’? I suppose 
that if one version is the right one, rendering the other one wrong, it could 
be an act of kindness to readers to suppress the erroneous reading. But in 
fact the surviving evidence does not indicate that one is wrong. We know 
that Americans read one version and the British read another. Notice, then, 
that for persons reading only one version this range of questions will not 
be raised or addressed. And note further that if such a single rightness were 
desirable in a scholarly edition, it would have had to be created in its single 
rightness by an editor who, first as a reader, had to enjoy the richness of the 
tension offered by the two versions in opposition and then spoil it for all 
other readers by making a decision on their behalf. Each version implies 
the work in a different way; in juxtaposition, the versions imply the work 
in a more complex way.
The other example Professor Briggs brought to my attention was from 
Thomas Middleton’s The Second Maiden’s Tragedy. The husband spends his 
life in passionate suspicion of his wife, who in fact is unfaithful to him. But 
just as he dies at the end of the play, in the first version, he is convinced by 
his wife and her lover that they are innocent, and the husband dies in the 
blissful belief that his wife is truly his, but he simultaneously dies in the 
sad truth that his whole married life has been wasted and embittered by 
groundless suspicion – never mind the fact that the audience knows that is 
false. In the alternative ending, the wife and lover come clean at the death-
bed, admitting all, and so the husband dies in the full satisfaction that he 
was right in his suspicions all along and in the sad certain knowledge that 
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his wife had indeed cuckolded him. Now, we might think that one or the 
other ending is better, more authentic, or more final; but in fact the ironic 
twists of both endings in tension against each other might be better than 
either of them alone. 
So, to sum up so far, the work is not a document. It is not a single text. 
And it is not the sum of all of its texts. It is implied in part by each docu-
ment and the texts of versions that can be extracted and constructed from 
documents. And it might, in some instances, be implied differently by the 
tensions between two or more versions at once than by a single version. 
Thus, even though we may not believe in ideal archetypal or intended 
texts, the proposition remains that literary works do not exist as fixed mate-
rial objects; they are only implied variously by surviving materials. That 
proposition entails problems such as, who shall be in charge of construct-
ing the edition that acknowledges these conditions of textuality? And who 
decides how readers wishing to understand the work of art in historical, 
documentary, social, and intellectual ways are to access and interact with 
the edition? And we must not forget that one reason we wish to develop 
some sophisticated sensitivity to the condition of literary works in their 
multiple selves, their implied forms, and their chronologies of dynamic 
existence is that we wish to create an electronic equivalence which enables 
and does not ignore or deny these sensitivities. 
And so, an electronic archive with digital images of documents and 
accurate, searchable transcriptions is a good start; but it isn’t good enough.
5. The Work Represented
Imagine you have gone to one of the world’s great libraries to see the manu-
script, or the first edition, or the even rarer third revised cheap edition of 
a work. You fill out a call slip, pass it to the librarian’s assistant and in due 
time you are handed a typed transcript of the work. After a moment of 
speechless surprise, you say, ‘No, no. Please, may I see the original’. ‘But’, 
says the librarian, ‘look, this is not just any transcription. See. There is a full 
header recording who prepared the transcript and how it was proofread. 
Not only that’, says the librarian, ‘it is from a TEI conformant �ML encoded 
original file’. ‘No, no’, you say. ‘I don’t care who transcribed it or how many 
times it was proofread. I don’t care if it is TEI conformant. I want to see the 
real original’. Thank goodness librarians do not act that way. So, why, when 
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we come to the electronic archive / edition / work site as a place to study 
a work of literary art on-line and we click on the icon or hotlink to ‘The 
Blessed Damozel’ or The Songs of Innocence or The Origin of Species or Vanity 
Fair, why oh why do we get a transcript? We do not want a transcript; we 
want an image. And we don’t want just any image. We want a choice of the 
manuscript, the 1821 newspaper, the 1848 first edition, or the 2002 critical 
edition, and what we get when we make the choice should be an image of 
what we asked for, not a transcript.
This is not an idea that goes without saying. Ninety-nine percent of elec-
tronic sites offering literary works offer only transcripts. Ninety-nine per-
cent of websites do not identify the source text for the transcript or say who 
transcribed it, how it was transcribed, how it was proofread, or when it was 
transcribed. Ninety-nine percent of electronic literary works were mounted 
by people who think that a text is a text is a text and any text will do. Even 
most of those who identify a particular source text offer only a transcript 
as if the transcript and the source were interchangeable equivalents. They 
are not. They do not imply the work in the same way, as has been argued 
too many times to count by the followers of D. F. McKenzie (1986) and J. J. 
McGann (1991). 
Nevertheless, I begin with the electronic archive because, of all things 
that have been done electronically with texts, digital image archives seem 
to me to be what we have, so far, done best. I’m not sure we have ever done 
it perfectly; we have frequently done it imperfectly. But there is a sense of 
satisfaction about the potential for electronic archives that makes us think 
that if we are not there yet, we are almost there. 
An archive of transcripts, by the way, is not a book archive. It is a collec-
tion of reprints, and possibly a valuable thing. But electronic transcripts do 
not constitute an archive in any sense of that word that I understand. 
So, we begin with images of texts. These too are not an archive. They are 
images of an archive. To be accurate we should call them virtual archives 
to distinguish them from real archives. And when the virtual archive is 
done right, it contains the images not just of the text but of the medium 
on which the text was written or printed, so that we can know something 
about the paper, the margins, the condition of the material, the quality 
of the printing, and the sense of age. The virtual archive, furthermore, 
can be better than a real one because of the capacity to produce images 
of high enough resolution that the virtual reproduction can reveal more 
than the original reveals to the naked eye. Certainly virtual archives can 
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be better than microfilm which has served our profession so well for so 
many years, but which has also taught us reams about the inadequacies of 
photo-reproductions.
In electronic image archives we have much more than photo-reproduc-
tions because we have mechanisms for searching, with the help of opti-
cal character recognition (OCR), text files which can be hidden behind the 
image files or as ‘a facing page’. There is, of course, the slight disadvan-
tage of OCR not getting everything right and therefore if one performs a 
machine search of a raw OCR file one will miss all the instances of the 
search words that have been mis-transcribed. But, what am I saying? Of 
course scholars do not expect machines to do what they are supposed to do 
before releasing their work to the public i.e. proofreading, double checking, 
vetting, verifying and approving the transcripts first. So, with electronic 
archives we have licked the problem of images and searchable texts. And 
this is to say nothing about the semantic web and data mining, which in 
our case we have not got.
Virtual archives can be better than real ones in other ways. First, because 
the internet and storage devices are capacious, we can add images and files 
to our archive until it is comprehensive. If we have not always been com-
prehensive, we sense that it is just a matter of time and money. And, second, 
and perhaps even better than that, we have licked the distribution prob-
lems too: unlike a library archive, the electronic library can be made avail-
able in Timbuktu via the Internet. Timbuktu scholars do not have to go to 
great academic institutions such as Cambridge, Oxford, UCLA or TAMU4 
— or if they still have to, we feel that in time they will not have to.
So, if we think of the electronic representation of texts and documents in 
these terms, we might with justice feel that the electronic age has reached a 
milestone: that the technology and the methodology for representing texts 
and documents awaits the will and direction of scholars to fulfil the prom-
ise of a new but present age.
But if texts and documents have now the potential (and in some cases 
have already realised the potential) to be represented electronically in 
scholarly, reliable and useful ways, what can we say about the representa-
tion of works?
The easiest thing to say is that works are represented in texts and docu-
ments and that without documents there are no works. I would of course 
agree with this but suggest that, good as it is, it is not good enough. It does 
4  University of California, Los Angeles; Texas A&M University
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not go far enough. If we revisit the notion of the ‘Work Implied’, and if we 
restate the notion that the work is not equivalent to any representation of 
it, is not fully represented in any one version of it, then the work cannot 
be essentially documentary. While it is true both, that at some level each 
document represents a version of the work and that the work cannot exist 
except through material forms, it is also true that an incomplete document 
does not represent a whole version, that manuscript documents frequently 
contain more than one version, and that sometimes an implied version of 
a work becomes recognizable as a version only when it has been extracted 
and constructed from more than one document. Thus, the complexity of 
works exceeds the complexity of texts and requires more than imitation on 
a computer’s screen of hand written and machine printed texts. If we hope 
to create a system for representing works electronically, it must cater to a 
range of views about how works can and should be represented and not 
just to a view that is satisfied by the archive of images of historical docu-
ments, not even when those digital images are backed by accurate search-
able transcripts.
It might help us to see this range if we imagine briefly just three differ-
ent kinds of edited texts to produce: 
First, edited texts of documents in which only demonstrable errors are 
corrected and to which editorial notes are attached.
Second, edited texts of manuscripts or other documents from which 
early, intermediate and final versions can be extracted or distinguished, or 
which can be provided with some navigation aids to help readers see the 
processes of composition and revision contained within the one document.
And third, edited texts that draw from two or more extant historical 
documents to provide an edited version that fulfils one or another view of 
what the text should or could be. 
This third type, eclectic editing, as I began by indicating, has been widely 
criticized in recent years, and yet it is still, at least for English language 
texts, one of the most practiced forms. At its least defensible it is practiced 
by editors who want to produce the most artistic, or most politically correct, 
or most aesthetically pleasing form of the work. The resulting forms may 
not only be eclectic, drawing emendations from historical documents, but 
also ‘enhanced’ by speculative emendation. It is worth remembering in this 
context, however, that all historical variants, excepting those produced by 
the author, were originally speculative emendations. In its most defensible 
form, eclectic editing seeks to incorporate in one text the guiding influ-
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ence of that person or persons to whom the greatest authority for the text 
is attributed. It is an approach used in attempts to reconstruct archetypes 
when all the historically extant documents are centuries removed from 
their originals and where many documents have a claim to some share of 
authority. And it is also used when manuscripts, proofs, and authoritative 
printed documents bear the evidence of carelessness, censorship, or heavy-
handed interventionist editing.
Whatever one might think of these ways to edit texts — to alter what 
is found in the raw documents — it is the case that editors practice all 
these forms of editing. Despite objections, there are responsible scholars 
who advocate each of these editorial approaches. The fact that one can find 
examples of abominably edited texts representing each of these approaches 
does not demonstrate that the approach itself is abominable.
And the point of this exercise is to demonstrate that in developing the 
tools for electronic editions and archives, the needs of scholars who use any 
or all these approaches must be acknowledged. But before proceeding with 
that thought, let us pause to think about the work interpreted. 
6. The Work Interpreted
My argument in brief is this. That if each material instantiation of a literary 
work implies it in some way — in some admittedly partial way and not in 
a definitive way — then it follows that each electronic representation of 
the work implies it in yet a different way from that in which the material 
form does. But that is not the most important part of the argument. If the 
work is implied by, rather than fully inherent in, the documents that rep-
resent it, then the only way to know what is implied by each form is to try 
one’s best to interpret that form and to say what one thinks is implied by it. 
And, when one does that, one is confined to saying what is implied by the 
particular copy of the work one is reading; it does not necessarily apply to 
other copies nor is it necessarily generic to the work as a whole. In short, if 
it is the nature of a work of literary art to be partially implied by each copy 
of it, any interpretive engagement with a copy of the work apprehends the 
implications only of that particular copy. That which is implied by a Yeats 
poem published in the Irish Times at a time of incidental public turmoil of 
1913 is not what is implied by that same poem safely ensconced in the Nor-
ton Anthology of English Literature, volume II in 1997 or 2007.
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It is clear from the traditions and habits of readers, however, that there 
are frequent and important congruities amongst readers of different copies 
of a work, such that in spite of reading different copies, each implying the 
work somewhat differently, there is a strong sense that they have indeed 
read the same work. This overlap is usually enough to make readers over-
look, or consider as trivial, the differences arising from the fact that they are 
not referencing the same lexical or bibliographical form of the work. Nev-
ertheless, it is worth remembering the potential for interpretive difference 
deriving, on the one hand, from the bibliographical and lexical particu-
larities of the copy being read and, on the other hand, from the contexts of 
origination that exercised an operant force on the construction of the copies 
of the work at important events in the work’s life, and on, if one but had one, 
the third hand, from the critical and interpretive communities influencing 
the present reader.
For the first of these, the bibliographical and lexical particularities of 
the copy being read, one probably needs only to say ‘coiled fish’ vs ‘soiled 
fish’ or perhaps ‘too sullied flesh’ vs ‘too sallied’ or ‘too solid flesh’ or ‘early 
editions of Henry James’ vs ‘the New York edition of Henry James’ or to 
refer to the examples from Middleton’s Second Maiden’s Tragedy or Virginia 
Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, mentioned earlier to get us thinking that textual 
differences often lead directly to conflicting interpretations. The already 
complex task of interpretation is rendered both more complex and more 
precise by attention to the particularities of the copy being read and to its 
differences from other copies.
The second potential for interpretive difference arises from knowledge 
or ignorance of the contexts of origination surrounding the significant 
events in the production of copies of the work. If in the act of interpreting 
a work we are inclined to use locutions like ‘What Shakespeare did so well 
here’ or ‘Only Melville could have thought to use such a word’ we had 
best be sure not only that the author is responsible for the locution being 
quoted but that we know enough about the circumstances of its utterance 
to know that our insight is supported by evidence that ‘went without say-
ing’ for the author, production crew, and first readers of that copy of the 
work. If, however, we avoid sounding as if we knew what the author had 
meant by claiming instead that ‘the text says so and so’ or ‘the text means 
so and so’ we speak the nonsense that paper and ink molecules have inde-
pendent volition. Texts do not mean things; people mean things by texts. 
But if I say that the text means such and such because I read and interpret 
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the text in relation to what can be known about the contexts of origination, 
then the interpretation is plausible in reference to textual and historical evi-
dence supporting it. In order to produce informed reader response, read-
ers need texts that are particular, that look like what they are, and that are 
surrounded or supported by the materials that at one time may have gone 
without saying but now do not.
Asking readers to express their opinions about texts concerning which 
they have no information about the contexts of origination is like asking 
anyone you might meet on the street to express an opinion about when we 
will pull out of Iraq or if it will rain tomorrow or who will be the next presi-
dent. People usually have no difficulty in expressing opinions but one had 
just as well ask a crystal ball or a cat because the opinion will be an act of 
the imagination unimpeded by knowledge, not the result of analysis of the 
full panoply of relevant evidence. Offering readers a historical text without 
also offering the fruits of scholarship into the contexts of origination is not 
good enough. It wasn’t good enough in print anthologies and it isn’t good 
enough in electronic forms.
Recapping: first, the work is implied by its material instantiations, not 
coeval with them; second, each representation of the work, material or 
electronic, is particular and partial; and third, the only access we have to 
the work is through acts of interpretation of representations that imply the 
work. It follows that the work itself exists only in deferred forms – not in 
immediate, transparent, unambiguous forms. A text is never a mere text or 
a simple text or a correct text, not even if it is well edited. We should be 
suspicious of locutions like ‘the work itself,’ for the work exists only in our 
constructs of it. While the text and the document are clearly material, the 
work is a mental construct. The German Historical/Critical editors make 
this same point by distinguishing, in the words of Gunter Martens, between 
textual evidence (the textual document) and the aesthetic object (the work 
extracted from it) (Martens 1995a, 1995b). Historical/Critical editors err, I 
believe, in assuming that editors can focus all their attention on the textual 
evidence and leave the aesthetic object for critics to worry about. For, even 
editors are prevented from unmediated, transparent interaction with the 
work because textual evidence is evidence for the work, not the work itself. 
The work is implied and represented by material texts and interpreted 
from material texts and thus will never be nailed down and made fixed for 
ever — not in print and not electronically. The textual condition leads inevi-
tably to arguments about how to interpret and how to represent works. 
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There are many legitimate ways to approach works of literature. And, so, 
while our job as editors is most immediately with the material representa-
tions of the work, we must acknowledge the elusiveness of works when 
we make decisions about how to represent them electronically. No edition 
of a work fully represents it. An archive of representations of a work only 
begins scholarship relative to the work by providing the foundation for 
full engagement with the work. Adequate electronic designs for archives 
and editions will make it feasible and easier to produce new literary criti-
cism that is more broadly based in relevant texts and contexts. New elec-
tronic text projects should not only provide the evidence that will support a 
greater number and a wider range of interpretive possibilities, it should do 
so in an electronic environment that enables augmentation. My personal 
bias inclines toward the belief that such archives of texts and contexts will 
make historical readings both richer and more precise, but they will cer-
tainly not prevent readings that ignore history. I think that is okay.
There is no group of people on earth, and especially not textual critics, 
who can make readers read in historically rich and precise ways. Readers 
have legitimate or at least compelling reasons to read in other ways and 
we must, I believe, accept that as a fact of life. It is not self-flagellation to 
say textual critics have, in the print world, not done the best possible job of 
making text and context readily and invitingly available to critics. Impor-
tant textual differences and revealing contextual facts are routinely buried 
in forbidding apparatuses and historical introductions. Better presentation 
and better interface designs can help readers achieve historical readings. 
With electronic scholarly editions we have a greater opportunity than ever 
to provide readers with particularized and contextualized editions. But I 
believe we still have formidable infrastructure and design problems to solve.
Those infrastructure and design problems are the natural results of a 
new medium with no traditions seeking local ways to solve local prob-
lems. In the book world every project had to be finished before it could be 
published. And we find big electronic projects following that model – fin-
ished and presented to users not as a dynamic growing site for scholarship 
but as a finished product to be seen and not touched. In the book world 
every project was cut down to size by compromise. And we find big elec-
tronic projects compromising in similar ways – by the size of hard discs, 
the speed of downloads, and the size of budgets. The state of modern elec-
tronic archives and editions represents a failure of imagination — a failure 
to see the problem whole or to recognize the shortfalls of local solutions for 
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local problems. We have thought too small. The goals of electronic archives 
/ editions for any work of literature are too great for any one editor or one 
small team of editors to fulfil. But we have yet to see electronic editorial 
projects as partial contributions to work sites where our best collaborators 
may have only just now been born. Can we do our work in such a way that 
textual critics, instead of ignoring existing electronic editions and looking 
for ways to rebuild from the ground up, can build on what is already done, 
or could attach their own scholarly work to the existing site as developing 
contributions to knowledge? If that is to happen how must we undertake 
our work?
7. Conclusion
My argument has reached this point: 
First: That we acknowledge editing as an attempt to deal with a com-
plex set of materials for which there are a variety of viable and necessary 
approaches.
Second: That editing, especially in the electronic world, is a task that 
cannot and should not end with one project’s vision of the product but 
instead serves as a foundation, requiring maintenance, repair, replacement 
of parts and extension beyond the capacity of any one person. 
Third: That there is a large and future community of scholars that can 
contribute to basic editorial work, to the construction of contextual matter 
and to the structure of critical understanding of the works represented in 
our electronic archive editions.
These three conclusions have much to say about how we do our work 
and how we lodge our scholarly endeavours in electronic form. In order 
for scholarly editors in the electronic medium to make a difference in the 
way students and critics read and interpret texts they must do the follow-
ing four things:
1. Make access to texts in scholarly editions as convenient and inexpen-
sive as paperbacks, but not oversimplified. 
2. Construct editions so that readers can not only see but touch, manipu-
late, personalize, and alter their copies in whatever way they wish.
3. Construct editions so that other scholars can participate in the fur-
ther construction of the work site by adding new materials, new links, new 
comments, new information, new texts, new tagging, new views.
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4. Protect the integrity of the original textual foundation and the dis-
creteness of each contributor’s offering whilst accomplishing points 2 and 3. 
This will require a completely new environment and storage and retrieval 
system for electronic projects – one that separates texts from commentary 
by stand-off markup, protects integrity by check-sums and engagement 
histories, ensures longevity by multiple distributed online storage, and 
provides for spontaneous aggregation and integration to incorporate all 
new contributions to a given project for new users.
The final word in this first part of a pair of essays on the subject1 is: until 
funding agencies supporting editions and archives add the third wheel to 
their funding scheme — development of a Collaborative Literary Research 
Electronic Environment — new electronic editions and archives will con-
tinue to imitate print by continuing to create closed, finished or abandoned, 
look-but-don’t-touch products.
1  See Shillingsburg (2009) for the second of the pair of essays.
8. Text as Algorithm and as 
Process1
Paul Eggert
1. Electronic Text and ‘Text’
Elsewhere in this volume Peter Robinson relates an anecdote from a lecture 
he gave in 2004 in which he surveyed his audience to discover how many of 
them had in the previous 12 months acquired an electronic book as opposed 
to other common digital products. Nearly everyone had done the latter, but 
only five percent the former. Everyone had bought a printed book. The 
expectations of the early 1990s about electronic texts and how they would 
change our reading habits had not materialised by 2004. E-books will suc-
ceed, Robinson concludes, only when they have a compelling advantage 
over their printed counterparts. 
What could this be in the case of scholarly editions? Despite consider-
able efforts on the part of many scholars around the world since the wide-
spread adoption of the internet in the early 1990s results have been at best 
modest. We cannot claim that electronic editions are an unqualified suc-
cess. They have not swept the field. As Robinson notes, while music, film 
1  The thinking in this paper has been stimulated by many conversations with 
my collaborators in the successive Just In Time Markup (JITM) projects at the Aus-
tralian Scholarly Editions Centre (see www.unsw.edu.au/ASEC and www.unsw.
adfa.edu.au/JITM). For reports, see Berrie et al. 2003; and Berrie et al. 2006. For a 
commentary on the wider meanings of the JITM projects, see Eggert 2005. I thank 
Peter Robinson for giving me access to three papers of his prior to their publication: 
‘Electronic Editions for Everyone’ (in the present volume), ‘Current Directions in 
the Making of Digital Editions: Towards Interactive Editions’ (Robinson 2007b) and 
‘Documenting Texts and Text Sources for Exposure and Retrieval’ (Robinson 2008). 
I also thank De Montfort University, especially its Centre for Textual Scholarship, 
whose support made possible my lecture to the London Seminar in Digital Text and 
Scholarship in 2007, on which this essay is closely based.
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and photographs have not had to be fundamentally re-thought for the new 
medium in order to succeed, the book will have to be. Nowhere is this truer 
than in the case of the scholarly edition. That is why, I conclude, fundamen-
tal rather than purely technical questions have to be asked when we are 
considering the fate or future of the electronic scholarly edition. 
Some basic questions about the nature of written and printed texts have 
been asked by members of the encoding community as they have struggled 
to define what it is that they are encoding. This ought not to be surpris-
ing. The act of encoding texts for computer processing involves a blatant 
intervention in text-files of a kind that scholarly editors in the print domain 
are normally shielded from, however heroic their emendation of corrupted 
wording of a literary or biblical work may be. Traditionally they have 
treated many aspects of the physical presentation of text as irrelevant to 
their pursuit. 2 However, this self-preserving instinct finds itself in a tighter 
corner in the electronic domain, where complete specification is crucial for 
computer processing. 
The different requirements of the electronic medium can help to throw 
new light on some of the enduring questions of what texts are and how 
they function. Recent commentary has been tending in this direction, 
bringing bibliography and some aspects of editorial theory to bear on 
electronic texts.3 My aim here is, accordingly, to inspect some of the recent 
text-encoding debate, and then the far-reaching proposals put forward by 
Jerome J. McGann in his provocative book Radiant Textuality (2001). I have 
some tough things to say. To get to that point I first offer a meditation on 
textuality, from which certain conclusions flow. At the fundamental level, 
textuality and electronic textuality, I believe, fold back into one. If this level 
of clarification can be achieved, then clarification of the continuing dilem-
mas in the computer representation of text should follow.4 
My aim in the second part of this paper will be to express what can now 
be described as a convergence in thinking by some pragmatic commenta-
tors on the future of electronic editions — people who have not been won 
over to McGann’s vision but who do see a way forward for an area of schol-
arly editorial endeavour that has not yet been unambiguously successful. I 
2  Editorial self-preservation usually means that physical evidence is ignored or 
suppressed: cf. Eggert 2004, 162-4.
3  See for instance: Aarseth 1997, Dahlström 2000, Kirschenbaum 2001 and 2002, 
and Hayles 2001 and 2003. For a commentary, see Eggert 2005.
4  For the importance of modelling as a route to knowledge in humanities com-
puting, see McCarty 2004.
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refer to Peter Shillingsburg, especially in From Gutenberg to Google (2006b); 
Peter Robinson and his soon-to-be-announced plans, already circulated in 
draft form, for a new direction for his endeavours in Chaucer and Greek 
New Testament editing; and some aspects of the DISCOVERY project 
funded by the European Union’s eContentplus scheme.5
The argument here has been anticipated in Eggert 2005, where I develop 
the wider implications of the methodology and aims of an Australian edit-
ing experiment called Just In Time Markup (JITM). By 2002 the JITM project 
had implemented stand-off markup as part of a system to guarantee the 
authenticity of a text file. We then realised that stand-off markup provided 
something we had not been looking to achieve: a basis for ongoing collabo-
rative interpretation. 
2. Defining ‘Text’
In 1995 Alois Pichler declared that the aim of encoding must be ‘to prepare 
from the original text another text so as to serve as accurately as possible 
certain interests in the text’, and he added: ‘what we are going to represent, 
and how, is determined by our research interests . . . and not by a text which 
exists independently and which we are going to depict’ (1995: 691, 690). 
Allen Renear, who has been deeply involved in the TEI (Text Encoding 
Initiative) movement, rejected this claim as ‘antirealist’ (1997). But his 
objection to Pichler’s argument is based on an under-problematised notion 
that text is or must be abidingly and objectively real, and that this condition 
demands encoding that is aimed at elucidating the object’s actual features.6 
The new light thrown upon textuality by developments in editorial 
theory is relevant to this text-encoding debate. Gone are the days when 
scholarly editors could safely invoke the authority of Sir Walter Greg’s 
‘Rationale of Copy-Text’ to justify a reading text established on the basis 
of final authorial intention (1950-51). The form of presentation — a single 
text, together with the rejected and variant forms recorded in the back of 
the book — was itself, in every edition, an enactment of an under-specified 
and narrow theory of textuality. It was both narrow (in that its quarry was 
a verbal text abstracted from the material forms that had carried it) and 
5  For DISCOVERY, see Pichler and Lanestedt 2007 and, more generally, Hayward 
2006.
6  Renear 1997, 117-24. My counter-argument is in Eggert 2005.
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Neoplatonic (the approximation of an ideal) at the same time. By the late 
1980s a newly self-conscious understanding of texts was being cultivated. 
Texts now emerged as always in process, as meaningful both in their verbal 
forms and their physical presentations, as anchored not only in authorship 
but also in the publishing process and in their successive readerships. Text 
now was recognised as having social, performative and artefactual dimen-
sions that editors’ prior concentration upon its abstracted verbal form had 
not so much ignored (since they at least partially recorded it) as occluded. 
This realisation bears out Pichler’s comment negatively — that is, that 
we can only represent certain interests in a text — although he was thinking 
about text-encoding, not critical editions. The realisation also exposes the 
inadequacy of the realist position espoused by Renear. Texts are anything 
but self-identical: whatever their ongoing existence consists of, our view 
of them is perspectival. A phenomenology of text has replaced a simpler 
ontology. And yet, a phenomenology of multiple perspectives is not nec-
essarily inconsistent with the belief that there is something abiding about 
texts. We know from experience that we wish, selectively, to absorb texts 
into our imaginative lives, just as, in the act of reading, we pour part of our-
selves into them. We are dealing with something, a persisting something, 
but what is it? How do we define it?
We know for one thing that we all live in bodies. Our reality is con-
ditioned by this corporeal existence. These bodies of ours live in an ana-
logue world, but one whose communications and many other functions 
are increasingly enabled, and extended in their reach and speed, by digital 
technologies. Books in their analogue format have a comforting familiar-
ity. They sit nicely in the hand. Like cats, they’re up on our laps and we’ve 
started to handle them — tenderly, almost unawares, indeed we are still 
savouring the pleasure in store — even as our thinking minds are getting to 
work on the book’s contents. The stream of words and punctuation — the 
text — is what we have now begun to read: isn’t it?
Certainly, traditional page designs cater to this assumption by aiming 
for layouts that are transparent. The best design is said to be the one we 
can’t see, that we look straight through to the content and never notice. It 
took some hundreds of years to achieve such designs. But of course the 
recent developments in editorial theory show that every reading is affected, 
consciously or not, by the page design, including the characteristics of the 
chosen font, the amount of leading and white space, the binding and paper-
stock, and more obviously the accompanying illustrations; or the competing 
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matter beside a magazine serialisation being read week by week. All this 
needs to be considered before we get to the wider contexts of the reading: 
when it happens, to whom, for what purpose, under what conditions, with 
what history of prior reading.
So now it becomes harder to define what a text is. But we can’t duck the 
question. We have to think about text, its material condition and its recep-
tion if we are to understand what it is that we are encoding when we say 
that we are encoding texts.
3. Text and Codes
I go for regular walks up Mt Ainslie near my house in Canberra. It’s actu-
ally less heroic than it sounds, and so if friends are visiting I take them too. 
About halfway up there is a striking gum tree to the left of the path, which 
I have frequently looked at (see cover image). It has various markings on 
it. An American friend, with a bent for editorial theory, saw that I was seri-
ous when I stopped in front of the tree and asked him whether he was now 
looking at a text, or not. There in front of him was potentially a document, a 
textual carrier — the nearly white, virtually smooth bark of the tree — and 
there were, without doubt, brown squiggles on it, more or less in a verti-
cal line, and conveniently at eye-height. He looked. Could they be in a Tai 
script, of which he was only vaguely aware? He had been to Thailand. Or 
was it conceivably in a sinuous Bengali script of which he had seen exam-
ples but could not read? He knew that Canberra is a multi-cultural city con-
taining people from all parts of Asia and the Middle East. He took a while 
to declare that he had tried but he could not make any sense of it, and that 
in fact he doubted that it was a text, even though he could not explain how 
the markings came to be there. The fact, once explained, that these mark-
ings are the trail gouged by an insect burrowing under the bark that the 
Scribbly Gum later sheds, thus revealing the markings, clinched the matter. 
This was not a text. There was no human communicative intent. 
In contrast, consider the period up until 1799 when the Rosetta Stone 
was discovered. Egyptian hieroglyphic inscriptions were unreadable, yet 
there was agreement that they would probably have a meaning, if only the 
code could be broken. There was little doubt that the stone inscriptions in 
the tombs were texts of some kind due to their regularity and repetitive-
ness. This of course proved to be the case when (by the 1820s) the code was 
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articulated. There was, after all, proven human communicative intent dem-
onstrated by the use of an alphabetic, syllabic and pictographic code that 
the original inscribers had held in common. The markings had proved to be 
not just mindless repetitions but real inscriptions, and the inscribed stone 
had therefore proved to be a document. What we had, now, were texts.7
The decisive change in status from natural or physical artefact to docu-
ment, and vice versa in the case of the Scribbly Gum, occurs at the same 
time that it is decided that markings are or are not textual inscriptions. In 
other words, the documentary and the textual dimensions are interdepend-
ent. They are separable for purposes of discussion, but they are not sepa-
rate. In a private communication, Mats Dahlström disagrees. He instances 
the case of the prisoner on death row who is given paper and ink on which 
at last to record his confession of the crime, but stolidly refuses to do so. 
The prisoner has created no text. But yet there is a document: the paper, 
Dahlström says.
I would disagree. The assumption that there is one seems justified only 
because the context has set up the expectation of normal documentary-
textual interdependence. The physical paper is about to achieve a docu-
mentary status, but it fails to happen. If the same unused sheet of paper 
were then turned into a paper aeroplane by the perversely silent criminal 
it would no longer be thought of as a document. So the objection only con-
firms what I contend: that the documentary and the textual dimensions are 
fundamentally interdependent. 
This fact is something we would have noticed long since as important 
did we not spend most of our reading lives assuming that we could essen-
tially ignore the document. The basis of the document may be physical, it 
may be computational, or it may be the sound waves of orally declaimed 
verse: but in all cases there is a material condition for its newly declared 
status. Materiality is not a sufficient condition, for the documentary dimen-
sion is always in relation to the textual. Neither is self-identical, and both 
have their histories: the histories of writing and production, and the histo-
ries of reading. The two histories are intertwined.8
7  Cf. the 3rd-century BC Greek shorthand systems known as tachygraphy. They 
are yet to be deciphered despite the existence of a prayer in both normal handwrit-
ing and three different types of shorthand.
8  The fi rst reader is the writer. At every stage of composition and revision, writ-
ers are reading what they just wrote, or wrote before. Typesetters, before they do 
anything else, are readers too, and obviously editors are; but so too are encoders of 
e-texts. All these people intervene between an earlier document to create the new 
document (printed or computer-processed) used by the readers. See further, Eggert 
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The space that we nevertheless open up by distinguishing conceptually 
between the documentary and the textual allows a number of otherwise 
puzzling things to fall into place. The first is that the material document can 
be seen now as the basis of the persisting something that we know reading 
reveals to us — whether the text is screen-evanescent, a temporary visu-
alisation, or whether it arises as we read from a document that has hardly 
altered in hundreds of years. What related conclusions may we draw? First, 
we note the space between, yet the intertwined nature of, the documentary 
and textual dimensions; and second (although I do not enlarge on it here), 
the central relevance, when considering texts, of agency and time.9
4. The Humpty Dumpty Approach to Text
How can computer-encoding respond to these fundamentals? One way 
forward was proposed in 2001 by Jerome McGann in Radiant Textuality. 
Before I get to his ambitious proposal, which most commentators seem to 
have passed over, I have to deal with the aspect of his book that has domi-
nated discussion so far: the Humpty Dumpty argument that words, and 
therefore texts, can mean whatever we want them to mean. A discussion of 
this ludic argument, which is conducted as a conversation between differ-
ent voices animated by McGann, will finally point a way forward.
David Hoover has given McGann’s Humpty Dumpty argument a 
mauling in ‘Hot-Air Textuality: Literature after Jerome McGann’ (2005). 
McGann’s repeated rescanning of the same double-column document, a 
process which he describes in his book, resulted in textual variation: ‘there-
fore,’ he concludes, ‘the text is not self-identical since the machine pro-
duced somewhat different texts from the same document’ (cf. 2001: 144-6). 
Hoover shows, by repeatedly scanning a simpler document, that variation 
can be trivial. Thus for most practical purposes, he claims, texts are self-
identical at least within a tightly defined readership (2005: 76). 
Hoover next turns to McGann’s account of a class on Keats’s ‘Ode on 
a Grecian Urn’. McGann writes it, teasingly, in the form of a discussion 
between various characters with names such as Instruction, Printer’s Devil 
and Footnote. The student who claims that the phrase ‘O Attic shape!’ 
refers to a ghostly shape in an attic, such as his grandmother’s attic, rather 
2009, chap. 10.
9  See further, Eggert 2009, chaps. 8-9.
Paul Eggert190
than to a Greek or Attic urn, is robustly defended. Although the student 
has deformed the poem’s meaning by reference to her own experience, isn’t 
this (McGann implies through one of the voices, but without fully commit-
ting himself) what always happens? The critic who brings historical infor-
mation to bear on the reading to defend the poem against such subjective 
deformation deforms it also but in a different way. This argument has upset 
traditional scholars.
Hoover’s counter-argument is that literature does not need to be opened 
up (quoting one of McGann’s characters) ‘in lots of new and interest-
ing ways’. Radical forms of deformation are not worth pursuing. Rather, 
Hoover argues, ‘interpretation requires new, interesting, and reasonable 
ways of constraining the wide array of possible meanings that literary texts 
typically make at least marginally possible’ (2005: 90). In a more recent 
article, ‘The End of the Irrelevant Text: Electronic Texts, Linguistics and 
Literary Theory’ (2007), Hoover gets further onto the front foot. His argu-
ment reflects the remarkable growth in empirical resources now available 
to us that can aid, guide and check literary interpretation: bibliographic 
databases, text corpora, computational stylistics, reliable scholarly editions, 
and biographies of writers and detailed chronologies of their writings.
It is easy to get hot under the collar about McGann’s proposals, except 
they are not quite his. He is only dramatising the dispute, giving voice — 
impiously, even wickedly, yet also sweetly and reasonably — to a normally 
repressed desire for a plenitude of meanings that anarchic students (such as, 
Dear Reader, we once were too?) must at least sometimes have felt when-
ever a teacher was determined to assert his or her interpretative authority 
on this or that line of a poem. ‘It’s mine too, isn’t it?’ we muttered darkly to 
ourselves as our suggested interpretations were cast ignominiously aside. 
The alarmed response to McGann’s book is understandable. Hoover’s arti-
cles are more importantly indexing a general shift in the critical scene after 
the winding-down in energy of the Theory (the capital T Theory) movement 
since the late 1990s. But I think the actual importance of McGann’s book lies 
elsewhere. He is setting up a principle of reading as inevitably and unavoida-
bly one of deformation, a principle that he needs to invoke later in the book as 
a counter-weight when he finally gets down to his serious proposals. They are 
what I wish to discuss now. It will become clear that my objection to McGann’s 
proposals takes a different form to the empirical ones of David Hoover.
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5. Text as Algorithm
McGann’s agenda was canvassed in a working paper published electroni-
cally (probably in 2000), ‘Rethinking Textuality’, where he talks of the need 
‘to rethink the work’s textuality by consciously simulating its social recon-
struction’. The computer game called IVANHOE, which he and Johanna 
Drucker developed to simulate textuality, is something I discuss later. The 
basic problem for encoding, McGann points out, is that literary texts are 
not like informational texts. They are inherently incommensurable. Poems 
are not just about a subject; they are also about their vehicle of transmission. 
They exploit capacities of sound, image, metaphor and movement; they get 
in behind the ratiocinating mind. Put another way: noise is part of their 
communication. It does not separate readily from signal. This is the conun-
drum faced by anyone who is sensitised to poetry but wants to specify the 
aspects of poems’ functioning susceptible to knowledge representation that 
the computer can deal with, and that would allow it, in a specific sense, to 
‘read’ the poem. This is the ultimate goal that McGann foresees, while rec-
ognising that there will always be limits (2001: 185).
The term that McGann invented in 1991 to cover the meanings emerg-
ing from the physical instantiation of the linguistic text — what he calls the 
‘bibliographic code’ — seems custom-made for the computing environment, 
and certainly he takes on the challenge in Radiant Textuality. He hopes to set 
off a general effort to encode physical aspects of documents: he is eloquent 
on the subject of page-space (say, versus scroll-space or cave-space). He 
affords some hope that basic aspects of the mise-en-page that are below the 
level of our notice may after all be precisely specifiable and therefore ren-
dered intelligible to the computer. Could we one day, then, have a machine 
called an OBR — an Optical Bibliographic Reader — exploiting new forms 
of digital pattern recognition? 
I am sceptical. It is not that I question whether advances in digital pat-
tern recognition will be made. Advances are very likely. Rather, I question 
McGann’s notion of bibliographic code itself. The term has been taken up 
by a raft of editorial commentators and theorists but the attraction of it is, 
I believe, mainly rhetorical. If one is to be strict about the term, then there 
clearly is no such thing as bibliographic code. Dictionary definitions stress 
the systematic nature of codes: rigorously collected and arranged, as in 
legal codes; and the strictly defined substitution of words for other words, 
as in secret military codes. But the unpredictabilities of the gap between 
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the physical features of a book and their meaning are poor conditions for 
the specification of a code. We can talk about the art of page design and 
book binding. Such work can be highly conscious and aimed at achieving 
particular aesthetic effects or even meanings: so that we could perhaps go 
so far as to claim the existence of a documentary or bibliographic seman-
tics. But code is going further than the evidence permits. It would require a 
full-blown semiotics.10 It seems to me that there can be no specifiable and 
invariable meaning for any particular mise-en-page. 
Compare the criticism of paintings. Art critics sometimes refer to the 
visual ‘vocabulary’ of a particular artist or movement, and sometimes pro-
fess to be ‘reading’ paintings. In truth, these claims work only at a loose, 
metaphoric level. While paint or page designs involve the production of 
physical markings, neither invokes, in their physical appearance, a specifi-
able code that would allow the site to be duplicated without loss or change 
of meaning. With written or printed pages, then, to profess to be specifying 
the full material range of their possible significances — to our senses of 
sight, touch and smell — in order to turn them into a code would involve 
having to close the gap between the documentary and the textual, the gap 
between the material stimulus and the meaning for the reader. Given that 
there is no pre-existing code that can be drawn down for analysis, how is a 
‘code’ to be specified? Clearly, it is impossible.
With what McGann calls the ‘linguistic code’ the chances are far higher, 
since a socialised agreement about the use of alphabetic or other scripts 
and about the functioning of syntactic arrangements, pre-exists both the 
writing and the reading of a text. The ‘code’ is, in effect, drawn down by 
both writer and reader. It is the document’s supplément. It can be described, 
with varying degrees of success, structurally. It has commensurability. But 
meanings based on it notoriously vary so, although the conditions for the 
specification of this code are propitious, even here they are far from perfect. 
There is also a larger, philosophical idea that the claim of a specifiable 
bibliographic code is presupposing. McGann envisages that it should be 
possible to articulate the rules for the reading of a document — as he puts 
it, ‘a set of protocols for negotiating the textual scene’ — so that a computer 
could read it (2001: 143). He claims that texts, because they are ‘coded biblio-
graphically and semantically’ should be seen as ‘sets of rules (algorithms) 
for generating themselves’ (2001: 138). These rules are the linguistic and 
10  If it ever were to be defined, C.S. Peirce’s semiotics might be the key to the 
advance: his account of the sign incorporates the interpretant of the sign into the 
semiotic transaction: see further, Eggert 2009, chap. 10.
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bibliographic codes. This is a breathtaking idea, but what does it imply? 
McGann realises that he is sailing close, here, to the holy grail of struc-
tural linguistics (2001: 151), only he wants to expand its purview to include 
the graphic (pre-semantic) markings in which the codings are embodied. 
McGann knows well that texts are not self-identical, and he says so several 
times in the book. But his new position on encoding is drawing him into 
the orbit of a transcendental idealism that would underwrite the continuing 
identity of any text. Indeed, he stresses it, relying on argument from 1960 
of the Italian aesthetic philosopher Galvano della Volpe: ‘As della Volpe 
shows, it [a ‘true critical representation’] stands in a dialectical relationship 
to its object, which must always be a transcendental object so far as any act 
of critical perception is concerned.’11 
When McGann writes that ‘A text is a display and a record of itself, a 
fulfilment of its own instructions’ (2001: 151), he is postulating the existence 
of bibliographic and linguistic systems that he hopes to see fully specified 
in ways that the computer can rapidly analyse when, say, presented with 
printed matter for scanning. A computer-algorithmic explanation of text 
is proto-structuralist; it requires no human participation. Yet such partici-
pation is crucial for the principle of deformation, which, as we have seen, 
McGann also maintains. By this principle he means that we can have a tex-
tual idealism while at the same time all our perspectives on that text can be 
different: ‘they cannot be measured on a scale of equivalence’ to the object 
of encoding, he says. All representations of it are, therefore, a deformation.
He hangs onto his earlier rhetoric of historical explanation of actual 
(what he calls ‘determinate’) productions and readings. Yet he also, in 
Radiant Textuality, refers to ‘fields of perception and systems of conception’ 
(2001: 178). Why ‘systems’? The proto-structuralist explanation is working 
against the historical case. The effort starts to sound positivistic. Diachronic 
explanation collapses into the synchronic, and the idealism is not far away 
— as was also the case for Husserl, as Derrida famously pointed out (1973: 
50). Reinvoking the transcendental ideal is too profound a philosophical 
step, or reversion, to be based on so little. In a sense the idea of system 
has been slipped in quietly to replace the human subject as the thing that 
underwrites and engages the transcendental ideal. There is, I believe, a 
more defensible model for textuality needed here.
11  McGann 2001: 173. Della Volpe (1895-1968): his principal work in aesthetic 
philosophy was Critica del gusto (1960), transl. Michael Caesar as Critique of Taste, 
London: NLB, 1978.
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6. A Model for Textuality
When in 1994 I first criticised McGann’s idea of bibliographic and linguis-
tic codes it was because I felt the idea vaporized the writerly and readerly 
witness of the document. It converted the documentary dimension instantly 
into the encoded meaning and thus made the role of individuals in rela-
tion to it more or less irrelevant (Eggert 1994, 22-4). I find that this objection 
remains, but with a significant caveat. Since McGann’s The Textual Condition 
of 1991, on which I was then commenting, he has found ways, both concep-
tually (via his principle of deformation) and in computer-assisted practice 
(in his IVANHOE game12), of incorporating readers’ dealings with texts. But, 
as I see it, the advance is essentially only additive — i.e. what we end up 
with is system plus dealings — which explains how his position can be both 
like Renear’s and Pichler’s, realist and anti-realist, at the same time. There is 
a dilemma here that McGann’s additive approach is trying to bridge: how 
can the text have a stable identity that can be encoded, and yet be always 
different? 
Once we remove the transcendental assumption that McGann invokes, 
once we recognise what editorial theory has been pointing to in richly dif-
ferent ways now for years — i.e. the diachronic lives of texts in our lives 
— then it becomes clear that text will always be a messy affair, that our 
knowledge of it will always be partial, and all the more intriguing for that. 
But, if so, what can we point to that sufficiently stabilises a text’s identity 
so that when we indulge in one of our culture’s primary and most produc-
tive games, discussing texts, we can be sure that we are not only or merely 
discussing ourselves? 
In 1998 I first adapted an idea of Adorno’s that a negative dialectic 
between the textual and documentary dimensions can be thought of as 
underwriting the continuing identity of works and as therefore eliminat-
ing the need for McGann’s or anyone else’s idealism.13 A negative dialectic 
has no synthesis. It describes an ongoing, antithetical but interdependent 
relationship. Document, taken as the material basis of text, has, by virtue of 
its physical or computational nature, a continuing history in relation to its 
productions and its readings; any new manifestation of the negative dia-
lectic necessarily generates new sets of meanings. The work emerges only 
12  For literature on IVANHOE, see the articles cited at www.ivanhoegame.org/
wordpress/?page_id=2 [accessed 26/02/2010].
13  Eggert 1998, further adapted in Eggert 2009, chap. 10.
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as a regulative idea, the container, as it were, of the continuing dialectic. 
The ongoing existence of document is enough to link all the textual proc-
esses that are carried out under the name of the work. And bibliography is 
a technology for describing and relating allied documents. What McGann 
calls a ‘deformation’ is, from this point of view, simply another manifes-
tation of text-in-process. And editions and text-encodings are only more 
excavatory and reconstructive forms of the same basic cultural dynamic.
Historical-materialist approaches to text are typically diachronic 
whereas semiotic (or algorithmic) modes are typically synchronic. As 
modes of explanation they have little respect for one another, and while in 
process are typically intolerant of one another’s truth-telling claims. They 
tend to consume one another, to explain away one another’s capacities to 
explain. My objection to McGann’s argument is that he wants to be able to 
invoke both at the same time. But they never come together like that. They 
are constantly in real or potential conflict. As the philosophers say, they 
sublate one another over time; hence my invoking of the idea of a negative 
dialectic as a way of modelling explanations of textuality.
In Radiant Textuality McGann (2001) seemed to be seeing the princi-
ple of deformation as the next step for literary criticism. He subsequently 
employed games theory to incorporate the reader into the textual field and 
to record the resulting interactions. A paper he gave at the conference of 
the Society for Textual Scholarship in New York in 2003 substantiated this 
development. It offered a form of modelling of what texts are and do, and 
in this sense it was a prospect of things yet to come.
The computer game IVANHOE, which he developed earlier with 
Johanna Drucker at the University of Virginia, allows participants to role-
play within what he calls the discourse field of Scott’s novel. This is defined 
as including its production history and subsequent receptions; what edito-
rial theorists, following the aesthetic philosopher Roman Ingarden in the 
1930s, would call its life, including its textual evolution. None of the play-
ers of IVANHOE stands outside this life; all are role-players in it. Players 
must respond to new information claimed to be factual but which may, for 
the sake of the game, be duplicitous. Each move they make is played in the 
knowledge of the public (i.e. recorded) moves of all the other players; and 
the players keep a private log explaining each of their moves to which the 
computer itself has access and can make arbitrary moves to unsettle things.
In Radiant Textuality, McGann stresses what he calls the quantum 
effects of being always self-conscious of one’s position within the game 
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as a participant rather than an outside observer (2001).14 As I see it, the 
game models the cultural field in which all works participate. Reviewers 
normally write their reviews, and critics their later articles, in at least par-
tial knowledge of the views already expressed about the work in question, 
and about, say, what the author said in interviews on radio or television. If 
parodies of the work spring up, they themselves assume an existing knowl-
edge of the work, or at least its mediation by commentators. All are operat-
ing in the same discourse field, for the real world of texts is always in a state 
of dynamic process.15
So this line of experimental modelling of text is potentially a fruitful 
one.16 But if my account of the negative dialect between the documentary 
and textual dimensions of works is persuasive; if works are indeed in a 
process of continuous unfolding; if synchronic explanations of text are 
inevitably partial, then totalising or exhaustive schemes for text-encoding 
cannot be brought to fruition — although less ambitious schemes may, par-
ticularly if they accord with the model of textuality that I have described.
7. Stand-off Markup and Other Modest Advances
Theodor (Ted) Nelson, the original theorist of the internet, has long advo-
cated the idea of external or stand-off markup rather than loading the text-
file, as is typically done at present, with increasing amounts of interpretative 
markup subject to the same document-type definition (DTD) and therefore 
to the same hierarchy of content objects. Take XML17 files for instance. They 
mix data with data referring to the data and with data referring to itself, all 
in the same file. This is very disadvantageous for some applications. Stand-
off markup on the other hand offers a way of data-modelling and enhanc-
ing a text from multiple points of view. There is the opportunity to proceed 
with encoding what we already know about texts and to accumulate new 
knowledge about them without the worry of overlapping hierarchies, since 
14  Cf. Schreibman 2003.
15  For a case-study, see Eggert 2009, chapter 9.
16  The IVANHOE game, and also the virtual-reality environments called MOOs*, 
such as the one developed for the Romantic Circle, MOOzymandias, may ultimate-
ly yield useful information about the ways in which readers process the physical 
qualities of books. See Fraistat and Jones 2003. *MOO stands for Multi-user dimen-
sion Object Oriented. See also Schreibman 2003. 
17  Extensible Markup Language (a set of rules for encoding documents electronically).
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conflicting models need not be applied to the text simultaneously. This 
method leaves open the capacity to add layers and new kinds of interpreta-
tion that may emerge in the future. It also allows the signing of interpreta-
tive stand-off files by their creators, simplifying copyright concerns that 
the mixing of contributions within the one expanded file otherwise creates. 
While better solutions will probably emerge, we know already that the 
use of stand-off markup using a checksum algorithm can resolve the prob-
lem of guaranteeing the ongoing authenticity of any text-file that is under-
going interpretation and enhancement. In the standard paradigm — i.e. 
using in-line markup — every addition of markup to a text-file necessarily 
creates a new state of the text. Text-files can quickly become so heavily 
encoded as to be beyond human capacity to proof-read them. 
This is a problem for scholarly editions. Those who prepare them get jit-
tery if asked to depend upon, without checking, the authenticity of newly 
processed text-files. Repeated human proof-reading is, strictly speaking, 
necessary because how can the editor know whether something has not 
accidentally been changed? Scholarly editors get jittery because they know 
from ample experience of manuscript and print production the normal fate 
of texts over time that are themselves undergoing repeated acts of copying. 
In the electronic environment, intervention, correction and enhancement 
bring with them new forms of this ancient fallibility. 
The use of stand-off markup external to the text-file, applied to the text 
upon the user’s call and incorporating an authenticating checksum algo-
rithm in the act of incorporation, has emerged as one answer. Since the 
experimental JITM projects, mentioned above and reported in Berrie et al. 
2003, Eggert 2005 and Berrie et al. 2006, there has been new interest in the 
potential of stand-off markup. In From Gutenberg to Google (2006b), Peter 
Shillingsburg assumes it as a given, and it helps him to strike out in new 
directions. Peter Robinson has informed me that he intends to give stand-
off markup a significant role in foreshadowed technical developments for 
his e-editorial projects at his editorial institute in Birmingham. And as of 
late 2007 the programmers in DISCOVERY were giving the technique con-
sideration as part of the likely development of a tagging tool aimed at col-
laborative interpretation of text-files within an RDF (Resource Description 
Framework) environment.
I mention these developments only to point to what I see as the emer-
gence of a less totalising alternative to the structural one that underlies one 
side of Jerome McGann’s thinking in Radiant Textuality. These developments 
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lean, without toppling, towards the opposite, deformative side of his think-
ing. While one has to admit that all interpretation is an appropriation, a 
collaborative working environment for interpretation is surely preferable if 
it lets scholars hang on to what has been hard won: reliable transcriptions 
of the versions of literary works, and thoughtful rounds of emendation 
and interpretation. The interpretative files (or ‘tagsets’) created by schol-
ars need to be accessible as a gradually evolving tradition of commentary 
and scholarship. This methodological requirement, familiar from the print 
environment, will not go away because of a change in medium. Scholarly 
agreement and disagreement need to be explicitly enabled in an environment 
where the commentaries are themselves authenticated i.e. electronically 
signed and dated and thus essentially anchored in their own tradition and 
history, rather than being free-floating and changeable, able to be deformed 
by others at will.
Of course, McGann’s deformation is in spirit a ludic methodology 
designed to open up critical and interpretative possibilities, so David 
Hoover’s censoriousness seems to me at moments to mistake its target. But 
his implicit question: ‘Is life long enough to entertain open-ended possibili-
ties?’ answers itself with a confident no. This is partly because scholarship 
is basically collaborative. It needs to be in relation to something shared. It is 
a conversation over time about an abiding something. Interpretation of that 
something calls out counter-interpretation. Error calls out correction. But 
unless all of the participants can continually refer to the documents that 
carry the texts under investigation, their remarks will pass one another by 
without ever meeting. To play the fool with the documentary-textual con-
tinuum definitely creates more instantiations of it, just as treating it seri-
ously does. But some instantiations are going to be more productive, more 
enlightening than others. Finally, the criterion has to be pragmatic, and I 
mean this in C. S. Peirce’s sense of the word.
If this is the modest direction that electronic-edition development is 
going to go, will the medium ever supersede the printed book? Even in its 
scholarly forms the book is reasonably compact, sometimes cheap, often 
expensive but not ruinously so. And it has developed ingenious ways of 
condensing multitudes of evidence in tables, footnotes and cross-refer-
enced textual apparatus. The fact of looming publication brings out heroic 
efforts on the part of the scholarly editor to finalise and complete the com-
plex task — to get it done — thus answering to an all-too-human desire and 
capacity. And, as Peter Robinson points out, the printed scholarly edition 
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filters out the surplus of information typical of electronic editions to date, 
an overload that readers cannot deal with profitably anyway. 
Robinson and Shillingsburg have given the best answers to date as to 
the conditions under which the electronic edition will be able to supersede 
the printed book. Both concur with an argument of mine (Eggert 2005): that 
we will get to the new phase only when editors stop treating the electronic 
edition as something that they must keep jealously under their control, let-
ting users consult but not re-build. Robinson’s projects have so far been in 
this mould. His recent system ANASTASIA gives impressive functionality 
in its engine room, and impressive displays on its interface. But editions 
based on it are hard to reissue in a revised form when errors are detected in 
so complex an array of cross-referencing files. Worse, the whole wonderful 
thing depends to a dangerous extent on the welfare of its creator. Everyone 
worries how long the editions that depend on ANASTASIA would remain 
fully functional should Robinson happen to go under the proverbial bus.
Perhaps he worries too. His new emphasis is on distributed servers, 
each giving access to whatever materials relevant to an edition have been 
lodged on those servers prepared by various scholars or other individuals. 
Editions must henceforth be interactive, he says and in this he joins hands 
with Shillingsburg. He imagines Web 2.0 (and presumably semantic-web) 
capabilities gradually learning to predict the reader’s needs, automatically 
finding, on other servers around the world, equivalent passages to, or rel-
evant commentaries on, the lines of text that the reader is currently viewing. 
The hope is that, when relevant images, transcriptions, collations and com-
mentaries automatically appear to gather themselves into our working or 
reading environment, editors will find the advantage compelling and will 
forsake the book. Readers will forsake it too, as soon as the web gives them 
a better experience. But we are not there yet, despite all the extravagant 
predictions about the imminent supersession of the book that were made 
in the early 1990s.
Is there an archival problem from this scattering of textual resources 
that Robinson predicts? My sense is: not as long as computers exist. Bits 
are tenacious creatures, probably more so than books, and they are very 
easily transferred. The digital resources of which I speak will achieve a 
permanent, effectively archival foothold purely through their wide distri-
bution and use. Regathering them at the moment of reading in a relevant 
and authenticated form, and allowing interested parties to make further 
enhancements, is the challenge. 
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Common encoding standards and, as Robinson argues, agreed address-
ing protocols that ensure that exactly the same text fragment is being ref-
erenced, are required to make this happen (2007b).18 Of course we still 
lack many of the basic tools. But this vision of a common, interactive 
type of scholarship and readership that democratically puts the reader 
in a box-seat while also empowering the scholar to make and sign more 
expert editions, doing much of the discovery work for us, is a very attrac-
tive prospect. 
We should not fear the barbarians entering the gates of the scholarly 
city. They have usually got less arduous things to do anyway, and even 
when they do decide to interfere (as in contentious passages from books 
of the Bible whose wordings they object to) or even if they are empowered 
to make their own editions, my response is: Let them! Existing scholarly 
protocols of assessment and refereeing will doubtless be adapted to sort 
the electronic sheep from the goats. Authentication routines will keep the 
scholarly transcriptions safe, and when emendations are proposed by other 
scholars we should be able to provide keys that securely link the emending 
file to the target edited text-file, with permissions or refusals to emend built 
in. Stand-off interpretative files written for the original edited text should 
be able to be applied to the emended one once authentication routines or 
signed files with appropriate keys become easily available.19
Peter Shillingsburg’s emphasis on modularity is important here (2006b: 
80-125). He usefully lists everything that a well-constructed and adequately 
populated electronic edition should contain: all of the textual, contextual 
and facsimile materials, the receptions and adaptations. It is perhaps best 
to think of this as a wish-list. To achieve it, the editorial team will in practice 
18  In his unpublished paper, ‘A Specifi cation towards Distributed Editions’ 
(2007c), Robinson proposes some new TEI attributes and authoritative addressing 
protocols for different versions of the same work. The Functional Requirements for 
Bibliographic Records standard should assist with the addressing. FRBR defines 
a descending hierarchy of Work, Manifestation, Expression, Item, with adapta-
tions treated as separate works but linked at the level of subject matter. FRBR’s first 
large-scale implementation was the AustLit database (www.austlit.edu.au): RDF 
and Topic Maps enmesh all instances of the fundamental concepts of agent (author, 
publisher etc.) and work into a spider’s web of relationships that themselves effec-
tively define the agent or work rather than treating each one as a self-identical entity, 
robustly separate from all other agents and works. 
19  JITM (the development of which ceased in 2005) was a step in that direction. 
Its system degrades gracefully. Markup written for text elements that are subse-
quently emended cease to authenticate those text elements when applied to them, 
but the remainder continue to be functional: see citations in n. 1, above.
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inhabit what I have called the ‘work-site’ or what Shillingsburg calls the 
‘knowledge site’. Whatever we call it, the activities on that site will be the 
same: those of preparing, gathering, encoding, comparing, presenting and 
interpreting materials relevant to the work being edited. All this will be 
happening on a site on the internet. Equally, elsewhere, any number of 
other people not engaged in building the specific work-site, could be seri-
ously or playfully or merely curiously handling copies of the same files at 
the same time. The work-site will be merely a more focussed and serious 
arena using the same — or mostly the same — materials. I say mostly the 
same, because the dragon of copyright is always at the gates, limiting the 
textual work we might do, limiting the free play that readers might other-
wise have.
Since its editor-constructors will have inheritors or adapters or popular 
re-users, the work-site will, or ought to, consist of modules — materials and 
tools — that are individually reusable and repurposable, rather than for-
ever locked together refusing entry to users. This imperative, about which 
Shillingsburg is persuasive, has to find a balance with the scholarly needs 
for textual authenticity, for precise citation of an ongoing tradition of inter-
pretative commentary and, as Robinson points out, for precise addressing 
of the text fragments under discussion. 
As I see it, the work-site will grow gradually by accretion, not by means 
of a grand scheme to enunciate the complete range of linguistic and bib-
liographic codes. It is virtually certain that the capacities of the compu-
ter to learn from our inquiries will bring to our attention information and 
materials for which we would never have thought to look. The computer’s 
use of inferential logic, especially when assisted by formalised models and 
ontologies, and its capacity to compare files and to enable their collabora-
tive enhancement, will multiply our knowledge. In these ways it will help 
us to build work-sites. It will allow us to understand works differently and 
anew. Its slow growth will reflect our gradual accumulation of knowledge 
about texts.
8. Conclusion
How, finally, does this vision of the future sit with the theoretical rela-
tionship between the documentary and textual dimensions sketched 
above? The material basis of electronic texts is obviously their computing 
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environment, just as that of printed texts is the printshop. The routines of 
both environments affect the storage, processing and generation of texts. 
We become aware of this only when we refuse to naturalise the format and 
environment, when we stop to think about them. 
I have referred easily and casually to texts being generated or visual-
ised on screen. But in truth what we call a text on a computer screen is not 
a text: it is a computer artefact, an encoding and visualising of a binary 
flow of data, just as ink on a page is not a text till the material medium 
can be understood to be a document; or not, as in the case of the Scribbly 
Gum. For working purposes, because it simplifies matters, we normally 
agree to call a particular computer file visualised on screen a text. But as 
I hope I have shown, computers cannot strictly actualise texts — that is a 
human accomplishment — but they can process, manipulate and visualise 
bits with astonishing speed, often illuminating results and can allow cheap 
worldwide distribution. For this, all book readers will eventually be grate-
ful, even if they are not now.
9. ‘I Read the News Today, 
Oh Boy!’1: Newspaper 
Publishing in the Online 
World
Marilyn Deegan and Kathryn Sutherland
1. News Media Inherited and in Flux
The desire to receive and impart news is part of our social fabric: we all 
want to know ‘what’s new?’ or ‘what’s up?’ with our friends, families, or 
neighbours; as well as what is happening on a local, national, or interna-
tional scale. As Mitchell Stephens (1990) observes, ‘the frenzied, obsessive 
exchange of news is one of the oldest human activities’. News is also infor-
mation with a time stamp: if it is not new, it is not news but something else. 
The oldest form of news is oral: word of mouth, which, before the advent 
of electronic media, could be conveyed only as fast as the fastest form of 
transport. Even before mechanization, this could be fast, and the stuff of 
legends: Pheidippides’ two-day run in 490 BC from Marathon to Sparta 
(150 miles) to bring news of the Persian attack; the ride of Paul Revere, in 
the American War of Independence, to alert his compatriots that the British 
Redcoats were on the march. Jungle drums, smoke signals, yodelling have 
all been used over time and in different societies to communicate news 
faster than the human body; in recent ages, better roads, trains, and boats 
have accelerated word-of-mouth communication. The complexities of pro-
duction and delivery processes mean that newspapers cannot, and never 
1  The first line of the Beatles’s song ‘A Day in the Life’, written by John Lennon 
and Paul McCartney; released in 1967 as the final track of the album Sgt. Pepper’s 
Lonely Hearts Club Band.
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could, compete with the speed with which individual items of news can be 
delivered by direct means. Where newspapers excel is in the comprehen-
siveness, variety, and range of their content, in the expansiveness of their 
comment on events and current affairs, and in their low cost, convenience, 
and portability. It is many decades since anyone relied upon newspapers 
for the football results, but sports pages remain hugely popular in all gen-
eral daily and weekly newspapers, with football the most popular sport, 
and readers almost as eager for opinion, comment, nuance, gossip and 
even bias, as they are for the bare news. Though the advent of the telegraph 
in the nineteenth century (the first technology to convey news and informa-
tion across vast distances instantaneously) and of radio and television in 
the twentieth century changed news reporting, they have not yet obviated 
the need for newspapers.
Periodical newsbooks, the ancestor of the modern newspaper, appeared 
in England in the 1620s, while London newspapers became widely availa-
ble throughout the country during the course of the eighteenth century. For 
the last 200 years newspapers, magazines, and journals have been among 
the most widely and regularly consumed and the most influential print 
objects. Over this time, newspapers have been the threshold for our adult 
relationship to print, the basic tool of our literacy that we all aspire to: peo-
ple who never read anything else will read newspapers. It is estimated that 
some 500 million newspapers are sold every day worldwide, though their 
circulation is likely to be much higher than this, with papers passed around 
within the home, the workplace, and other public spaces. In regions where 
literacy levels are low, the literate will read newspapers aloud to the illiter-
ate. At the same time, printed news has always shared porous boundaries 
with other, higher literary forms: poetry, fiction, and criticism have regu-
larly found a place, and often a first articulation, in the columns of a daily 
or weekly paper. In the newspaper, and its allied forms the journal and 
periodical, distinctions between high and low culture that might operate 
elsewhere have conventionally broken down under the pressure of vari-
ety in voice and subject, but also in authority: a common editorial practice 
dating back to the eighteenth century was the collapse of the writer-reader 
distinction in letters and opinions pages. Newspapers can thus claim to 
represent the demotic reach of the printed word: we all read or, perhaps, 
we must now say we all used to read news. 
Over the same 200 year period, the newspaper industry has been at the 
frontier of technological innovation. It is important to register the inter-
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connectedness of the two phenomena — the mass appeal of newspapers 
and technical development — because the one fuelled the other. It was 
the offices of the London Times, not of some book-industry entrepreneur 
(though such existed) that installed in 1814 the first steam-driven press 
for commercial use. The book trade, generally untroubled by the need to 
produce long high-speed print runs, lagged comfortably behind by several 
decades. By 1816 press production on The Times accelerated from 250 to 900 
perfected sheets an hour. It is difficult to overestimate the consequences of 
such growth: the high-circulation newspaper and a mass-reading public 
together represented an explosive information alliance. A repository of cur-
rent events and organ of opinions, the newspaper’s regular punctuation of 
the working week and its centralizing overview formatted its readership, 
for good or ill, as a collective consciousness; both were the direct conse-
quence of steam-power. The last twenty years have seen similar momen-
tous technological and distributive change, and equally momentous shifts 
in how we relate to news. Change began in the 1980s with the move to an 
almost totally electronic workflow, in which production processes — from 
submission of copy, editing and typesetting, to page composition — were 
streamlined. Though constituting a major high-cost investment, this switch 
was practically invisible to the readership because the final product was 
still a printed paper. But electronic production meant that the industry 
was poised to move relatively rapidly into electronic delivery of various 
kinds; for example, e-papers are derived from the same files as those for 
the printed paper. The whole point of a paper, especially a daily, is that it 
reacts fast to news and new developments; it stays ahead of the competi-
tion or its sales wither. The pursuit of the scoop, the exclusive interview, the 
fastest breaking news are all aimed at outwitting rival papers, stimulating 
the readership and keeping circulation up, generating advertising revenue, 
and making money. If one paper implements a new feature, others soon fol-
low. But currently the fear is that the Internet is changing reading and com-
munication habits, and with them newspaper production and consump-
tion, beyond all recognition, to the point where some fear newspapers as 
printed products may soon be a thing of the past.
The developed world has seen a slow but steady decline in printed news-
paper production in the last ten years, though over the same time span some 
countries in the developing world have experienced an equivalent upsurge. 
Declining circulation is not the consequence of a diminished hunger for 
news but of a rapid increase in different sources of news, in particular online 
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sources, and in the availability of portable devices, such as mobile phones, 
to which news can be delivered directly. The driving factor for these recent 
developments is the Internet: the pervasiveness of broadband connections, 
the increased capacity of processors, and improving quality of screens on 
desktop and mobile devices mean that the Internet is fast becoming the 
medium of choice for news and information. Some of this news and infor-
mation is supplied by the traditional public and commercial broadcasting 
and publishing organizations, which have diversified their operations and 
established an online presence, but the new technologies have also ushered 
in a huge increase in alternative providers. There is a predictable demo-
graphic division in this narrative of changing news access, with younger age 
groups turning to the Internet more regularly for news than older. 
The key to the health or otherwise of newspapers is of course econom-
ics; they are hugely profitable and many fortunes have been built in news-
paper publishing over the last 200 years. They are also hugely expensive 
enterprises. Indeed, the cost of newsprint is so high that the cover price 
does not even pay for the paper the news is printed on. Content, journal-
ism, analysis, comment, etc, are all funded from advertising revenues; if 
these revenues decline, corners must be cut. Since the mid-1990s and the 
early days of the Web, most major national newspapers throughout the 
world have established a serious online presence, delivering a version of 
the daily paper together with other enhancements such as audio versions, 
blogs, and premium content for subscribers. Initially, such web sites acted 
as little more than trailers for print. For example, the WayBackMachine, 
the Internet Archive’s access point for archived web sites,2 has a version of 
The Guardian newspaper’s web site from 5 November 1996, referred to as 
‘a jumping off point for Guardian web projects’. The interface is plain, and 
the content a greatly curtailed version of the paper. The Guardian launched 
its full news site, Guardian Unlimited, three years later in 1999, by which 
time it had developed from a print ‘taster’ into a digital repurposing of the 
print object; far more extensive than its 1996 e-presence, it incorporated, 
for instance, a ‘Breaking news’ facility updated throughout the day. By 
2003/2004, Guardian Unlimited was Britain’s second most visited news site, 
after the BBC. Its print newspaper, a serious, left-of-centre broadsheet, then 
had a circulation under 400,000, but Guardian Unlimited had 7.5 million 
unique visitors per month, 2 million of those from overseas; it now reaches 
12 million readers each month. 
2  The Internet Archive  http://www.archive.org [accessed 8/10/2007].
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Online sites are highly successful, clearly achieving the market penetra-
tion (for advertisers) and user satisfaction (for readers) they seek. They are 
largely free to readers and these days most do not even require registra-
tion. Revenue comes, as it long has with printed news, from advertising 
(with such massive hit rates they are hugely attractive display cases) and 
from charging for premium services like the daily crossword. In the case of 
Guardian Unlimited, readers can also opt for an ad-free site for only £20 per 
year. The impetus for creating a strong online presence for newspapers is 
partly visibility and partly falling print sales, especially during the working 
week. In common with other newspapers, The Guardian and its Sunday sib-
ling, The Observer, see an upturn in paper sales for weekend editions, when 
readers have more leisure to peruse comment, analysis, reviews, and all the 
other supplementary materials. 
How do we classify online versions of newspapers? They share visual 
features with the printed product — banner and layout — though con-
trary to print, they all use sanserif typefaces. But they also share visual and 
structural characteristics with news sites that do not have a print counter-
part: BBC, CNN, Fox News, Yahoo News, for example. They are hybrids, 
clearly related to their parent printed publications but because material 
is not bounded by the confines of the physical page, whether broadsheet 
or tabloid, stories can be longer; in some cases items are published online 
when space constraints dictate they do not make it into the print paper. 
Conversely, if the information supplied by online news sources may be 
‘unlimited’, only a fraction of it is visible; by contrast, a five-minute scan 
of the whole edition of the print version can give a good overview of what 
is available. Once the workflow was electronic and text for newspapers 
was marked up in some form of SGML3 (originally for print purposes) 
it could be directed down two different channels with little extra cost in 
terms of finance or time. The next step is a decoupling of print and online 
versions: they are clearly related products, share the same copy and simi-
lar design, but they are not two manifestations of the same thing. Unlike 
print, online news can be updated throughout the day, so it begins to be 
a news site, not a newspaper. Another way to think about the relation-
ship might be to invoke the ‘Stop Press’ column, that small section once a 
regular feature of twentieth-century newspapers, by convention reserved 
on the front page of a paper issue for very late or breaking news items. 
3  SGML, or Standard Generalized Markup Language, is a standard for how to 
specify a document markup language (which indicates a document’s structure and 
other attributes).
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Though now discarded from print, what online papers permit is the bur-
geoning of ‘Stop Press’ into a leading characteristic of news delivery and 
a further refinement of the underlying principle that news is information 
with a time stamp. 
Besides offering an online edition of a newspaper, a large number of 
titles now also offer ‘e-papers’, also called ‘digital papers’ or ‘smart edi-
tions’. These are surrogate newspapers with all the presentational fea-
tures of print, but available online for viewing or printing. Full pages are 
displayed in single- or double-page view, and individual features can be 
magnified (zoomed) for reading. All the various supplements and maga-
zines are available as with the printed version, and a number of e-tools 
are provided — searching, bookmarking, and ‘smart’ navigation. But this 
digital paper is (largely) identical to its paper form, costs more for access 
to the same information, and is not updated as regularly as online news. 
It is difficult to know what to make of e-papers. Do they represent a fail-
ure of confidence, a temporary blip in digital progress? They purposefully 
recouple what online delivery decouples – digital and paper characteristics 
–  and from the technological point of view they make little sense. But they 
do make limited economic sense in terms of an overseas market anxious 
to replicate some of the comforts of paper while avoiding the freightage 
costs of the real thing. British daily newspapers cost around three euros 
throughout Europe, and weekend newspapers up to five euros, but a one-
off payment of £1.50 (at the time of writing, around 2.20 euros) will give 
24-hours of electronic access to the last thirteen issues of The Guardian and 
the last four issues of The Observer. Thus British e-papers are currently tar-
geted at an expatriate rather than a home audience. The Guardian group, for 
example, states: 
Now you can read the Guardian and the Observer anywhere in the world, 
just as we do in the UK. Page by page. Picture by picture. Exactly as it 
appears in print.4 
What the e-paper claims to offer is a newspaper reading experience as close 
as possible to that of a print edition from a traditional source; what it does 
not offer is up-to-the minute electronic currency, as generally only one edi-
tion is available per day. 
The difference between an online newspaper and an e-paper seems to 
be the degree to which the one publication is customized to the latitude of 
the online environment and the other simulates the print object. The two 
4  http://www.guardian.co.uk/digitaledition/subscribe [accessed 8/10/2007].
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e-forms represent an uneasy accommodation — to the old technology, to 
the new, and to each other. E-papers are a back-formation, after the devel-
opment of online news sites, and represent, however bizarrely given their 
electronic delivery, a nostalgia for paper and print. David Crow, writing in 
The Business, suggests that: 
while newspaper websites are constantly improving, some customers dis-
like viewing content online and miss the feel and design of the printed prod-
uct (Crow 2007).
With this particular print object, the familiar formula may be as valuable 
as the content it carries; or as Harold Evans, a former editor of The Sunday 
Times and The Times, pointed out in his 1973 book Newspaper Design, ‘the 
design cannot be separated from the product. The format, the typography 
and the printing are as integral a part of a newspaper as the words’ (McKit-
terick 2002: 7). This is a point worth dwelling on: much of any newspaper’s 
significance or message has long been acknowledged to lie in its form; form 
has always played a constitutive role in structuring content and guiding the 
reader’s interpretation. We need only think of paper size (tabloid or broad-
sheet), the ordering and layout of an article on the page, the mix of font sizes, 
width of columns, and the interposition of photographs in the text block, to 
realize how rich in connotation such visual signals are — far richer and far 
louder than the visual signals incorporated in other common print objects, 
like novels, for instance.5 To confuse things further, some online newspapers 
now offer a print version as a kind of crossover between the two digital for-
mats, giving readers the chance to print off a PDF of a section with stories 
updated all day. The Guardian, for example, announces the G24 service with 
the invitation ‘Print your own PDF’.6 There are five PDFs to choose from: 
Top stories, World, Media, Business, and Sport. The Daily Telegraph, whose 
stated aim is the creation of a ‘digital universe, without distinction between 
print, podcast or pdf’ produced TelegraphPM (described as ‘your multimedia 
afternoon newspaper’) in September 2006. It was made available at 4.00pm 
and updated at 5.30pm, and offered a 10-page digest to be downloaded as a 
PDF; the reader was encouraged to, ‘Read it on screen or print it out to read 
on the way home.’ This was discontinued as a daily service in January 2008.
These examples would seem to indicate that, just as early printed books 
simulated features of manuscript copies, in moving from a print to an 
5  For a recent example, see the comments accompanying The Guard-
ian’s redesign in 2005 in Berliner format, http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguard-
ian/0,16390,1552451,00.html [accessed 8/10/2007].
6  http://www.guardian.co.uk/g24 [accessed 8/3/2010].
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online world we too are reluctant to lose functions familiar to us from the 
older technology, even though in this case the shift is larger, and the fit 
between the old and new technologies less evident. News publishers, tra-
ditionally in the vanguard of print developments, may be taking advantage 
of new possibilities, but they are also hedging their bets. This is particularly 
true when it comes to evaluating the look of a site in relation to its func-
tionality: should online news sites look like web sites or like print papers? 
Which will ultimately have the greater appeal to the customer? How do 
we assess the intermediate forms, which mimic closely the printed object 
onscreen, in some cases even trying to reproduce the experience of ana-
logue interaction by offering a 3-D-like appearance of the ‘original’ with 
facilities such as page-turning. Anyone using digital page-turning devices 
will soon find that they do not perform well in moving from one part of a 
digital text to another; false imports, intended to make us feel comfortable 
in the new environment, they actually impede our naturalization within it. 
By contrast, in the digitization of historic newspapers, a close simulacrum 
of the printed paper is a huge advantage to a sense of the real value of the 
object in its social and cultural time. 
If in newspaper publishing we are currently witnessing a gradual 
decoupling of news from paper and print, with hybrid signs of both experi-
ment and formal nostalgia along the way, there is an undeniable significant 
collateral benefit of electronic technology — aggregation. To achieve econo-
mies of scale in the digitization of news, the same underlying software is 
used to present, in aggregation, all the titles licensed by a single supplier. 
NewsPaperDirect, a key supplier, has created an integrated solution to the 
availability of newspapers for worldwide access. The company offers (as of 
April 2008) 650 newspapers from 77 countries in 37 languages, including 
many of the world’s most-read dailies and weeklies, in the form of e-papers 
or printed papers through a print-on-demand service and using a browser 
called PressDisplay which claims to be ‘redefining the reading experience’. 
This has increased from 470 titles in just a year. The front page of PressDis-
play can be customized in a variety of ways to operate across a number of 
titles or chosen subsets of titles simultaneously, allowing the user to per-
sonalize the view of any particular paper and make comparisons across a 
range of publications, by title, country, language, or author. This means that 
several news titles can be cross-searched from one screen and search hits 
from different titles can be merged and listed together in order of relevance 
rather than by individual title. The benefit to the reader is in comparative 
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searching of different versions of the same news item. Since searching and 
the list of hits is usually free, the benefit to the papers themselves or to 
the aggregators is collateral in as much as it leads people to more content 
that they will then spend money on. The sites make their money through 
recoupling, that is, print on demand of individual issues. By contrast, one 
of the disadvantages of many individual online news offerings is the disag-
gregated or ‘silo’ approach to information, in which it is possible to burrow 
deep into one resource, but difficult to move across to another and look at 
the same topic from a different perspective. (But see below the discussion 
on RSS feeds and personalization of news for further exploration of these 
issues). 
Over five hundred years, the textual desires of literate societies have 
taken shape as print. We are now transferring what seems to us best about 
print into the digital realm and the online environment, at the same time as 
we are learning to accommodate the new things we believe the new tech-
nologies do best. There is a view that technology is something that does 
not work yet; or, put another way, nobody recognizes as technology those 
devices we take for granted, like books, alphabets, wheels. Current com-
puter and communication technologies offer storage and retrieval, search-
ability and interconnectedness; but the price we pay is an expensive, cum-
bersome, and unreliable machine interposed between reader/writer and 
text. Print offers portability and cheapness, as well as a seemingly ‘direct’ 
experience. There are still, and there may always be, some things that 
paper does best: the access mechanism of the codex book in the hands of an 
experienced reader, for instance, can offer faster retrieval of known infor-
mation than a computer. In the case of newspapers, the page is a highly 
sophisticated and evolved piece of design, offering fitness of purpose as 
well as ease of use. The screen-page assembled for paper printing does not 
yet work as well; on the other hand, a great deal of ingenuity and expen-
sive software development have gone some way towards producing digital 
solutions which are surprisingly successful for both current and historic 
newspapers. Where e-papers score over online papers is in their translation 
into something just like the day’s newspaper; where online papers excel 
is in their currency. Online news can be updated as the day goes on and 
as a story breaks, and it is interactive: through blogs and comment forms, 
readers can have their say and engage in a dialogue with journalists and 
other readers. The difference in e-papers and online papers actually comes 
down to how each handles the logical units that make up a complex textual 
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object like a newspaper. These logical units are articles, ads, pictures, etc., 
which are mapped onto physical structures such as pages or pixels. When 
the page is the physical structure, this has a fixity that the pixel lacks, being 
an electrical phenomenon. In the case of e-papers, the fixed page composi-
tion is a delivery decision, not a physical necessity. With online papers, the 
logical units are delivered in ways that suit the electronic medium, though 
they may continue to share some design features with their paper or paper-
like siblings: type design, banner, etc. The advantage of the logical unit 
unbound from a page is that it can be delivered in different ways to differ-
ent devices (including paper). The reader can opt to personalize the news 
and have it delivered to computer screen, mobile phone, MP3 player, and 
other handheld devices. Currently, the disadvantage of the unbound pixel-
lated news unit is the doubtful status of the long-term reliability and pres-
ervation of its information, given the frequency with which that informa-
tion is updated. What, in this new world is the paper of record? Probably 
the printed paper still. 
2. New Forms, Ideas and Functions of News
While strategies for decoupling and recoupling content from and to a paper 
vehicle still shape many of the ways in which we interact with news, there 
are other areas where the formal properties and the idea of paper have dis-
appeared completely, and where news is genuinely paperless. Google News, 
for example, currently aggregates 4,500 news sources in English (of many 
different kinds) for searching or browsing, with a front page which can be 
customized according to interest. Google News is also available in other 
languages, including all the major European languages, Arabic, Hebrew, 
Chinese, Japanese, and Korean, where several thousand more news sources 
are aggregated. The news in all languages is updated continuously, and is 
computer-generated from these thousands of sources. Google News groups 
similar stories together displaying them according to each reader’s person-
alized interests; links are offered to several versions of every story, permit-
ting the reader to choose by topic and version of topic. Articles are selected 
and ranked by computers which evaluate, among other things, how often 
and on what sites a story appears online. As a result, Google claims that 
news stories are sorted without regard to political viewpoint or ideology. If 
the claim appears disingenuous — there can, after all, be no such thing as 
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a neutral perspective on news; the choice of sources to search itself deter-
mines a viewpoint — Google’s declared neutrality is particularly ironic in 
light of the agreement they reached to help the communist government in 
China block access to websites containing politically sensitive content (i.e. 
references to the Tiananmen Square massacre and criticism of the politburo) 
(Watts 2006) — a move which Google later admitted had caused the com-
pany’s reputation damage in the United States and Europe (Martinson 2007).
Where Google makes a parade of its aggregated non-bias, there are highly 
influential paperless sites which are openly and vehemently partisan and 
politically-driven. The Drudge Report began as an email newsletter and has, 
since its inception in 1994, become one of the most powerful media influ-
ences in American politics. The plain and functional website, drudgereport.
com, has received an estimated four billion hits in the last twelve months 
and is regarded by many as the first port of call for breaking news. Matt 
Drudge and his army of informants trawl television and the Internet for 
rumours and stories which are posted as headlines on the site. Mostly, these 
are direct links to traditional news sites, though Drudge sometimes writes 
the stories himself: in 1998 he was the first to break news about Monica 
Lewinsky, and in 2008 broke the news that the UK’s Prince Harry was on 
the front line with troops in Afghanistan. According to Naughton (2006), 
many of his critics, especially those on the left, ‘view his reportage as biased 
towards conservatives, careless, malicious and frequently prone to error’; 
but also, he has been hailed (by Camille Paglia) as ‘the kind of bold, entre-
preneurial, free-wheeling, information-oriented outsider we need more of 
in this country [USA]’ (quoted in Naughton 2006). Whatever one’s view, 
Drudge’s importance in the American news arena is undisputed.
Salon.com is an influential and successful online-only news magazine, 
describing itself as a ‘smart tabloid’. It prides itself on its provision of origi-
nal, professional-standard media content over the Internet. Started by jour-
nalists in San Francisco in 1995, it had its origins in a newspaper strike: 
When the San Francisco Examiner was shut for a couple of weeks in 1994 
a few of its journalists taught themselves HTML and had a go at doing a 
newspaper with new technology. They found the experience liberating, 
and David Talbot, the Examiner’s arts editor, subsequently gave up his job 
and launched the kind of online paper he had always wanted to work for 
(Naughton 2006).
Salon attracts contributions from a wide range of well-known American 
writers and journalists, including Camille Paglia and Arianna Huffington. 
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Its name, borrowing associations from the regulated intellectual and con-
versational space of French Enlightenment salon society, reflects its policy 
of linking professional contributors with readers; and Salon has established 
two extensive discussion board communities, available only to subscribers: 
Salon Table Talk and The WELL. Since 2005, comments on editorial stories 
are open to all readers. The publication is strong on news and opinion, and 
claims to feature:
some of the most in-depth and hard-hitting political coverage found any-
where, as well as breaking news, investigative journalism and commentary, 
and interviews with newsmakers, politicians and pundits. The War Room is 
updated throughout the day with breaking news.7
Salon is popular and successful, but without major commercial sponsors 
has always had a precarious financial basis. 
Salon is a good halfway point between different modes of publication 
and aggregation in the mainline news industry, and less conventional pub-
lications available only online. There are other sites with the specific brief 
of reporting news outside the mainstream. One such is OhmyNews Inter-
national, which has the tagline: All The News That’s Fit to Share With You.8 
Founded in South Korea in 2000 ‘after decades of authoritarian rule had left 
the South Korean media deeply co-opted’ (Grossman 2006), and initially 
available only in Korean, OhmyNews is ‘Part blog, part professional news 
agency’ and ‘gets up to 70% of its copy from some 38,000 ‘citizen reporters’ 
[…] basically anyone with a story and a laptop to write it on’ (McIntyre 
2005). An English language version was launched in 2004, and OhmyNews 
now claims to have, besides its army of Korean reporters, 1,300 citizen 
reporters in over 100 countries outside Korea. It also has around twenty 
‘featured writers’, information professionals and free-lancers, contributing 
quality content on a regular basis. OhmyNews publishes about 150 stories 
and gets one to one-and-a-half million page hits a day. Contributions are 
edited and fact-checked by professional editors to filter out inaccuracies 
and potentially libellous claims. If a contribution is deemed extra-news-
worthy, the editors give it a higher billing and a token $20 fee. OhmyNews 
is now one of Korea’s most powerful media outlets, credited with influenc-
ing the outcome of the last Korean presidential election (McIntyre 2005).
As a concept, citizen journalism (sometimes also known as participatory 
journalism, grassroots journalism or public journalism) is difficult to define. 
7   http://www.salon.com/press/fact/ [accessed 8/10/2007, 08.50 GMT].
8  OhMyNews International  http://english.ohmynews.com [accessed 8/10/2007].
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The boundary with professional journalism can be fuzzy, but it seems to 
marry the role of reader and writer in the news arena. In Korea, citizen 
journalism is a response to a deeply compromised professional media sec-
tor; it works less well where the mainstream product is trusted. Audience 
participation in mainline news media has, in the analogue world, hitherto 
been limited by the technology to readers’, listeners’ or viewers’ letters, and 
radio and television phone-ins. On the Internet, the technical barriers and 
costs of making available material contributed by the public are slight, and 
people’s desire to participate is considerable, so blogs and reader comment 
facilities attached to news sites are well used. This is not journalism, but 
once the boundaries between news and opinion producer, and consumer 
become less fixed, the parameters of what is and is not journalism change. A 
general feature of paperless news is the erosion of the paper-based notion of 
an expert editorial team selecting and directing news and opinion to reader-
ships whose identities are, in some senses, group-constituted by the paper 
they read. This model now comes under pressure from informed users who 
interact with sophisticated tools and services provided by news suppliers 
(which may be online papers or paperless aggregated systems) to generate, 
and on occasion to respond to and initiate, news as a more personally or 
locally tailored service. This is potentially a momentous shift in the newspa-
per’s function — from mass collective identification to mass individuation. 
The Fort Myers News-Press in Florida, owned by Gannett, the world’s 
largest newspaper chain and owners of USA Today, is experimenting in the 
redefinition of newspapers in direct response to lost readership and rev-
enue to the Internet and other new media. Their solution is radical: ‘the 
chain’s papers are redirecting their newsrooms to focus on the Web first, 
paper second. Papers are slashing national and foreign coverage and beef-
ing up ‘hyper-local,’ street-by-street news.’ (Ahrens 2006). This news is pro-
vided by mobile journalists, or mojos, out on the streets every day looking 
for local stories, backed up by dozens of ‘reader experts’ who review docu-
ments and data on local issues and produce reports. Gannett has coined the 
term ‘crowdsourcing’ to describe this kind of outsourced journalism. This 
initiative is actually a return to an earlier mode of journalism, dying out 
because it was too labour-intensive and costly: by enlisting amateur, and 
therefore cheaper, assistance news publishers are effectively reinstating the 
local roving reporter.
The greatest costs in running a news source are editorial. Serious, in-
depth, investigative journalism and professional editing do not come cheap, 
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and many publications have been cutting their editorial costs as revenues 
decline. As Andrew Marr pointed out, in an article in which a number of 
media professionals gave their views on the future of news, there is a huge 
increase in the sources of news, but most of the actual information is recy-
cled; there is not much more new reporting:
Although there’s an enormous amount of online news-related material, if 
you analyse it, very, very little is actually new fact, new information - it’s 
almost all parasitic journalism carried out either by broadcasters or news-
papers […] what you have not got, obviously, is a new source of original 
proper journalism, because that costs money and someone has to pay for it 
(quoted in Burrell 2006).
According to The Economist, the decline in ‘proper’ journalism is a conse-
quence of dwindling newspaper revenues in the face of stiff competition 
from the new media. Its current policy is to take a middle view on citizen 
journalism: it welcomes the opening up of ‘the closed world of professional 
editors and reporters to anyone with a keyboard and an internet connec-
tion’ and cites a number of cases where bloggers and citizen journalists 
have called attention to critical issues; but it argues that for ‘hard news’ 
reporting, as opposed to comment, their contribution is limited (Leader, 
The Economist, 20069). Citizen journalists are outside the mainstream and 
often untrained, but sites like OhmyNews have shown that if you use pro-
fessional editors and writers as well, their contributions can be valuable. 
Where problems arise is when the use of non-professionals is seen by the 
paymasters of the mainstream media as a way to save money or, by new 
entrepreneurs as the way to set up a lucrative business without investing in 
skill. Robert Niles, editor of Online Journalism Review, comments scathingly: 
Perhaps this frenzy to create a ‘reporterless’ news publication is simply the 
logical extension of the disdain that many in news management have had 
for employing actual journalists over past decades. It’s the ultimate Wall 
Street fantasy — a newspaper without reporters (Niles 2007a).
Niles is not averse to the use of grassroots contribution to news publica-
tions, just to the lack of any professional journalistic or editorial leadership 
in such enterprises (Niles 2007a). Professional journalists themselves are 
concerned about the incursion of the amateur into their realm, and one can 
understand why: surgeons would be worried if members of the public with 
the skill to apply a band-aid or administer an aspirin decided they would 
like to carry out operations. Just because people can use a keyboard and 
9  Leader comment, ‘Who Killed the Newspaper’, The Economist, 24 August 2006.
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have an opinion does not give them journalism skills, though when they 
carry a camera phone and are in the right place at the right time, it can 
make them news photographers: the terrorist attacks on the London trans-
port system on 7 July 2005 were captured visually by hordes of bystand-
ers on camera phones and used extensively by the media. In a July 2005 
posting on his ‘Complete Tosh’ blog, Neil McFarlane, head of editorial 
development at Guardian Unlimited, has suggested that we stop using the 
term ‘citizen journalist’ and instead refer to such contributions as ‘citizen 
storytelling’. For Macfarlane, the desired aim is not a society with ‘‘citizen 
journalists’ overthrowing the professionals’, but an integrated ecology of 
news reporting in which ‘countless individual stories [are] told, and then 
highlighted when they happen to touch on a matter of mainstream inter-
est.’ For Robert Niles, this integrated ecology is actually a benefit for the 
mainstream, with readers and writers, professional and amateur, joined 
together in a news enterprise:
‘Citizen journalism’ provides professional reporters the chance to collect 
many more data points than they can on their own. And ‘mainstream media’ 
provide readers an established, popular distribution channel for the infor-
mation we have and can collect. Not to mention a century of wisdom on 
sourcing, avoiding libel and narrative storytelling technique. And our read-
ers don’t care. They just want the most complete, accurate and engaging 
coverage possible. They don’t know how we make the sausage, or even who 
makes it. They just want to eat (Niles 2007b).
3. Scale and Fine-tuning
The paperless, unbounded availability of vast and diverse news sources 
seems like a benefit to a world constantly hungry for news; but how do we 
cope with the volume? If we have seen everything we can find on a topic, 
are we well-informed? And how much is everything? One answer to deal-
ing with the flood is personalization: choosing only the sources or parts of 
sources that seem to match our interests. Either we can choose for ourselves 
what news we want to receive from whom, or regularly visited sites might 
learn our preferences from our behaviour and cater for us up front, much in 
the way that book sites like Amazon give us recommendations based on our 
past purchases. If we want to personalize our online news sources, we might 
set up RSS feeds permitting the user to collate and access a constantly updat-
ing stream of material from a web browser; or we might create a Google 
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personalized page integrating various news feeds with useful tools, includ-
ing calendars and calculators. RSS is the acronym for ‘Really Simple Syndica-
tion’, and establishing an RSS feed involves downloading a small program 
to a browser and then choosing the feeds. As described by The Times, ‘It’s like 
having a very efficient butler who cuts out the headlines of your favourite 
newspaper and serves them to you on a tray’.10 This could be the answer 
to controlling the volume, but what do we gain and what do we lose from 
this kind of targeted approach? We can receive information that matches our 
interests closely, but where we gain in precision, we lose in range: the degree 
of serendipity which may save each of us from tunnel vision. The beauty of 
a traditional paper newspaper is the opportunity to find out about things 
we did not know we were interested in. The seemingly random page layout 
is in fact well composed, with a balance of large and small items, images, 
and advertisements, and the opportunity for radial reading described by Jer-
ome McGann as ‘the most advanced, the most difficult, and the most impor-
tant form of reading because radial reading alone puts one in a position to 
respond actively to the text’s own (often secret) discursive acts’ (McGann 
1991: 116, 122). Lateral reading across, or constantly updated reading within, 
a space tailored to our individual tastes does not equate to this. And yet, the 
interesting thing is that such reader refinement or second-guessing has long 
characterized the kind of highly commodified text that newspapers represent 
in the alliances they forge between disparate items. Throughout modern his-
tory, the newspaper one read offered a shorthand expression of one’s politi-
cal colour, social standing and taste. Miscellaneous digests of news and opin-
ion, newspapers have long informed (shaped) our collective and individual 
consciousnesses. The instant expertise, based on the tactical deployment of 
the telling allusion, fact or statistic, which in so many areas is a promise of 
the sophisticated resources of an online world, was always implied in the 
newspaper’s model of knowledge transfer. Similarly, recent developments 
in e-text distribution, like Google’s selling of contextual advertising space 
wrapped around other people’s content, now extended to the marketing and 
distribution of e-books, are a direct development from newspaper econom-
ics. What has changed is the scale and the fine-tuning of the newspaper’s 
functions as its economies and its implied reading culture shift from paper to 
screen and as its conceptual model sets a standard for the electronic delivery 
of other textual forms than those associated with the news. 
10 ‘Times Online RSS Feeds’, Times Online, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/au-
dio_video/rss/ [accessed 8/10/2007].
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